FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER 1966

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

BERNARD B. FALL, Professor of International Relations, Howard University; a French citizen, he served in the French Underground in the war; author of six books on Indochina and Viet Nam, including "Street Without Joy," "The Two Viet-Nams" and "Viet-Nam Witness, 1953–1966" * * * *CHARLES W. YOST,* Senior Fellow on the permanent staff of the Council on Foreign Relations; Deputy U. S. Representative to the United Nations, 1961–66; former Ambassador to Laos, to Syria and to Morocco; author of "The Age of Triumph and Frustration" * * * *ERNEST A. GROSS,* recently chief counsel to Liberia and Ethiopia in the South West Africa case before the International Court of Justice; formerly Deputy U. S. Representative to the United Nations; Assistant Secretary of State, 1948 * * * *FRANK CHURCH,* U. S. Senator from Idaho, member of the Foreign Relations Committee * * * *ANDRE FONTAINE,* Foreign Editor of *Le Monde,* Paris; author of "Histoire de la Guerre Froide" * * * *KENNETH T. YOUNG,* President of the Asia Society, New York; Ambassador to Thailand, 1961–63; Deputy U. S. Representative at the Panmunjom talks, 1953–54; Director, Office of Southeast Asia Affairs, Department of State, 1954–58; member of postwar U. S. missions to Japan and Korea * * * *IAIN MACLEOD,* P. C., M. P., member of the British "Shadow Cabinet," with responsibility for Treasury and Economic Affairs; Minister of Health, 1952–55; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1959–61; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Leader of the House of Commons, 1961–63; Editor of *The Spectator,* 1963–65 * * * *ARTHUR P. MENDEL,* Professor of Russian History, University of Michigan; former Associate, Russian Research Center, Harvard University; author of "Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia" and other works * * * *RODERICK MacFARQUHAR,* Editor, *The China Quarterly,* London * * * *JOHN DIEBOLD,* President of the Diebold Group, Inc., management consultants; member of the Secretary of State's Advisory Group for Developing a Foreign Affairs Programming System * * * *WELLES HANGEN,* N.B.C. correspondent in Germany, 1963–65, now in Hong Kong; Carnegie Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 1965–66; former staff correspondent of *The New York Times;* author of "East Germany's Challenge to Russia and the West" * * * *CLAUDE RYAN,* Publisher and Editor of *Le Devoir,* Montreal; former National Secretary of Canadian National Action and President of the Canadian Institute of Adult Education.

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VIET NAM IN THE BALANCE

By Bernard B. Fall

IT may well be the opinion of future historians that the small but fierce engagements which in late 1965 pitted newly-arrived American troops against the *Chu-Luc* (Main Force) units of the Viet Cong and of North Viet Nam were the First Battle of the Marne of the Vietnamese War. The Battle of the Marne in September 1914 halted the seemingly irresistible onslaught of the Kaiser and thus foreclosed the possibility of an immediate end of the war through a collapse of the French; but the Great War, with its immense human and material losses, still ground on for four years and the enemy would often again come close to victory. The same happened in World War II before Moscow in the winter of 1941, or at Guadalcanal a few months later: no "turning point" as yet, but a halt to the runaway disaster.

In South Viet Nam, after being stopped at Chu-Lai, Plei-Mé and the Ia-Drang, the Communist regulars lost enough of their momentum for the time being not to be able to bring about the military and political collapse of the Saigon government late in 1965—a situation which would have altogether closed out the American "option" of the conflict. But just as at the Marne 52 years ago, or before Moscow a quarter-century ago, nothing had been decided as yet. Years—perhaps a decade—of hard fighting could still be ahead. And the political collapse of the government in Saigon is still a distinct possibility. It is, however, important to assess in detail the military and political elements on which this precarious balance rests and what *real* possibilities for manœuvre (as against wishful thinking on one side or party rhetoric on the other) exist at present in the Viet Nam situation.

II

On the American and South Vietnamese side, two main events dominated the scene between the first deployment of major

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American combat units in September 1965 and the Saigon government's attempt at providing itself with the beginnings of a representative base in September 1966: the government of Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, by surviving for more than one year, provided planners both in Saigon and Washington with a political "peg" on which to hang some of the reform programs deemed essential to any counter-insurgency effort worthy of the name; and also the increasing effort by the United States to shift the whole main burden of the war as far north as possible. The latter was being achieved by committing the bulk of the American forces to the Central Vietnamese mountain and coastal areas under the jurisdiction of the South Vietnamese II Corps, and by "raising," in the words of President Johnson, "the price of aggression" which North Viet Nam would have to pay for her participation in the war. What this meant became clear on June 29, 1966, when American bombers attacked oil storage depots within the city limits of Hanoi and Haiphong and unleashed an air offensive outstripping in intensity most of the bombing operations of World War II.[1]

The decisions which led to this situation were based on the clear realization in Washington that, earlier optimistic predictions to the contrary notwithstanding, the South Vietnamese were in the process of being defeated in an operation which was a carbon copy *not* of the French defeat of 1954 but of the Chinese Nationalist defeat on the mainland in 1948–49. And exactly as in the case of China, it was American prestige which now was at stake. Opposite views were strong even within the American military, however, where advisory support for friendly local ground troops was considered with favor over the commitment of large American ground forces. As late as August 1964, that viewpoint was clearly expounded as official policy in a pamphlet jointly issued by the State and Defense Departments, which explained the Viet Nam problem in question-and-answer form. The answer to the then hypothetical question as to why no American combat units were committed to Viet Nam reads in full as follows:

> The military problem facing the armed forces of South Viet Nam at this time is not primarily one of manpower. Basically it is a problem of acquiring training, equipment, skills, and organization suited to combating the type of

[1] According to Secretary of Defense McNamara, the 1966 "bombing plan" for Viet Nam involves an expenditure of 638,000 tons of aerial munitions. In comparison, the whole Pacific theater expended 600,000 tons throughout all of World War II.

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aggression that menaces their country. Our assistance is designed to supply these requirements.

The Viet Cong use terrorism and armed attack as well as propaganda. The Government forces must respond decisively on all appropriate levels, tasks that can best be handled by Vietnamese. U.S. combat units would face several obvious disadvantages in a guerrilla war situation of this type in which knowledge of terrain, language, and local customs is especially important. In addition, their introduction would provide ammunition for Communist propaganda which falsely proclaims that the United States is conducting a "white man's war" against Asians.[2]

That perceptive statement of the basic liabilities involved in using massive numbers of white troops is beyond doubt as true today as it was in 1964. One can, therefore, only guess at the sudden deterioration inside South Viet Nam—or the suddenness with which the worsening situation was finally perceived in Washington—which compelled the Administration to do in 1965 what it felt was unwise only six months earlier. But the decision was made to commit large American forces to the land battle as being the lesser of the two evils: 300,000 were in Viet Nam by September 1966, and another 100,000 could be there by the end of the current year.

The immediate net result of that American influx was that the brunt of the major encounters was now to be borne by the American troops instead of the South Vietnamese, just as on the other side infiltrated regular units of the People's Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) now assumed the larger part in engagements in the II Corps area and the northern section of III Corps. The argument that South Vietnamese forces still suffered heavy casualties—they suffered 11,000 dead and 21,600 wounded in 1965—must be modified to include the fact that the bulk of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) casualties are suffered passively, *i.e.* by units garrisoned in forts or ambushed on roads rather than engaged in offensive operations.[3] A 1965 net desertion rate of about 93,000 out of about 600,000 troops, which by all accounts further increased during the first half of 1966, also indicates that the ARVN has yet to become a stabilized force, let alone a diplomatically stabilizing factor in the way the South Korean Army became dur-

[2] Department of State Publication 7724 (Dept. of Defense, Gen.-8), *Viet Nam: The Struggle for Freedom.* Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964, p. 21.

[3] According to the *Weekly Summaries* prepared by the Department of Defense, the average number of ARVN-initiated battalion-size operations has slightly decreased over the past year while the number of Vietnamese under arms went from 493,000 to 640,000. At the same time, the number of U.S.-initiated battalion-size operations has trebled.

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ing the negotiations of 1952–53. How much indeed the war had become "American" is also shown by the relatively high casualties suffered by the U.S. combat forces in the field: out of a total of 240,000 troops in Viet Nam in the spring of 1966, about 50,000 at most were actual combat troops. Yet they had suffered, in less than one year, the bulk of America's 4,000 dead and 21,000 wounded. Losses of combat leaders were even more severe, as shown by statistics covering 1965 only, when it turned out that the officer death rate was 23 percent, as against 5 percent for U.S. Forces during the Korean and Second World Wars,[4] while the French officer death rate during the Indochina War amounted to about 3 percent.

On the civilian side, a thorough perusal of the testimony given by senior Administration officials before various Congressional committees shows that, like Abbé Sieyès during the French Revolution, the Saigon government had survived but had done little else besides. To be sure, some particularly optimistic observers already felt a year ago, a bare three months after Ky's rise to power, that "there is genuine enthusiasm generated by the imaginative programme worked out by [the government's] civilian advisers," and that "a social, economic, and political revolution" was finally under way.[5] The hard statistics and observed facts paint a somewhat different picture. Economically, the country experienced a 130 percent inflation in less than a year, which finally led to a strong devaluation of the South Vietnamese currency in an effort to keep prices from rising uncontrolledly. And while there are, as in the past, hopes of future improvement, they have as yet to materialize in Viet Nam for anyone who is not in the war-economy circuit—that is, working for the big building contractors who construct runways and bases, or, for instance, serving as a barmaid. Land reform has never gotten off the ground; there have been at least four distinct reforms, all of which stalled, over the past decade or so. While the Diem régime expropriated a total 457,000 hectares (2.47 acres per hectare) and the French Government gave South Viet Nam between 225,000 to 246,000 hectares of formerly privately French-owned land as early as 1958, only some 248,000 hectares have thus far been redistributed, according to a recent A.I.D. report,[6] *i.e.* the equivalent of the French-owned land. According to a recent American

[4] *The New York Times,* January 19, 1966.
[5] P. J. Honey, "Viet Nam Argument," *Encounter,* November 1965, p. 69.
[6] *Congressional Record,* March 10, 1966, p. 5328.

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observer who was an adviser in Viet Nam, much of the unredistributed land was kept under government control and "commonly put up for rent to the highest bidder."[7]

While it is obvious that the middle of a war is not the best place to start such reforms, it must be realized that in Viet Nam the choice no longer exists, for the reforms are as essential to success as ammunition for the howitzers—in fact, more so, because the failures of land reform create an almost hopeless vicious circle. With only 25 percent of the non-urban population under effective government control, a large mass of landless peasants stands to lose a great deal the day Saigon reëstablishes control over the countryside and thus restores the old tenant-landlord relationship, as invariably happened in the past wherever government troops reoccupied a given area. (In fact, in some such areas the landlords arrived in the supply trucks of the troops and some unit commanders could be persuaded to launch a clearing operation in an area where the returning landlords promised to share the proceeds with them.) Hence, the certitude of a genuinely "peasant-oriented" land reform, including a freeze on land holdings already distributed by the Viet Cong, would do more to change the allegiance of the peasantry than probably any other single counter-insurgency measure. And the much graver problem then arises as to whether the landlord-oriented leadership group in Saigon—regardless of whether it is made up of generals or medical doctors, as seems to be alternately the case—is *intellectually* capable of engineering that kind of revolution.

Finally, South Viet Nam must face up to political problems which, even in the absence of the Viet Cong insurgency, would leave it in the precarious position of the Dominican Republic a year ago. To blame the French colonial legacy for all the present ills has become a sort of ritual to which every writer in this field pays automatic homage. It does not, unfortunately, explain why North Viet Nam, similarly saddled with French colonial holdovers, does not suffer from administrative disintegration; nor does it explain how twelve years of extensive public-administration training in South Viet Nam—staffed and financed by America—has apparently made no dent in the problem. The reason is that South Viet Nam's ills are of a more fundamental nature.

Regionalism in Viet Nam is a fact of life which no amount of centralization can paper over. For some unfathomable reason,

[7] Stanley Andrews, "Red Tape and Broken Promises," *The Reporter*, May 5, 1966.

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the decision was made in 1954 to replace what was on the whole a well-decentralized administrative system[8] by a truly French-patterned, highly centralized administrative structure. More and more power was heaped on the fragile shoulders of Saigon's central bureaucracy, while such "natural" units of government as the region or the district were either abolished or lost all effective power. The village, which had been the real cradle of a Jeffersonian type of representative government in the country (the French found a well-operating local election system and, like all colonial powers, left village life to its own devices), was deprived of its elected officials by Ngo Dinh Diem's fiat in June 1956 and for the first time felt the full brunt of central arbitrariness and maladministration without the relative compensations of a rapidly improving economic situation. On a broader plane, the Hoa-Hao and Cao-Dai sects were in a state of more or less overt anti-Saigon dissidence until Diem's murder in November 1963, and those two sects number about 3,000,000 people between them and live over a vast area north and west of Saigon. The mountain tribesmen of the vast plateau area which covers almost 65 percent of South Viet Nam were the object of political and economic oppression which American experts as early as 1957 considered tantamount to genocide. They formed an organization known as FULRO (*Front Unifié de la Lutte des Races Opprimées*) which, like "Black Nationalism" in the United States, has pathetic overtones of a curses-on-both-your-houses attitude, and which resulted in two major rebellions quelled in the nick of time by well-liked American advisers who found themselves in the strange position of being honest brokers between two "Vietnamese" ethnic groups.

But by far the most serious regional problem is that of Buddhism and Catholicism. The term "regionalism" is used advisedly, for in South Viet Nam today Catholicism is largely associated with the North Vietnamese civilian refugees of that faith (almost 600,000 out of a total of 850,000), while Buddhism, though practiced lackadaisically throughout Viet Nam, finds its most fierce and tradition-bound adherents in the Central coastal area around the ancient imperial capital of Hué. People are rarely tolerant about their religion, and the Vietnamese possibly less tolerant than most. This, added to the fact that the Catholics, though only

[8] *Cf.* the little-known but excellent study by Vu Quoc Thong, "*La décentralisation administrative au Viet-Nam.*" Hanoi: Presses Universitaires, 1952.

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perhaps 11 percent of the population, were in power under Diem for almost a decade and that the ARVN's officers corps is over 50 percent Catholic to this day, would be sufficient to create an explosive situation anywhere. In Viet Nam, in the absence of a broadly accepted government, people of necessity must fall back on the *one* structure of society they can trust—their religion. It was a foregone conclusion, then, that the Buddhists would attempt to gain power, just as far smaller groups have previously done with great success.

The argument that perhaps the Buddhists are not "ready" to assume the reins of government is by-and-large irrelevant. After all, Buddhists as individuals—including Premier Ky, who is a North Vietnamese Buddhist—have been in positions of power all along. What is, however, true is that the Buddhist political organization in Saigon, grouped around the *Vien Hoa Dao* (Institute for the Implementation of the Dharma), has yet to find a political program which it can openly proclaim. That is meant in the literal sense of the term, for many of the Buddhists are known to be in favor of a negotiated solution to the war, but under presently-existing legislation any utterance to that effect is likely to earn its maker a prison term of up to five years. Not being able to stand openly on a platform of moderation or neutralism, the Buddhists are condemned to vague utterances about "social revolution," "true democracy" and other similarly noncommittal slogans. But that is not the kind of program likely to rally the war-weary Vietnamese 'round the flag for a supreme effort against the Viet Cong, or, for that matter, against Saigon. And perhaps the supreme refinement of the dilemma came last spring when the Central Vietnamese Buddhists were cornered by ARVN troops into abject surrender: at that time there were better than five North Vietnamese regular regiments in the I Corps area which, had the Buddhists and the mutinous 1st ARVN Division chosen to go over to their side, could have wreaked utter disaster in almost half of Viet Nam, with incalculable consequences in Washington and Saigon, not to speak of the rest of the world. But the Buddhists chose the likelihood of political destruction and the detention of their key political and military leaders by Premier Ky as against the highly speculative possibilities of entering into an alliance with the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.), the political arm of what is commonly called the Viet Cong.

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Yet the very extremism which the government of Premier Ky showed late in July 1966 when he suddenly resumed harping on a theme dear in 1964 to one of his predecessors, General Nguyen Khanh, "*Bac Tien!*" ("Let's March North!") may have a maturing influence not only on the Buddhist leaders but also on the moderate Catholics of Father Hoang Quynh and lead to an alliance between the two religious groups. This in turn could become a base of political power owing nothing either to an alien ideology or to the massive presence of foreign troops.

III

It is against this South Vietnamese backdrop of frustration and upheaval that the military effort which has been made over the past year now must be measured, and *not* simply against its own abstract yardsticks of increasing troops present, ammunition expended, enemy killed, "structures" destroyed, rice confiscated, weapons captured and weapons lost or acres of rice fields defoliated. Not that such indicators are wrong per se; but they are simply meaningless in terms of what is going on.

First of all, the war must be judged against its progress toward its initial objectives. If the objective was—as was contemplated in 1961—to "pacify" South Viet Nam with the help of an eighteen-month counter-insurgency plan, then the operation already has failed. This is also true if Viet Nam is judged against Secretary McNamara's target date, announced on October 2, 1963: "The major part of the United States military task [in Viet Nam] can be completed by the end of 1965." If the next set of objectives was to nip the rising insurgency in South Viet Nam merely with an increased American advisory effort and perhaps with the "antiseptic" help of American-manned airplanes and naval craft, that policy failed in 1964. The same can be said of such tactical measures as the bombing of North Viet Nam. It first was explained as a retaliatory measure against a guerrilla attack on the American base at Pleiku, then as a measure designed to cut off the flow of North Vietnamese manpower and supplies to the insurgents, and, finally, as simply a political measure designed to bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table.[9] Since it was clearly admitted that the retaliatory aspect of the raids was at best a temporary rationale, only the two other criteria need to be judged. Secretary McNamara, in explaining the bombing of the

[9] Secretary McNamara's press conference of June 29, 1966.

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storage depots near the former Hanoi and Haiphong "sanctuaries," stated that during the previous year of bombing Communist supply deliveries had increased by 150 percent and troop infiltration by 120 percent, and President Johnson, two days later at Omaha, stated that what hitherto had been jungle trails had in many places become fully motorable "boulevards."

Obviously, then, as with operations "Strangle" and "Choke" in Korea 15 years ago, air operations failed to effect decisive results in spite of a 1965 bomb tonnage (255,000 tons) far exceeding what had ever been used before on so small a target area. As for the political effectiveness of the air operations, the record is plain: more intransigence from Hanoi and a gradual increase in the Russian commitments to Hanoi, at least in the field of air defense.

All this could well delineate the conditions for a stalemate, were it not for the fact that, contrary to what happened in Korea, the American build-up in Viet Nam is at the present moment open-ended. Neither budgetary nor manpower ceilings seem to have been arrived at and whatever limitations there are appear to be imposed more by the difficulties of finding suitable deployment areas and logistical support facilities than by a lack of will in Washington to provide massive reinforcements. Even so, manpower requirements are likely to become extensive this autumn: by late September, about 165,000 men now in Viet Nam will have fulfilled their one-year tour; that, added to the 400,000-man strength considered desirable for the end of 1966, would mean that at least a quarter-million new troops must be moved to Southeast Asia fairly rapidly.

All this, of course, is perfectly feasible for the United States, and so are the many "search-and-destroy" and spoiling operations which are said to have prevented the Viet Cong from launching a "monsoon offensive." (Ironically enough, the North Vietnamese claim that the American "dry-season 'counteroffensive' " had likewise met with failure.)[10] Enemy losses are heavy, and may well reach 60,000 dead this year; but the present infiltration rate may match this, and local recruitment inside South Viet Nam still amounts to 3,500 men a month, while the total number of Viet Cong and PAVN forces rose over the past year from 110,000 men to 270,000. The present American pincer operations, with their net results of a few hundred enemy killed in return for

[10] *Viet Nam Courier* (Hanoi), Nos. 60 and 61, May 26 and June 2, 1966.

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a commitment of often more than 10,000 troops for ten days, are by and large no more efficient than similarly large French operations were (the French using paratroop battalions where the United States uses helicopter-borne units). They are unlikely to achieve gains of strategic importance until a troop saturation ratio is attained which permits the permanent reoccupation of cleared areas in strengths which deter attack. Expert advocates of such tactics, notably Hanson W. Baldwin, feel that they can be the only logical conclusion of present policies and estimate that one million American troops would provide for an adequate saturation ratio. Interestingly enough, that view is likewise shared by the opposition. In an interview granted in January 1965 by the Chairman of the Liberation Front, Nguyen Huu Tho, he made the cogent point that "it is not bombs and artillery that win wars; it is infantry that can occupy territory."[11]

Let us then reconstruct the military-political landscape which the Communist planners in Hanoi or in the N.L.F.'s jungle headquarters might see before them. In spite of severe casualties, their troops and underground administrative structure have held on to much of what they held last year and, with minor tactical adjustments, they are still capable of attacking. Aerial bombardment, north as well as south, hurts but has yet to cut deeply into their supply and replacement system (they have Secretary McNamara's word for it). The American ground effort has foreclosed the chances of a headlong rush to victory, but is not yet of a size to make a Communist defeat certain. Saigon, for all the beautiful plans on paper, has yet to come through with effective reforms. And abroad, the dark outlines of more massive Soviet help (with a concomitant Russo-American worsening of relations) appear discernible.

If the Communist interpretation of the situation is *anywhere* near this estimate, as it is very likely to be, then it can be easily seen why both Hanoi and the N.L.F. would be highly reluctant to accept negotiations which offer them literally nothing but the complete and permanent dismantling of the whole South Vietnamese Communist apparatus in exchange for a minor share in an economic development plan which contemplates a total expenditure equivalent to the cost to the United States of fifteen days of war in South Viet Nam. Much depends, then, on whether

[11] Wilfred Burchett, "Viet Nam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War." New York: International Publishers, 1965, p. 240.

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Hanoi and the guerrillas in the south view the development of the war *exactly* in the same light, for the sacrifices they are expected to make at the conference table, as well as, for the time being, on the firing line, are of an entirely different nature.

IV

A major part of the whole Viet Nam argument revolves around a clear identification of the character of the enemy—for it is that identification which pins the label of "aggressor" on North Viet Nam (and thus justifies military action against it) or, conversely, makes the conflict largely a civil war, with the United States as the major foreign "interventionist."

A recent issue of *Foreign Affairs* presented an unusually well-argued and sophisticated case for the first view.[12] But precisely because it is so well argued, it unconsciously presents some of the arguments for the opposite viewpoint as well. And since it is almost impossible to discuss the possible rational outcomes of the Viet Nam situation as long as the true character of the adversary is in doubt—it is this writer's own belief that it lies somewhere between the two extremes presented above—the nature of the Viet Cong must be explored further before it can be definitively dismissed as "faceless."

It can be conceded in advance that any Communist member of the National Liberation Front in South Viet Nam is likewise a member of the *Lao Dong,* the Vietnamese Communist Party, and that North Viet Nam, which had without a shred of doubt won the war against France in 1954, fully expected to gain control of South Viet Nam as well either by the elections slated for July 1956 or at a later date. I am, however, inclined to doubt that Hanoi's decision to intervene in South Vietnamese affairs was prompted by any "increasing disparity between political life north and south." For it became obvious even to the blindest of optimists that, unfortunately, the political lives of both Viet Nams, far from becoming "disparate," began to resemble each other as only two extremes can, with their gradual falsification of representative processes and, finally, with their concentration camps and persecution of religious groups. The existence of a "Central Reunification Department" in Hanoi of which much is made is surely revelatory of something—until one becomes aware that West Germany, for example, has a Ministry for All-German

[12] George A. Carver, Jr., "The Faceless Viet Cong," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1966.

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Affairs to which, of course, East Germany and the Soviets ascribe equally sinister motives, even though it can be safely assumed that the *Ministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen* is more innocuous than any Hanoi committee with the same purpose.

It is likewise very much open to question that the intervention of Hanoi was first evidenced by a terror campaign directed against small South Vietnamese officials. In actual fact, Diem began to become oppressive as early as January 1956, when a concentration camp ordinance (No. 6 of January 11, 1956) gave the régime almost unchecked power to deal with the opposition—and the non-Communist opposition, least inured to clandestine operations, was hit hardest. It took until May 1966 for a U.S. Government agency, the Public Affairs Office in Saigon, to state candidly what was a well-known fact all along—to wit, that some of the so-called "political-religious" sects provided the hard core of the early opposition:

> . . . Ten of the eleven [Cao-Dai] sub-sects had opposed Diem, and their leadership fled to Cambodia or went into hiding. . . . The members of the other ten sects made up the bulk of the early NLF support, although the alliance was at all times an uneasy one . . .
> . . . The [Hoa-Hao] sect in 1952 formed the Social Democratic Party as its political arm. It too challenged Diem, and its armies were smashed by ARVN in 1956. Like the Cao Dai, it was an early and major participant in the NLF, . . .
> . . . The third of the esoteric sects of Viet Nam, the Binh Xuyen, which was also smashed by Diem, also worked with the NLF in its early days.[13]

The decision by Diem—probably his most pregnant in terms of its future consequences—to abolish elected village government in June 1956 (again before the July 1956 election deadline, at a time when the Communists were on their best behavior) did the rest. The hated appointees became a prime target for local resentment and by March 1958 over 400 had been murdered by guerrillas who indeed, as Carver points out, "harped on local issues and avoided preaching Marxist doctrine." When it is remembered that there were enough "local issues" around to cause the South Vietnamese Army itself to try at least three times to murder Diem, it becomes understandable why South Viet Nam appeared to Hanoi ripe for plucking. In other words, there can be no doubt but that Hanoi, or even South Vietnamese stay-behind Communist elements, took advantage of Saigon's glaring weak-

[13] U.S. Mission in Viet Nam, JUSPAO Planning Office, *A Note on the Vietnamese Sects*, May 1966, p. 2–3.

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nesses after 1959. But the Communists can hardly be held responsible for the incredible stupidity of the Diem régime and the somewhat surprising blindness to its faults of its American advisers. And it is equally hard to deny that there was plenty of motivation *inside* South Viet Nam, on the left as well as on the right, for a revolutionary explosion.

The next point which requires clarification is *not* whether the insurgency in South Viet Nam is abetted, directed and aided from North Viet Nam (it is to a large extent), but whether such outside controls preclude the existence of *real* objectives which are specifically those of the insurgents rather than of their external sponsors. Here, the recent British revelations as to the truly enormous extent of the control of the French Resistance in France by the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.)—the 1940–1946 British equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency—shows what is meant. According to the now-published official history of S.O.E. in France, "till 1944 the British had a virtual monopoly over all of de Gaulle's means of communications with France," and the French "could not introduce a single agent or a single store" without Allied permission and help, and "anything [they] planned with marked political implications was liable to be vetoed by any of the three major Western allies." Yet, having substantiated exactly what both the Vichy French and the Nazis had said all along, *i.e.* that the French Resistance was nothing but an "Anglo-Saxon conspiracy" and the resisters (this writer included) nothing but foreign agents, the official history makes the key point: "All these victories by and through resistance forces in France had a common basis: overwhelming popular support."[14]

The hard historical facts which emerge from the French Resistance and which appear to apply to the Viet Cong are (a) that in spite of overwhelming technical control by the Allies, de Gaulle succeeded in winning political and military loyalty among the diverse guerrilla forces in France, and (b) that even de Gaulle's own views and desires had to accommodate themselves to those developed by the internal resistance in its four-year fight, in which it bore the brunt of the struggle and suffered the bulk of the losses. The differences of view between Viet Cong leaders who have now been in the fight for six years (and some of them for twenty!) and the Hanoi theoreticians and conven-

[14] M.R.D. Foot, "SOE in France." London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966, p. xix, 33, and 442–443, *passim.*

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tional military commanders go in many cases far beyond normal internecine party struggles or mere tactical disagreements.

A glance at factual examples is interesting: there have been three changes of N.L.F. secretaries-general at times when Hanoi was in the throes of no purge whatsoever. There was the N.L.F. five-point manifesto of March 22, 1965, whose "jungle version" was rebroadcast later by Hanoi with 39 extensive amendments or text changes, softening some of the N.L.F. statements. There were the spontaneous reactions of N.L.F. leaders when faced with respected Western observers on neutral ground, openly explaining why they disagreed with the "narrow-minded commissars in Hanoi." And there is the fact that while the United States and Hanoi are now officially wedded to a return to a Geneva-type conference (and, presumably, its two-year election clause), the N.L.F. has thus far left Geneva out of its program, preferring a flexible formula of eventual reunification in negotiated stages.

It is easy to dismiss those differences as being mere camouflage (after all, some people believe that the Sino-Soviet split is nothing but a grand deception foisted on the easily-fooled West) and to believe the N.L.F. is indeed nothing but "a contrived political mechanism with no indigenous roots," as Carver avers. But in that case, the 220,000 Viet Cong who fight side-by-side with 50,000 PAVN regulars, and who over the past three years are said to have suffered almost 100,000 dead and 182,000 wounded, fight rather well for what must be a vast mass of remote-controlled and force-drafted recruits. Otherwise, desertion would be just as easy on the Viet Cong side as it is on the ARVN side, but thus far the V.C. desertion rate simply seems to keep pace with the increase of manpower on the Communist side.

That leaves, lastly, the argument of "facelessness": the N.L.F. leaders are men of little stature in their own society; they are unknowns. But four years ago only a few Vietnamese military men knew who General Ky was, and no one thought of him even two years ago as being of presidential timber. Clandestineness is not attractive to the sort of men who are national figures: aside from Jugoslavia's Marshal Tito, it takes real expertise to recall the names of European resistance leaders. In any case, N.L.F. propaganda has seen to it that its leaders should not remain anonymous: at least forty senior leaders' biographies have been published, along with their photos.[15] Their background shows the

[15] Commission for Foreign Relations of the NLF, *Personalities of the South Viet Nam Liberation Movement*, n.d. [1963], 44 pp.

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normal social background of Vietnamese leadership in general, from medical doctors and pharmacists, to lawyers and even army officers (though the sprinkling of Montagnards and women is more typical of the likewise classic "united front" picture). And they have one remarkable common characteristic which thus far no Saigon government has been able to match: they are all from south of the seventeenth parallel.

None of the foregoing justifies Hanoi's claim that the N.L.F. should be the "sole legitimate voice of the South Vietnamese people." But nothing justifies the opposite claim either, to the effect that without Hanoi's full support, the N.L.F. would disappear into thin air like a desert mirage. There can indeed be no quarrel with Carver's statement that "the Viet Cong organization is unquestionably a major factor in the South Vietnamese political scene." In that case, however, it must be treated as what it is—a political force in South Viet Nam which cannot be simply blasted off the surface of the earth with B-52 saturation raids, or told to pack up and go into exile to North Viet Nam.

There is one further consideration which argues against the likelihood of Hanoi being able (assuming it were willing, and it does not seem to be) to turn off the southern guerrilla movement like a water tap: Hanoi has, since March 1946, made four separate deals with the West at the expense of the South Vietnamese. The French-Vietnamese accords of March 6, 1946, provided for a Vietnamese "free state with its own government, armed forces and foreign relations" but left South Viet Nam proper (*i.e.* Cochin China) under French control and, as it turned out, severe anti-Viet Minh repression. The French-Vietnamese *modus vivendi* signed by Ho Chi Minh in Paris, September 14, 1946, further confirmed this seeming "abandonment" of the South. In the Geneva Accords of July 1954, it was South Viet Nam which was left to the tender mercies of the Diem régime for at least two years, and we have Nguyen Huu Tho's own word in an interview with Wilfred Burchett to the effect that "there were mixed feelings about the two-years' delay over reunification." And when neither Hanoi nor Peking (nor the Soviet Union) made strong representations against dropping elections in 1956, it must have become obvious to even the most obtuse pro-Hanoi elements south of the seventeenth parallel that the North Vietnamese Communists are somewhat unreliable allies.

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V

These are simple historical facts, not extrapolations of obscure paragraphs in three-hour speeches of Communist leaders. They make it somewhat difficult to explain by the tenets of the all-out "aggression" theory why the same Communist leaders (in Hanoi and at least Peking) should have chosen in 1958 to fight a highly risky guerrilla war in preference to trying to win South Viet Nam by a bitter political fight in 1956 (a call to the U.N. or for the reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference, or for the interpretation of the Agreements by the International Court of Justice; or simply by a vast propaganda offensive).[16] The fact of repeated abandonment goes a long way to explain why North Viet Nam is somewhat reluctant to come to the conference table: Washington has sometimes seemed to feel that a sudden convening at a conference table might well bring about the collapse of the South Vietnamese government's spirit of resistance, for the South Vietnamese as a people know only too well what their military posture would be without all-out American help. But, vice versa, in view of past performance, *any* peace conference in which Hanoi would once more speak for the southern insurgent elements and in the absence of their own full representation would raise among the Viet Cong the spectre of yet a fifth sellout of the southern guerrillas. Other countries too have "credibility gaps."

Yet it is precisely that symmetrical weakness which, in this writer's view, opens new perspectives on how to approach the Viet Nam problem as a whole. And while lapidary formulations have in the past been more confusing than helpful, it would perhaps be useful to say that a major attempt must be made to "politicize" rather than to further "militarize" the Vietnamese conflict and to treat it as what it really is—a local conflict with outside support which has gotten out of hand, not the Stalingrad or El-Alamein of a worldwide cold-war confrontation.

There is no more reason to believe that a free-world "victory" in Viet Nam is going to deter other revolutionary guerrilla wars than there was to have hoped that the Kaiser's defeat in World War I would teach Nazism a useful lesson in 1938; or to have ex-

[16] It is totally forgotten today by those who support the "unilateral-aggression" theory that North Viet Nam on March 7 and December 22, 1958, addressed two long notes to President Diem conceding the temporary division of the country and offering a 4-point program involving interzonal trade, travel and nonaggression. Saigon refused to reply to the notes.

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pected that Communist guerrilla setbacks in Greece, Azerbaijan, the Philippines, Malaya or the Congo would "teach" guerrillas something in Cuba, Venezuela, Laos, Burma, Thailand or South Viet Nam. If it "teaches" them anything at all, it may well be this: that unless the local régime undertakes a measure of true reforms, even the hugest military power in the world can be successfully stalemated for a long period of time by lightly-armed peasant guerrillas and the infantry of a tiny underdeveloped country. That point might well be left somewhat less substantiated than it has recently been.

In that case, the present balance, including the American and PAVN forces in South Viet Nam, can be used to establish a political starting point from which to approach the whole problem anew, perhaps along the following lines:

1. Make the Saigon government and the Liberation Front leaders the center of all future negotiations, with the United States and North Viet Nam in a back-up position, just as was the case with the Laotian factions and third powers at the Geneva Conference of 1961–62. (It will be recalled that the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina was a *military* cease-fire conference, like Panmunjom in Korea.)

2. Have the United States restate in less prolix language the promises contained in the State Department's 14-Point Declaration of January 1966, notably with regard to the non-permanence of American bases in South Viet Nam and the disengagement of *both* Viet Nams; and have this declaration filed with the United Nations as proof of good faith.

3. Prepare the Saigon government forcefully and publicly—just as Premier Ky informed the United States of his desire to carry the ground war to North Viet Nam—for the coming *political* contest with a well-organized native left-wing minority which can neither be evacuated nor exterminated. (*Vide,* France and Italy in 1945–47 having to face the stark fact of heavily-armed Communist ex-partisan forces, which to this day in 1966 have not really surrendered all their weapons.)

4. Encourage Liberation Front leaders to commit themselves to specifically *South* Vietnamese political and economic options in preference to North Vietnamese desires (again as was the case of the West European Communists in the early 1950s, in relation to Moscow) in exchange for a legal participation in the political life of the country.

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5. Encourage the eventual creation of a "piastre common market" (as advocated two years ago by Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia) which would include North Viet Nam and thus satisfy its legitimate desire for contacts outside the Communist world, but which would include 26,000,000 people from non-Communist states as against North Viet Nam's 19,000,000. Postwar international organizations—even the Warsaw Pact—have shown that small strong-willed countries succeed far better in holding their own within such organizations, even when they include a large predatory country, than they can individually.

6. On the basis of President Johnson's Baltimore speech, restate and expand the idea of a flexible area-wide rehabilitation program, taking into account the immensely increased destruction which has taken place since last year. Include proposals for political normalization, such as those which the United States implemented in Germany and Japan, Britain in Israel, and France in Algeria. In that case, Viet Nam could set the pattern of a détente applicable to other divided countries as well.

None of the above is likely to produce a miracle cure for South Viet Nam's ills. If Saigon is still grimly determined to botch its land reform or to falsify its elections, not even a million American troops can stop it from doing so. Of course those troops at least could crush the opposition even if it were at the price of which Tacitus spoke when he said of the Romans in Britain, "You have made this a desolation and you call it peace."

It would indeed be a pity if so much ingenuity, diplomacy, blood and treasure should have been spent on trying to persuade Hanoi to abandon the insurgents in South Viet Nam, without a solid attempt ever having been made at getting the insurgents to modify their relationship with Hanoi in return for a specifically South Vietnamese solution that could be as honorable all around as it would be realistic. The only alternative to such an approach would be a further escalation both in terms of battleground and participating countries. And if Munich is not a good example of how to settle the Vietnamese conflict, neither is Guernica, or Sarajevo.

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THE UNITED NATIONS: CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE AND WILL

By Charles W. Yost

AMAZEMENT and concern are often expressed these days that the United Nations seems unable or unwilling to "do anything" about Viet Nam. What is the Security Council for, it is asked, if not to stop wars? If the Council is blocked by a veto, why does not the General Assembly act? Yet neither apparently will even discuss Viet Nam.

The history and limitations of the United Nations are not always well understood. Americans forget that we collaborated with the Soviet Union in writing into the Charter severe restrictions on the powers of the Security Council, and that we have of late publicly shared with our West European and Latin American friends apprehension that new "swirling" Afro-Asian majorities in the General Assembly might drag us into adventures against our interest. A narrow mandate conferred on the United Nations, if sauce for the goose, has to be sauce for the gander too.

In 1945 the Security Council was conceived as the all-powerful peacekeeping instrument of Five Great Powers acting together but capable only of procedural action and ineffectual debate if one of the Five dissented. At the same time, the Assembly was conceived not at all as a world legislature—perish the thought!—but as a vehicle of parliamentary or multilateral diplomacy, able to recommend what could be negotiated among the requisite majority but unable to decide or enforce.

What is really astonishing is the amount of effective work the two bodies have been able to do. The Council, in the absence by chance of a permanent member, mobilized an international army against an aggressor in Korea and subsequently has authorized and supervised military operations not only between but inside sovereign states, with their consent. The Assembly set up and has ever since maintained a substantial peacekeeping presence at Suez, and has nursed and prodded disarmament negotiations as far as the Five Powers would tolerate and sometimes further than they would like.

At the present moment, however, the United Nations is seriously weakened by the consequences of the Article 19 crisis. In that case the United States, from the noblest of motives, on

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reasonable legal grounds, but with considerable political recklessness and imperfect perception of its own real interests, asserted the Assembly's right and duty to tax all members to pay for all peacekeeping operations. The worthy objective was to provide the U.N. with the substantial resources necessary for effective peacekeeping. The obstacle was the refusal of the Soviet Union and France to pay for an operation in the Congo of which they strongly disapproved and which the Soviets considered to have been directed at least in part against themselves. There was a certain U.S. disingenuousness in ignoring the fact that, should the shoe be on the other foot, Congress would be unlikely to appropriate funds to support an operation which it felt was directed against American interests. The critical U.S. miscalculation, however, was in imagining that the majority of U.N. members, no matter how strongly they believed in U.N. peacekeeping and "collective financial responsibility," would humiliate two great powers by depriving them of their vote and thus, in the majority's view, risk breaking up the organization. The consequence of pressing the issue so hard and so long was to arouse everyone's apprehension about various aspects of U.N. peacekeeping and at least temporarily to destroy the large measure of consensus on the subject which had been gradually and painfully worked out.

The fact is that the United Nations is itself an anomaly, because it is an international organization with theoretically far-reaching authority superimposed on radically unequal but equally sovereign states. Hence, its real power and effectiveness fluctuate wildly depending on the climate of international relations and its own internal temperature. The authority, absolute and relative, of the Security Council and the General Assembly, because of the Article 19 affair and for other reasons, is in the process of painful reappraisal at the moment. It is a good time to examine the health of the two bodies and attempt to determine what confidence or hope can realistically be placed in each of them.

II

Article 24 of the U.N. Charter says: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."

The Soviet Union has always slurred over the first clause of this provision, which specifies that the purpose of conferring this

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responsibility on the Council is "to ensure prompt and effective action." It has also tended to define the word "primary" as synonymous with "sole" and, while admitting that the Assembly could debate problems involving peace and security, has insisted that action in this field could be taken only by the Council. It has, moreover, at least theoretically held that every military operation initiated by the Council should be directed by the Military Staff Committee, of which it is a member, acting of course unanimously.

There is little point in displaying moral indignation at this conservative and restrictive interpretation of the Charter. The fact is that the U.S.S.R. has, except on questions of decolonization and "imperialism" where it gleefully and sanctimoniously joins the Afro-Asian majority, been very substantially in the minority in both the Council and the Assembly since the establishment of the United Nations. The Western powers have (once again except in colonial and some economic questions) usually been able to mobilize majorities in both bodies for action or exhortation they desired. In its view, which seems not implausible, the only way the Soviet Union could protect its interests was the veto.

What has been most aggravating to other members has been the Soviet habit of using the veto in protection not only of its own interests but also those of states with which it wished to curry favor, such as India or the Arabs. On the other hand, since it is obviously one of the primary aims of Soviet foreign policy to influence and lead the underdeveloped world, it has in practice increasingly refrained from blocking Council action, even to the extent of limited military operations directed by the Secretary-General, if and when such action or operations were clearly desired by the Afro-Asian states. United Nations intervention in Cyprus and the India-Pakistan war, and even the later anti-Tshombe phase of the Congo operation, fell within this rubric and demonstrated a limited but welcome degree of great-power coöperation in the Council. Rather ominously, however, in the India-Pakistan case, both the U.S.S.R. and France, after joining in calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal and charging the Secretary-General to observe them, immediately objected to the scale on which he did so and insisted that both direction and financing of the operation be subjected, in a manner contrary to established practice, to very strict Council scrutiny and control.

The France of de Gaulle is basically skeptical of the value of in-

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ternational organizations, except those of a cultural character propagating the French language, the logic of Descartes and the rhetoric of Racine. With its bias toward rugged national individualism, the French Government is attracted by Article 2 (7) of the Charter: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." France since 1958 has often given the impression it believes this clause outweighs all the other provisions of the Charter.

Nevertheless, France too cannot be wholly indifferent to the interests and desires of its friends and of the Third World. While it is as categorical as the Soviet Union in insisting on the quasi-exclusive responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of peace and security, it rarely vetoes, just as it rarely supports, executive action by the Council, and very often ends up in a lonely abstention which would be embarrassing to any government less indifferent to isolation than de Gaulle's. Of course, the French Government is no more irrevocably wedded to consistency than any other and is quite capable, as in the Dominican case, of pressing zealously for a degree of United Nations intervention which it has in most previous cases held to be wholly improper.

The United States fully supports the view that the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and favors resort to it, in preference to the General Assembly or any other international body, whenever a threat to the peace occurs. The United States has, however, four reservations in regard to Council powers and functions.

First, it emphasizes the word "primary" in Article 24 and insists that the Assembly has a residual responsibility when the Council is unable to act because of the veto or for any other reason. This widely shared view has since 1951 been implemented by the "Uniting for Peace" procedure whereby under certain circumstances an issue is carried automatically from the Council to the Assembly. The second United States reservation relates to the application by the Council of Chapter VII of the Charter, which provides for a formal "determination" that a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression exists, and a decision as to what enforcement measures to take to restore peace. The U.S. Government seeks to avoid, except in the gravest circumstances, the application of sanctions, in the wisdom and effectiveness of

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which it has little confidence. This reservation has, to the intense annoyance of the African nations, governed our attitude toward Chapter VII action on apartheid in South Africa and on Portuguese territories in Africa, as well as on Rhodesia until its unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965. The third United States reservation about the powers of the Council relates to our view that only the Assembly has the right to assess members for peacekeeping or any other expenses, though recommendations from the Council to the Assembly on such matters may be appropriate. The fourth reservation concerns our insistence that the Secretary-General, if he is designated by the Council to conduct an operation, be given sufficient authority and discretion to do so effectively.

The United Kingdom and other Western European states, together with Canada, Australia and New Zealand, share our views about the primacy of the Security Council but many of them, while not excluding it, are less enthusiastic about residual resort to the Assembly when the Council is immobilized by a veto. This coolness arises partly from a more persistent inclination on their part to come to terms with the Soviet Union and France, and partly from a lingering resentment at the prolonged anti-colonial vituperation to which many of them have been subjected in the Assembly. It stems more particularly, however, from the fear that the new Assembly majority might involve them in prejudicial crusades in southern Africa or Asia. They show an increasing tendency, therefore, to keep the focus of action in the Council, even when this means, as it recently seems to, that there will be very little action at all.

The Latin American attitude is similar to that of the West Europeans. To the extent they judge multilateral peacekeeping necessary or desirable in this hemisphere—and some of them have serious reservations on this score—their preferred instrument is the Organization of American States. They have joined in resisting Soviet efforts to use the Council to circumscribe United States policy and action vis-à-vis Cuba. On the other hand, some of them have not been averse to availing themselves of the U.N. platform to denounce U.S. "imperialism." In the Dominican case the two Latin American Council members split, Bolivia upholding our view that the problem should be left to the O.A.S., while Uruguay attacked United States intervention and supported an active United Nations presence as a monitor

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on the U.S. and O.A.S. forces. The Latin American members of the Council do not normally display deep concern with Council business outside the Western Hemisphere, though they have usually endorsed U.S. initiatives and have on occasion supplied troops, diplomats and officers to assist in U.N. peacekeeping.

The attitude of the Afro-Asian states toward the Security Council is ambivalent. Their recognition of its importance is demonstrated by their successful campaign to expand its membership from eleven to fifteen, thereby increasing their own representation to five, or one-half of the non-permanent members. In light of the presence of two Communist states, it will henceforth be virtually impossible for the Council to act by the constitutional majority of nine votes without the concurrence of at least some Afro-Asian members. Moreover, particularly since the Article 19 crisis, they have increasingly felt the necessity of great-power agreement on fundamental issues, particularly in the field of peacekeeping, and have plausibly assumed that this could best be found in the Security Council.

At the same time, most of them being small or middle-sized states vulnerable to attack by larger or more aggressive neighbors, they have traditionally been among the strongest proponents of an effective U.N. peacekeeping capability and of a resort to the Assembly under "Uniting for Peace," if the Council were immobilized on such an issue. They have, moreover, been increasingly disillusioned by the refusal of the Council majority to take radical action on the problems about which they feel most deeply, particularly those in southern Africa, and have therefore recently tended to concentrate their efforts on those issues in the Assembly where their numbers enable them to obtain sweeping declamatory resolutions, even though such resolutions are unenforceable.

Before concluding consideration of the Security Council, we may revert for a moment to the Council's refusal to deal with Viet Nam. Why has this been so?

In August 1964 occurred the so-called Tonkin Gulf incident in which American destroyers were attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. In accordance with its customary practice, the United States immediately brought this issue before the Council. At that point the Soviet delegation proposed, and the United States agreed, that North Viet Nam, as a party to the dispute, be represented during the Council proceedings or otherwise present its views to the Council. Hanoi, however, cate-

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gorically refused to attend and publicly rejected U.N. jurisdiction in the incident. Peking went further and denied U.N. jurisdiction over any aspect of the Indochina conflict. Since it thereafter became clear that the Soviet Union would veto any draft resolution which might be submitted to the Council and that further proceedings were consequently futile, the case was dropped.

Subsequently the Secretary-General sought repeatedly and in vain to find means, either in or outside the U.N., whereby the conflict might be ended. Throughout 1965 the United States consulted repeatedly with him and with all members of the Security Council with a view to ascertaining whether and how the issue might usefully be brought before the U.N. In each case our delegation was advised by all concerned that Hanoi and Peking would clearly continue to oppose U.N. jurisdiction as long as they were not U.N. members, that the Soviets would consequently veto any Council action and that in these circumstances it would be useless to raise the issue.

Nevertheless, after the United States had exhausted all other possibilities of negotiation during its prolonged bombing pause in January 1966, it did bring the issue formally to the Council, frankly with little hope of success but at least to demonstrate to opinion at home and abroad that no stone was being left unturned in the search for peace. The result was as expected. The Soviet delegation strongly opposed the inscription of the item on the agenda and, having demonstrated that even this procedural point was a cold-war issue, was able to persuade France and the three African members to abstain in the vote, so that the United States was barely able to obtain the required majority for inscription.

Thereafter the Japanese President of the Council, Ambassador Matsui, labored long and diligently but quite vainly to obtain some constructive result. It was impossible, in the absence of some agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., even to persuade the members to meet again on the subject since they feared a violent debate in which they might be unable to avoid taking sides. When the President finally concluded proceedings by a letter to members in which he suggested there was at least consensus in favor of reconvening the Geneva Conference, the Soviet delegation, which had insisted that only this Conference could deal with the issue, scolded him for implying that any consensus existed. So the effort ended in frustration.

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III

Where do these conflicting policies and practices leave the Security Council as the "primary" instrument of the United Nations, and perhaps of the world community, for the maintenance of international peace and security?

First, the Council has of course demonstrated that it can act effectively when the great powers are in agreement, even if that agreement is partial and precarious. The Council brought the India-Pakistan war to an end and assumed a contingent responsibility for the removal of its causes, even though it was unable to agree on subsequent steps, in part because the Soviet Union saw and seized the opportunity to mediate unilaterally. The Council authorized and sustained the major phases of the Congo operation, despite Soviet, French and British disagreement with important aspects of it. A United Nations force has been maintained for two and a half years in Cyprus at the Council's direction, and war between Greece and Turkey averted.

On the other hand, issues involving great-power confrontation are either withheld from the Council by common consent, as in the case of Berlin, or brought in primarily for psychological or preëmptive purposes without the expectation of substantial United Nations action, as in the case of Cuba or Viet Nam. All members are extremely reluctant to render judgment on major disputes between states—first, because each party has its friends which support it and, second, because judgment may imply enforcement. Most members, as was shown during the India-Pakistan war, shrink from the application of enforcement measures against a sovereign state, even from a formal determination that a threat to peace exists, except in direst circumstances. Western and Communist states join in their reluctance to apply sanctions, except to each other, and the neutralist nations prevent their application in East-West confrontations.

New impediments have emerged and old ones have been given new life since the Article 19 crisis. While it is true that there has been a revival of efforts to use the Security Council in preference to other machinery and to seek assiduously for great-power agreement, the Soviet Union and France, while of course welcoming this trend, have shown little corresponding disposition to make concessions in order that Council machinery can work. On the contrary, with apprehensions aroused and tempers frayed by the

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crisis, they manifested during the India-Pakistan affair a determination to check the creeping effectiveness with which Hammarskjöld and Thant had been organizing peacekeeping operations outside strict Council supervision. Moreover, the same two permanent members seem more than ever resolved to insist that the Council, despite the clear provisions of the Charter and the strong opposition of practically all other U.N. members, shall play the decisive part in determining how operations are to be financed, and indeed that in most cases they be financed in the most inefficient way possible—by voluntary contributions. It is no doubt significant that the Soviet-French Declaration, issued during de Gaulle's visit to Moscow last June, included the following complacent paragraph: "As concerns the United Nations Organization, note was taken with satisfaction of the progress made in the sense of realizing more exactly the role which belongs to the organization in accordance with its Charter, and also of the efforts which are being undertaken for the introduction of greater financial and administrative strictness in its functioning."

Another factor that must be taken into account in estimating the future efficiency of the Council is the probability that the Peking Government will before very long be invited to assume the seat of China there and that it will eventually accept the invitation. Considering the revolutionary zeal and arrogance of the Chinese Communists, this could result in an epidemic exercise of the veto, which would recall the early days of the Council when the Soviets were in a similar mood. On the other hand, it is not clear what national interest the Chinese would serve by consistently immobilizing an international body of which they were a member. It would seem more plausible to suppose that they would use the veto only when their own interests were directly threatened and otherwise would, like the Soviets, follow the course most likely to curry favor with the Afro-Asians. Indeed the element of Sino-Soviet competition introduced by the presence of the Chinese might create a pattern of Council behavior more favorable to Afro-Asian than to Communist aims.

It will be well, before venturing any prognosis of the future development and efficiency of the Security Council, to examine briefly the present state of its complement and rival, the General Assembly. Nevertheless, we may here note the paradox that, even as the Council's membership was reënforced and as it dealt rapidly and vigorously with the India-Pakistan war and the

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Rhodesian declaration of independence, it thereafter for nearly a year has sedulously avoided occasions to show its authority and its capacity.

IV

Senator Vandenberg in 1945 described the General Assembly which had just been established as the "town meeting of the world." He meant, presumably, that it would be the tribune of all the world's people, not censored and inhibited by the great powers as the Security Council, it was feared, might be. Though necessarily the Assembly heard the voice of the people filtered through and expressed by governments, history in general bore out the Senator's description. It is perhaps only ironic justice that, as a result of the peculiar organization of society in the modern world, those of the world's peoples which are more equal than others in power are becoming less equal than others in the General Assembly.

There have been four major functions which the Assembly has served during the past 20 years. First, it has provided an unparalleled platform for statesmen from all countries, great and small, to address mankind and in this way has given those from small countries particularly a healthy feeling of status, dignity and participation. Second, it has provided these same statesmen with regular and relatively unspectacular occasions for meeting with their confreres, for taking the temperature of current crises, for negotiating quietly if the temperature is conducive, and for exposure to the realities and complexities of the world, inducing the sobriety that sometimes comes from that exposure.

Third, the hortatory resolutions adopted each year by the Assembly, though lacking the force of law, express and often enhance the force of public opinion. Last year nearly a hundred were adopted, on such varied subjects as Chinese representation, a world disarmament conference, Tibet, peacekeeping, apartheid, dismantling military bases, a U.N. capital development fund, the World Food Program, elimination of racial discrimination, minimum age for marriage, housing, promotion among youth of the ideals of peace, refugees, Rhodesia, Aden, the Cook Islands, et cetera. Finally, the Assembly's functions are those concrete actions it takes to create, maintain and finance various operations and agencies designed to implement United Nations purposes and principles, such as the U.N. Emergency Force in the Sinai, the

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Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, the Conference on Trade and Development, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and the U.N. Development Program.

To understand, however, how the Assembly in fact currently performs these functions, it is pertinent to note the substantial change which has occurred in the last six years in its composition and balance of power. During the first decade and a half of the United Nations' existence its membership rose gradually from 50 to 82. This latter number was composed of 41 "Western" states (Western Europe, Western Hemisphere and Antipodes), exactly one-half of the total; 31 Afro-Asian (22 Asian and only 9 African); and 10 Communist states (all in Eastern Europe). The Westerners, therefore, had an effective veto and, moreover, were generally able to pick up from Afro-Asian allies or friends the extra votes for the two-thirds majority required to approve actions or resolutions they sought.

However, beginning with the massive African accretions in 1960, the balance has radically shifted. There are now 117 members and the 118th, Guyana, will be admitted as soon as the current Assembly convenes. Of the 36 new members, no less than 27 are African, 4 Asian (of which one, Mongolia, is Communist) and the remaining five (Cyprus, Malta, Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana) all in the category of "developing" nations. There are, therefore, at present no less than 72 Afro-Asians, almost two-thirds of the membership, and another 25, including all the Latin Americans, which line up with the "have-nots" in "North-South" controversies. The "Westerners," therefore, even assuming their continued alliance with Latin Americans on most political issues, are now barely more than a third of the Assembly.

This trend will presumably continue. New states likely to become independent and to ask for United Nations membership in the near future are the three so-called High Commission Territories in South Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, as well as Mauritius and perhaps British Honduras. There are, of course, a host of small islands in the Caribbean and the South Pacific (which the present sovereign, in most cases the United Kingdom, finds financially onerous and sometimes politically embarrassing to continue to govern) which have as good a claim to independence and United Nations membership as, for example, has the Maldive Islands. However, if these were admitted in large numbers, there would soon be created an As-

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sembly in which the majority of members might represent only 5 or 10 percent of the world's population. This would hardly be conducive to its prestige or effectiveness.

This problem of "ministates" is giving increasing concern to the older members of the United Nations and even to some of the more farsighted Afro-Asians who, while they of course welcome additions to their numbers and voting strength, realize that the value of the latter would be gravely depreciated if it came to be based on a *reductio ad absurdum*. The rules of the Security Council provide that applications for membership shall be referred to a committee of the whole, presumably to determine *inter alia* whether the applicant is "able and willing" to carry out the obligations of the Charter. This rule has, however, long since fallen into abeyance and, though the Council was last year gently reminded of its existence by the U.S. delegation, so far no one has dared challenge the "sacred right" of any political entity, no matter how tiny, to self-determination, independence and, implicitly, U.N. membership.

This doctrine, promulgated in the celebrated Assembly Resolution 1514 of December 14, 1960, is the credo of the indefatigable and single-minded "Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," and is rarely qualified by reference to Assembly Resolution 1541, adopted one day later, which declares that a territory may reach "a full measure of self-government" by means other than total independence.

V

As the Afro-Asians are already the majority of the Assembly and seem likely further to increase their strength, it is important to examine their use of this power. First, however, one must note its limitations. The so-called "Afro-Asian bloc" is not a bloc at all since it contains conservatives, moderates and radicals, since this spectrum shifts as governments change, since alliances and traditional associations with Western states continue sporadically to operate, since often uninstructed delegates do a great deal of freewheeling and since common goals are not always shared by Africans and Asians or by subregional groups within these continental conglomerations. In practice, therefore, one finds that on many issues the "bloc" is widely divided.

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Quasi-unanimity is obtained among the Afro-Asians only on two broad categories of issues: those relating to decolonization and to the political and human rights of subject peoples, and those relating to trade and aid arrangements designed to benefit the underdeveloped nations. When voting is called for on the first of these categories, they are almost invariably joined by the Communist states, and in action on the second category they are joined by the Latin American states. In either of these cases they therefore command a clear two-thirds majority, except when the proposed measure is manifestly so dependent on Western states for its implementation that the Afro-Asian majority itself perceives the futility of adopting it over Western opposition.

In general, at least in so far as decolonization issues are concerned, the radicals among the Afro-Asians call the tune. They tend to be more energetic, persistent, articulate and tactically unscrupulous than their more moderate brethren. Most important of all, they have the advantage that most of the moderates are politically vulnerable at home to charges of betrayal, or at best "Uncle Tomism," if they fail to support resolutions bearing the charismatic labels of freedom, anti-imperialism, human rights, equal or preferential trade or development, etc. Most alarming to the "Westerners," which in this instance includes the legally and regionally minded Latin Americans, was a display of tactical unscrupulousness at the end of the 1965 Assembly. On that occasion the Afro-Asians, unable to muster the necessary two-thirds to adopt a resolution calling, *inter alia,* for the dismantling of military bases in colonial territories, decided by a simple majority—contrary to all precedent and to their own treatment of the issue—that this was *not* an "important question" within the meaning of Article 18 (2) of the Charter and hence did not require a two-thirds vote for adoption. The possible implications of this action for the future are all too clear.

However, before becoming overwrought at the prospect of Assembly excesses, it is well to recall once again: (1) that the Assembly can only recommend, not decide or command, and that it rests with states to determine whether or not to comply; (2) that most measures recommended by the Assembly for action by the United Nations itself require funds for their implementation, that the West supplies more than two-thirds of the funds, and that the United States at least, for good or ill, has asserted its right to follow the Franco-Soviet example of ignoring assess-

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ments when it considers its national interest so requires; (3) that the "new majority" generally maintains its cohesion only on two sorts of issues—residual decolonization, trade and aid—on which Afro-Asian objectives can usually be achieved only with Western coöperation; and finally (4), lest the West itself yield to self-righteousness, that while the "old majority" still prevailed it also was none too scrupulous about running over minorities with its well-oiled steamroller.

VI

Under the circumstances described above, how capable are the Security Council and the General Assembly, jointly or separately, of performing the functions laid down for them in the Charter?

By far the most essential function of the Council is to maintain, or assist in maintaining, international peace and security. If it succeeds to some degree in this aim it justifies its existence; if it fails consistently it has little reason for being.

Over the past ten years, despite the strong reservations of the Soviet Union and France, the Security Council was able to play an important role in peacekeeping in Africa, in the Near East and South Asia, and to some degree in Latin America. It was not able to play such a role where the great powers confronted one another, as in Berlin, though it did contribute, together with the Secretary-General, to the solution of the Cuban crisis. It was not able to play such a role in East or Southeast Asia—despite American willingness that it do so—because of the absence of Communist China and North Viet Nam from the United Nations, and after 1964 because of the absence of Indonesia.

As to the future, should another confrontation so acute as to threaten general war unhappily occur between the United States and the U.S.S.R., they would certainly and rightly wish to deal with it bilaterally and at the highest level. However, a concurrent resort to the Security Council, as in the Cuban case, would very probably be in the interest of both and would in any case almost certainly be brought about by neutrals if it were not by the parties themselves. Whether the presence of Communist China in the United Nations would enable the Council to deal constructively with the problems of Asia is open to serious question. Nevertheless, the situation there is, in the view of most U.N. members, so perilous to world peace that they are likely soon to extend an invitation to Peking to be represented in both

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Assembly and Council, regardless of the immediate prospects of the invitation being accepted or, if it were, of constructive results ensuing. Many members would, however, wish to qualify such an invitation by insisting that Taiwan also retain a seat in the United Nations. Finally, it should be noted that a revival of activity and effectiveness on the part of the Council would probably cause it to take a deeper interest in threats to the peace in Latin America—unless the Organization of American States shows itself more united and effective than it has recently.

The immediate question, however, is not whether the Council can broaden its scope and improve its capabilities but whether, after the disastrous confrontation over Article 19, it can recover the ground it has lost and once again deal effectively even with situations not directly involving great powers and in areas outside the immediate periphery of China, the Soviet Union and the United States. It is clear that the U.S.S.R. and France would prefer that it not do so, that they feel the current deadlock over peacekeeping works to their advantage, and that whenever Council intervention is invoked they will endeavor to limit its action to rhetoric and adjuration. If unsuccessful, they will insist at least that the Council exercise the strictest supervision over any peacekeeping operation in respect to finance, command, composition and supply. However, the lengths to which they will carry their restrictive preferences will depend to a great extent, in the future as in the past, on whether others show a willingness to carry issues to the Assembly if action on them is vetoed in the Council.

In fact, the only real hope of the Council's continuing to be an effective instrument in the immediate future is that the Afro-Asians, whose interests it has most served, will insist that the Soviets and French liberalize their approach to peacekeeping at least to the degree they grudgingly accepted in recent years. So far the behavior both of Westerners and Afro-Asians in the Committee of 33, which was set up by the Assembly to inject new life into U.N. peacekeeping, has been disappointingly timid and ineffective. Whether the Afro-Asians will exert the pressure necessary to change the picture depends on some measure of cohesion among themselves, on the character of the crises that may occur in their areas, and no doubt also on the degree to which the Western powers permit the Council to serve Afro-Asian as well as Western interests, particularly in southern Africa.

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The future prestige and effectiveness of the Assembly also depends to a substantial degree on the behavior of the Afro-Asians, but here it is restraint rather than initiative that is called for. If they choose to employ their voting strength merely to pass provocative resolutions, by either two-thirds or simple majorities, they will destroy the inter-regional harmony and coöperation that makes the Assembly a meaningful body. Similarly, if they continue to insist on full independence and U.N. membership for all political entities, no matter how small or unviable, and reject the exploration of devices for associating such small entities with other states or with the United Nations in a status short of full membership, they will before long undermine the significance and credibility of the Assembly. This would greatly intensify the demand for some form of weighted voting in the Assembly, even though so far no form has been proposed or devised which would be reasonable, just and useful even from the viewpoint of the West.

On the other hand, the responsibility for making the Assembly "work" does not rest solely with the Afro-Asians. Western statesmen sometimes imagine that, if Afro-Asians would only act "responsibly"—that is, in a manner inoffensive to Western interests and sensibilities—the world would proceed smoothly along its accustomed dichotomous course and the General Assembly would continue to reflect the comforting consensus which existed there before 1960. Yet such statesmen in their less euphoric moments recognize that "winds of change" are blowing, and the "town meeting of the world" cannot escape the blast. The Afro-Asians will in fact be "responsible" and the Assembly will "work" to the extent that the developed Western nations offer within its framework an acceptable measure of satisfaction to the vital interests of the Afro-Asians, especially in the fields of trade and aid, human rights and decolonization. Their task in doing so will certainly not be facilitated either by the failure of Britain and the United Nations to check "white settler" domination of Rhodesia or by the recent politically inspired decision of the International Court of Justice on South West Africa, both of which have substantially contributed to the growing and dangerous African impression that they cannot find justice through the United Nations.

Residual peacekeeping by the Assembly, which may have to be more frequently invoked if there is to be any U.N. peace-

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keeping at all, also depends in large measure on the nerve and wit of the West. If Western governments, despite their control of the resources, hardware and logistics without which no substantial peacekeeping operation can be carried out, remain frozen into immobility by their fear of the Afro-Asian majority, then the Assembly—like the Council—will be unable to exercise its responsibility in this field and the United Nations as a whole will revert to that "static conference machinery" which Dag Hammarskjöld in his final report asserted is the desideratum of "certain" (*i.e.* Communist) members.

After all, it is the West, and most of all the United States, which will have to man the breach whenever and wherever the United Nations fails to meet a vital need for security and progress, for peacekeeping or nation-building, for checking externally inspired "wars of liberation" or fostering economic development necessary to political health. Had the United Nations been impotent, the United States and its allies would have had to meet alone, with their own forces, at their own exclusive expense and with unpredictable but certainly unhappy political consequences, the need for stabilization around the frontiers of Israel, in the Congo, in Cyprus, just as they have had to meet alone, because the United Nations is absent, analogous but substantially escalated needs in Viet Nam, Laos and Malaysia.

It therefore especially behooves the United States and its allies to refurbish, sharpen and use the instruments provided for these purposes by the Security Council and the General Assembly. The prerequisite for doing so does not lie in the first instance in attempting to satisfy the Soviet Union and France, whose objectives in these bodies are at present inconsistent with ours, but in reviving our traditional association inside the United Nations with the Afro-Asian states and in overcoming the errors on our side and on theirs which have weakened that essential coöperation. Such an association should not and cannot be directed against the Soviet Union and France, but, if its members once again show a common determination to make the United Nations an effective instrument for carrying out the purposes and principles of the Charter, in fact as well as in name, there is a reasonable prospect that in the long run those two ultra-conservative great powers, and perhaps even eventually Communist China, can be gradually prodded into progress in this as in other realms of international interdependence.

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THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASE: WHAT HAPPENED?

By Ernest A. Gross

"THE International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." Article 92 of the United Nations Charter thus rounds out the grand design of what the Court itself has described as the "organized international community." This is the structure or framework for world order, which, however nascent and rudimentary, is an indispensable feature of the modern age.

It was to the principal judicial organ of the United Nations that Ethiopia and Liberia submitted the protracted and unresolved dispute with South Africa concerning the interpretation and application of the Mandate for South West Africa, the very existence of which was denied by South Africa.

A summary of the history and background of the dispute is an essential prelude to the following discussion, which concerns: (1) Why the litigation was instituted. (2) What the Court did —1962. (3) What the Court did—1966. (4) Some lessons to be learned.

The Territory of South West Africa, a German colony prior to the First World War, was entrusted to South Africa in 1920 as a Mandate under the League of Nations Covenant. The Mandate System, of which South West Africa is the one vestigial remnant, comprised certain colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the war, had ceased to be under the sovereignty of the defeated states.

These colonies and territories, in the words of Article 22 of the League Covenant, were "inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." The restoration of the colonial status quo ante or the immediate grant of independence were considered by the victors to be unacceptable solutions. Although the powers had publicly voiced opposition to territorial annexation as a proper end of victory, secret arrangements had in fact been made by Great Britain, France and Japan prior to the armistice. These arrangements provided, among other things, that three British Dominions were to have the right to annex, respectively, German

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South West Africa, New Guinea and German Samoa. South Africa was to receive the first of these.

After prolonged, often bitter, discussions at Versailles, the Allied Powers—largely as a result of President Wilson's vigorous insistence—accepted the principle of "no annexation." The Mandate System was devised as a new international institution.

The heart and essence of the system is embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant: "the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant." The same Article provides that "the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League."

A Mandate for German South West Africa, accordingly, was "conferred upon his Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Union of South Africa" (then a member of the British Empire). His Britannic Majesty, in turn, agreed to accept the Mandate on behalf of the Union of South Africa and undertook "to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations." As in the case of all Mandates, a Mandate agreement was confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. This instrument, together with Article 22 of the Covenant itself, comprises the principles and defines the terms for the governance of the Territory.

As early as 1922, South Africa adopted the view that "C Mandates" (in which category South West Africa was placed) were—in the words of the South African leader, General Jan Christiaan Smuts—"in effect not far removed from annexation." The Permanent Mandates Commission, until it ceased to function in 1939, frequently recorded its disagreement with South African assertions of sovereignty over the Territory, as well as of the right to incorporate it as a fifth province. South Africa, nevertheless, submitted reports to the Commission and recognized the legal existence of the Mandate.

Soon after the dissolution of the League and the commencement of United Nations operations, and certainly by 1949, it became obvious that South Africa's conception of its legal obligations under the Mandate was essentially at variance with

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those of other members of the United Nations. In 1947, South Africa submitted its first and last report to the United Nations. By the end of 1948, it openly referred to "the previous Mandate, since expired."

The United Nations General Assembly, on December 6, 1949, requested the Court for an Advisory Opinion on certain questions concerning the Mandate. These centered upon the international status of the Territory and the international obligations of South Africa arising therefrom. The Government of South Africa, which appeared before the Court, contended that the Mandate had expired with the dissolution of the League. The Court unanimously held to the contrary, stating:

> The Mandate was created in the interest of the inhabitants of the territory, and of humanity in general, as an international institution with an international object—a sacred trust of civilization. . . . If the Mandate lapsed, as the Union Government contends, the latter's authority would equally have lapsed. To retain the rights derived from the Mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could not be justified.

The Court ruled that the necessity for international supervision over the Mandate continues to exist despite the disappearance of the League of Nations Council, in as much as such supervision is an essential element of the Mandate System and the United Nations has an international organ performing supervisory functions similar to those performed by the League. Hence, the Court held, ". . . South Africa is under an obligation to submit to supervision and control of the General Assembly and to render annual reports to it."[1]

In response to another question posed by the General Assembly, the Court unanimously held that South Africa has no competence to modify unilaterally the international status of the Territory or any of the "international rules respecting the rights, powers and obligations relating to the administration of the Territory and the supervision of that administration."

The Advisory Opinion of 1950 was interpreted and applied by the Court in two supplementary Opinions of 1955 and 1956. The first of these upheld the voting procedures adopted by the Assembly on Mandate questions; the second affirmed the Assembly's right to grant oral hearings to petitioners from the Territory.

[1] The Court also held, five Judges dissenting, that the Charter did not require South Africa to place the Territory under the Trusteeship System, even though this was the "normal course," which the framers of the Charter had "expected." The Territory, indeed, is the anomalous exception.

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The 1950 Advisory Opinion, which was promptly accepted by the General Assembly, remained a dead letter. Year after year, unsuccessful efforts were made by successive agencies of the Assembly, and on its behalf, to negotiate with South Africa on the basis of the Advisory Opinion of 1950. South Africa, however, repudiated the Opinion, explicitly repeating its contention that the Mandate had lapsed.

All the while, the South African Government was extending, with increasing severity, the racially discriminatory laws and regulations which comprise the apartheid policy, and which were rigidly applied in the Territory—as in South Africa itself. These official policies and practices were universally condemned in regularly repeated United Nations resolutions. The response was a steady tightening of repressive administrative action. By 1960, it had become crystal clear that the process of resolution-passing by the General Assembly was no more than a perennial autumn rite. The requirements of justice and humanity made imperative an examination of realistic alternatives.

II. WHY THE LITIGATION WAS INSTITUTED

Decision to seek judicial recourse is never easily taken. As far back as 1957, the U.N. General Assembly had requested the Committee on South West Africa to study the legal action available to ensure that South Africa fulfilled its obligations under the Mandate.

The Special Committee appointed a working group consisting of representatives of Brazil, Finland and the United States to give the question special study and to report back to the Committee. The conclusions of the working group were fully discussed and accepted by the Committee, which advised the General Assembly that "there would be little doubt that the right to invoke Article 7 of the Mandate is enjoyed at any rate by those former members of the League which were members at the date of dissolution of the League and which are now members of the United Nations."[2]

The Committee expressed the view that a "dispute," to which Article 7 referred, "may be of any nature," provided, of course,

[2] Article 7 of the Mandate, in relevant part, provides: "The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

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that "it related to the interpretation or application of one or more clauses of the Mandate or to the effect of the Mandate as a whole," including disputes "concerning the supervision functions themselves."

The Assembly all the while persevered in efforts to reach agreement with South Africa on a basis "which would continue to accord to the Territory of South West Africa an international status." The General Assembly established for this purpose a Good Offices Committee, consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom and Brazil. Toward the end of 1959, the Good Offices Committee regretfully reported that it had "not succeeded in finding a basis for an agreement under its terms of reference."

Shortly thereafter, the South African Foreign Minister, speaking at the United Nations, referred to the "previous" and "lapsed" Mandate. Condemnation of the policy of apartheid as a violation of the Mandate and the Charter of the United Nations was turned aside with the reproach that the Committee "seems to search for ulterior or bad motives in every single act of the South West Africa Administration."[3] The end of the road of political action clearly had been reached.

Early in 1960, the Asian-African group at the United Nations discussed the feasibility of judicial recourse and explored availability of legal counsel. Subsequently, the Liberian Government requested the author to prepare a Memorandum of Law for circulation to governments in advance of the Second Conference of Independent African States, scheduled to convene at Addis Ababa in June 1960. After full discussion, in which the author was privileged to participate, the conference concluded "that the international obligations of the Union of South Africa concerning the Territory of South West Africa should be submitted to the International Court of Justice for adjudication in a contentious proceeding." Note was taken in the resolution of the Report of the Special Committee concerning legal action open to former League members.

The decision was a combined product of frustration and of a sense of responsibility. The objective was not to resolve doubt concerning the jurisprudence of the Mandate, which had its firm foundation in the Advisory Opinion of 1950, but to transform a dishonored, though authoritative, Opinion into an enforceable Judgment. The Court would, moreover, be given an opportunity

[3] U.N. Document No. A/C.4/421, p. 33–35 (1959).

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to adjudicate upon the compatibility of an official policy of extreme racial discrimination with the international obligation "to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory." (Mandate, Article 2.)

There was, if possible, even less room for doubt that an official policy of extreme racial discrimination is legally, no less than morally, repugnant to such an obligation than there was that the Mandate subsisted and that South Africa owed a duty of international accountability for the conduct of its administration of the Territory.

Denunciations of apartheid, voiced by all responsible governments, and recorded in countless United Nations resolutions and international declarations, furnish a thesaurus of terms of opprobrium and revulsion: "a cancer on the body politic" (Japan); "a venomous and contagious disease" (Poland); a "bitter toxic" (United States); "morally abominable, intellectually grotesque and spiritually indefensible" (United Kingdom).

It was known—and confirmed out of the mouths of South Africa's own witnesses at the lengthy Court hearings on the merits—that, in the more than forty years of the conduct of this trust, not one "native" ever has been qualified in law, medicine, engineering, dentistry or registered nursing; none may form or join a labor organization with rights of collective bargaining; none may be employed in a skilled occupation; none may move from place to place without official permission; none may reside (except for purposes of labor) in areas designated as "White"; and none has a voice in government or in the administration of "Native" affairs.

If any realistic prospect had existed that members of the United Nations would repress, rather than merely condemn, South Africa's violations of its clear and present duties under the Mandate, the hazards, burdens and, above all, the time involved in litigation no doubt would have been avoided.

The difficulties with which enforcement of the Mandate would confront members—particularly South Africa's principal trading partners, the United States and the United Kingdom—are matters of public knowledge. More than one-third of South Africa's total trade is with these two countries. Britain's investments in South Africa total about one billion pounds sterling. Britain is South Africa's largest customer; South Africa is one of her prin-

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cipal markets. The economic stake of the United States in South Africa is large (of the order of $500,000,000) and growing. Both the United States and the United Kingdom, more particularly the latter, are vulnerable to South African economic and financial retaliation.

The new ingredient which would be introduced by a favorable judgment in a contentious proceeding—and this was the heart of the matter—would be the potential application of Article 94 of the United Nations Charter.[4] The explicit grant of power to the Security Council to compel compliance with a Court Judgment (as distinguished from an Advisory Opinion) expressly vests in the Council what may be called an "executive" function, analogous to that in normal municipal systems. There was never any secret about the significance of Article 94 in the decision to seek judicial recourse.

It was the hope and expectation of the Applicant States, as well as of most other members of the international community, that a Judgment would impel the United Nations—in particular, South Africa's principal trading partners—to take effective action in support of the rule of law, embodied and reflected in the judicial process.

III. WHAT THE COURT DID—1962

In November 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia instituted proceedings against South Africa, by applications requesting the Court to adjudicate upon the issues in dispute between them and to grant suitable relief. The subject of the dispute was defined in the Applicants' Memorials: Whether the Mandate was still in force, whether the United Nations had supervisory authority, and whether South Africa was violating its obligations under the Mandate by, among other things, imposing an extreme form of racial discrimination upon the "non-White" inhabitants of the Territory.

The South African Government, as was its right under the rules of the Court, entered "preliminary objections," challenging the Applicants' standing to bring the suit and contending that the Court had no jurisdiction "to hear or adjudicate upon the questions of law and fact raised by the Applicants." After con-

[4] Article 94(2) provides: "If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment."

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sideration of the briefs and arguments of the Parties, the Court rendered its Judgment of December 21, 1962, dismissing the objections and upholding its competence to proceed with the merits of the dispute which the Applicants had referred to it. The vote was 8 to 7.

The 1962 Judgment examined the origin and nature of the Mandate System, the character of South Africa's obligations as Mandatory, the legal interest of the Applicants in the performance of the Mandate and the functions of the United Nations and of the Court under the Mandate scheme. On all points the Court found that the Applicants had the required standing to bring the issue before it, and that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute.

One proposition which, the Court said, formed "the very basis of the applications" was whether the Mandate had lapsed, as South Africa insisted. If so, no application based upon that Government's duty to submit to the Court disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the Mandate could be accepted by the Court. The Judgment reaffirmed the unanimous Advisory Opinion of 1950, finding that "the Mandate as a whole is still in force." The Court repeated the 1950 conclusion that "to retain the rights derived from the Mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could not be justified."

A second prerequisite to the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute was the Applicants' standing as States which had been members of the League of Nations at the time of its dissolution. The Court found not only that they had the right to invoke the Court's jurisdiction but, indeed, that such a right "continues to exist for as long as the Respondent holds on to the right to administer the territory under the Mandate." (I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 338.)

A third prerequisite to the Court's jurisdiction was that the dispute be of a character envisaged by Article 7 of the Mandate, in which South Africa had agreed to submit to the Court "any dispute whatever . . . relating to the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Mandate." This issue centered upon South Africa's contention that in as much as the dispute did not "affect any material interests of the Applicant States or their nationals," the dispute was outside the scope of Article 7. The Court dismissed this objection, holding that "The language [of Article 7] is broad, clear and precise: it gives rise to no ambiguity

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and it permits of no exception. . . . For the manifest scope and purport of the provisions of this Article indicate that the Members of the League were understood to have a legal right or interest in the observance of its obligations both toward the inhabitants of the Mandated Territory, and toward the League of Nations and its members." (I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 343.) The Court, accordingly, found that it had "jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute."

IV. WHAT THE COURT DID—1966

The Judgment of July 18, 1966, rejected the Applicants' claims. It did so on the ground that ". . . the Applicants cannot be considered to have established any legal right or interest appertaining to them in the subject-matter of the present claims, and that, accordingly, the Court must decline to give effect to them." Again the vote was 8 to 7.

In the 44 months which elapsed between the two Judgments, the parties filed sixteen volumes of written pleadings and appeared in 100 Court sessions during six months.

On opening the oral proceedings in March 1965, the President of the Court said: "The Court is assembled today to deal with the merits of the South West Africa cases between Ethiopia and Liberia on the one hand and South Africa on the other." All the pleadings, hearings and evidence related solely to the merits of the dispute. Many questions were addressed by numerous Judges to the parties and to witnesses; these, too, all were directed to the merits of the dispute. No question indicated or implied that any judicial thoughts were bent in a direction other than adjudication upon the merits of the dispute referred to the Court by Ethiopia and Liberia.

The South African final submissions, like those of the Applicants, were based upon the assumption that the 1962 Judgment had settled all preliminary questions and that the Court was dealing with the *validity* of the claim before it, as distinguished from its *admissibility*. South Africa's submissions and arguments, both of law and fact, were directed solely toward establishing that the Mandate was no longer in effect, or, alternatively, that if the Court should hold that the Mandate was still in existence, South Africa was not subject to international supervision and was not in violation of the Mandate by reason of its apartheid policies.

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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Philip Jessup of the United States commented: "The Judgment of the Court rests upon the assertion that even though—as the Court decided in 1962—the Applicants had *locus standi* to institute the actions in this case, this does not mean that they have the legal interest which would entitle them to a judgment on the merits. No authority is produced in support of this assertion, which suggests a procedure of utter futility."

Little purpose would be served by an analysis here of the judicial alchemy by which the dissenting opinions of 1962 were transmuted into the Judgment of 1966. As Judge Padilla Nervo (Mexico) pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the 1966 majority merely was "reproducing on the present occasion the arguments adduced in dissenting opinions against the Judgment of 1962." The 1966 Judgment, indeed, is essentially a paraphrase of the 1962 joint dissenting opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (U.K.) and the President of the Court, Sir Percy Spender (Australia), who broke a deadlock by casting a second vote, as permitted by the Court's Statute. On the basis of the same reasons which they advanced in the 1962 Judgment and which were rejected, the majority in 1966 found that the right of the Applicants to an adjudication on the merits of the dispute was an "antecedent" question, which "appertained to the merits of the case," and held that although the Applicants had sufficient standing to "activate" the Court, they were not entitled to a judgment on the validity of their claim. Hence the Court did not even pass upon the issue whether the Mandate is in existence or whether South Africa has a right unilaterally to modify the terms of the Mandate.

The logical and legal qualities of the 1966 Judgment no doubt will be the subject of much scholarly appraisal. The adventitious changes in the Court's composition between 1962 and 1966 are matters of public record. It suffices for present purposes to stress elements of fairness and common sense. These suggest that judicial tribunals avoid "procedures of utter futility," place a high premium upon predictability, and normally assure that litigants are given due notice of questions which the Court, upon its own motion, may consider crucial to its decision. The mutual incompatibility of the 1962 and 1966 Judgments is manifest.

The basis upon which the Court deprived its earlier Judgment of meaningful legal quality or effect reflects a sharp contrast in perspectives between the Court of 1962 and that of 1966. In

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1962, as in 1950, the Court gave full weight and dignity to the requirements of the Mandate. It stressed the necessity of United Nations supervision as the "normal security to ensure full performance of the 'sacred trust' toward the inhabitants of the Territory." The Court considered that, in the words of Judge Jessup in his 1962 concurring opinion, the clause providing for submission of disputes to the Court "was intended to recognize and to protect the general interests of Members of the international community in the Mandates system." The Court held that members have an interest of a legal nature in the conduct of the Mandatory toward the inhabitants, including its universally condemned policies of racial discrimination. The Court declared that its function under the scheme of the Mandate is "to serve as the final bulwark of protection . . . against possible abuse or breaches of the Mandate."

The 1966 Judgment, in contrast, dismantles the bulwark, leaving the Applicants a right of judicial recourse only to protect their so-called "special interests" in assuring access to the Territory of their non-existent missionaries. The disputants thus are remitted to the arbitrament of pressure and power. The "principal judicial organ of the United Nations" becomes irrelevant to a dispute the settlement of which has been frustrated by South Africa's refusal to comply with the Court's own earlier decisions.

It is fortunate that such an approach toward the "sacred trust" did not find expression in a binding judgment "on the merits," properly so called, and that, as the United States Government declared in a statement of July 28, 1966, the 1966 Judgment leaves unimpaired the finality of the Court's previous decisions, which ". . . remain basic and authoritative statements of the International Court of Justice on important substantive legal questions, including the existence and scope of South Africa's obligations and rights of inhabitants of South West Africa."

V. SOME LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

One of the reasons assigned by Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice, in their 1962 joint dissenting opinion, for denying Ethiopia and Liberia a standing before the Court was that, in their words, "the real dispute over South West Africa is between the Respondent State and the United Nations Assembly." The Applicants, the two Judges said, were "in fact appearing in a representational capacity to bring proceedings which the Assembly

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cannot bring for itself because, under Article 34 of the Statute of the Court, only States can appear in contentious proceedings before the Court."

In an Advisory Opinion concerning the right of the United Nations to claim reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the U.N., the Court unanimously concluded "that the Organization is an international person" and, as such, "is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims." (I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 179.) It is therefore difficult to see any justification, in logic or in policy, for barring the judicial settlement of disputes in which the United Nations has an interest of a legal nature. If the organization has sufficient "personality," in a juridical sense, to be party to a dispute, it should not be denied the right of judicial recourse, designed to lead to an enforceable Judgment, as distinguished from an Advisory Opinion.

Serious consideration, accordingly, should be given to amending the Statute of the Court so as to enable the United Nations to appear as a party in appropriate cases before the Court. Where, as here, states are denied the right of judicial recourse, while at the same time the U.N. itself is precluded from seeking a binding adjudication of a dispute to which it is a party, a dangerous vacuum exists in the process of peaceful settlement.

A second lesson taught by the history of the South West Africa cases involves the delicate problem of the standards which should govern the selection of Judges of the Court. Widespread concern, and, indeed, dismay, occasioned by the procedures followed by the Court, as well as the outcome, impel attention to the proper role of the Court in the judicial settlement of major disputes among nations.

The concern, which by no means is confined to any one region, is epitomized in an editorial in the Johannesburg *Star* of July 23, 1966. After referring to the "six long years," the Judgment on jurisdiction and the unprecedented evidence on conditions in the Territory, this leading South African journal commented:

> Turning its back firmly on the great questions that move the world of the second half of the 20th Century, such as racial discrimination and the responsibility of the United Nations for the welfare of non-self-governing peoples, the Court cast an eye on the plaintiffs as if seeing them for the first time

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and asked what right they had to be there at all. None, it decided (though by the narrowest possible majority) and threw the case out without further ceremony.

Notwithstanding the disillusionment evident in such comments, the Court remains the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and an important potential factor in the peacekeeping process. In order for it to achieve its vital purposes, however, attention should be given not only to the indispensable statutory requirements of independence, character and qualification of the Judges, but also to an added dimension: an outlook which accepts the Court's relevance to the settlement of disputes in accordance with justice and the rule of law.

Finally, a lesson which should never have had to be learned is now driven home with climactic force. There is not, and cannot be, an effective substitute for the willingness of members of the international community to enforce, with vigor and conscience, the principles of their own Charter, the dictates of their own decrees and the plain terms of their own undertakings.

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U. S. POLICY AND THE "NEW EUROPE"

By Frank Church

PRESIDENT Johnson said recently of Europe: "The Europe of today is a new Europe. In place of uncertainty, there is confidence; in place of decay, progress; in place of isolation, partnership; in place of war, peace." Confidence, progress, partnership and peace—what better testimonial could there be to the health and vitality, both political and economic, of Europe today; and what better promise for Europe's future?

During the summer, in a month of hearings, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee examined "the Europe of today." Our discussions ranged over the entire continent, literally from the Atlantic to the Urals, and beyond. For a diagnosis of the Atlantic Alliance means considering not only de Gaulle's aims, but the prospects for German reunification, Britain's association with the Common Market, nuclear arms control, greater European cohesion, East-West détente, the impact of Viet Nam, and much more. These problems are connected to each other in a seamless web that joins the United States with Europe, linking us together in the future as inextricably as in the past.

When the Committee's hearings began, it was announced that their purpose was educational. In preparation for them, I visited Europe in May for interviews with governmental leaders, including Wilson, Erhard and de Gaulle, along with prominent spokesmen of the opposition parties and other knowledgeable political observers. I have now had a chance to test my tentative conclusions against what the Committee has been told by a number of distinguished American experts on Europe.

The fact that there is in Europe today confidence, progress, partnership and peace is due, in no small part, to farsighted policy decisions we have taken since the end of the war. But we may stand in danger of being so dazzled by past successes that we could easily stumble into future failures. For Europe is now rumbling, not with discontent, but with a new spirit of independence, in both East and West. We seem to hear the sound, but we may not understand its meaning. To me it is the murmur of widespread European assent to the proposition: "Resolved, that the postwar period has ended."

Testifying before the Committee on July 13, Under Secretary

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of State George Ball said: "The 'NATO Crisis' [not the postwar period] . . . is over." Such a statement assumes that the principal problem facing NATO is France's refusal to continue her participation in SHAPE, or to permit NATO bases to remain on French soil, and that because the other allies have decided to retain a relocated military headquarters for the Alliance in Belgium, the crisis has ended.

But the questions General de Gaulle has raised have a much deeper significance. For he is the symbol of the growing desire of European countries to exert more control over their own destinies —the longing for a larger measure of national independence. To the extent that he has appealed successfully to these sentiments, General de Gaulle is not isolated, either in France or in Europe. And, perhaps more importantly, by leading the assault upon the old barriers of the cold war, which all Western Europeans want removed, he appears to many, if not to most, Europeans to be moving with the current of history, while the suspicion grows that we are anchored to the past. Europeans recognize that de Gaulle's perspectives exceed his power, but they also believe that we are so preoccupied elsewhere, particularly in Viet Nam, and so tied to cold-war concepts, that we fail to take advantage of the openings our power presents. As one astute European observer remarked, "France has the objective but not the means, while the United States has the means but not the objective."

Perhaps our resistance to the mood of Europe is most clearly reflected in our relations with de Gaulle's government. We seem to have a peculiar ability to get under each other's skin, to use one another as a foil. McGeorge Bundy described the present foreign policy of France as "disappointing in its manners, costly in its pride, wasteful in its lost opportunities, irrelevant in much of its dramatics and endurable in its fundamentals." Though an intriguing epigram, Bundy's assessment must be weighed on the scales of recent French history. When the General returned to power, France was on the verge of civil war. The Fifth Republic may be hard to live with, but who would prefer the France before de Gaulle, with its revolving-door governments? The previous régime was marked by feeble central power, a faltering economy, poor national morale, mutinous armies and a chronic inability to extricate France from costly and questionable colonial involvements. France today is prosperous and stable, shorn of her outdated imperial burdens, aglow with the rekindled pride of her

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people, and engaged in an enterprising diplomacy of her own design.

How has de Gaulle achieved all this for France? Perhaps, as Professor Henry Kissinger suggested, it was because the General saw the need to teach his country and Europe generally "attitudes of independence and self-reliance," in the belief that "before a nation or an area can mean something to others it has to mean something to itself." Above all, we should remember that, however disconcerting we find de Gaulle's policies, or imperious his style, he has proved time and again, most recently in Moscow, that he is a man of the West.

Yet, despite de Gaulle's basic loyalties, the present occupants of the seventh floor of our State Department will not forgive him for throwing roadblocks in the path of a united Western Europe. Secretary Ball, in his appearance before the Committee, referred repeatedly to the "compelling logic" of a unified Western Europe, to be built, presumably, in the general image of the United States. His testimony, in line with many previous Departmental statements, was replete with warnings that the alternative to unity is a return to the "corrosive nationalist rivalries" of prewar Europe, as though there were no middle ground.

Actually, there is scant basis to fear that Western Europe—knit together by a flourishing common market—is in any danger of unraveling, and even less reason to apprehend a reversion to the pattern of militant nationalism which plagued the period before the wars. The "either-or" argument is unreal, a rhetorical duel between two straw men. When pressed, Secretary Ball himself conceded that Western Europe was not likely to revert to the old habits of a discredited past. Summing up, he sought a more plausible case, declaring that "the central issue before the American government and the American people . . . is what kind of Europe and what kind of Atlantic world we want."

My talks in Europe, and the comments of witnesses during the hearings, brought home to me the fact that it is not the kind of Europe *we* want that any longer governs. The question is really what kind of resurgent Europe the Europeans themselves will build. We can encourage them to move in certain directions, largely because they have looked to us for leadership. But we should avoid pressing them too hard to adopt our favorite schemes for solving their problems. Looking back over the statements of leading State Department officials, one is struck by the fact

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that they seem to hold out for Europe no alternative between our form of unity and chaos, no awareness that European sentiment may have shifted toward a different arrangement, that what might have been achieved in the vision of such men as Jean Monnet when Europe lay prostrate after the war may no longer represent a practical possibility. In brief, I believe it isn't wise to keep insisting that Western Europe should grow to resemble the United States of America.

At best, it is a dubious policy to keep prodding our NATO partners for their reluctance to make new offerings at the altar of European union. For we cannot forecast with any certainty that our Grand Design for Europe, even if it were to happen, would necessarily prove a blessing to the world.

What real assurance is there that world peace would be promoted by the emergence of another gargantuan state, comparable in size and strength to the United States or the Soviet Union, and equally capable of waging global war? Is it not just possible that a looser association of European countries, which rejects subordination to a single executive authority, might turn out to be the safer arrangement? After all, Bismarck's *Reich* welded together, under one Emperor, the separate principalities which had composed the German *Bund* in a union which proved a curse to peace. Yet the *Bund* itself was once touted for having been "impregnable in defense and incapable of aggression."

Can we really be so confident that a united Western Europe would always remain our faithful partner? We are dismayed by de Gaulle because he dissents from our view about how European defense, European political life and European relations with the rest of the world should be conducted. Why should we believe that a great European Union would not prove even more assertive, contrary and—dare I use the term?—disobedient than de Gaulle's France? Perhaps, as Professor Kissinger suggested, there are advantages to be found in preserving pluralism in Europe.

In any case, the fact remains that in Europe today there is a desire for diversity. Therefore, the task for us is to cast our policy so that it encompasses both the quest for cohesion and this desire for diversity. To accommodate these two aims concurrently, we should avoid taking rigid ideological positions. We must not insist that Europe evolve in any way which does not correspond to the real feelings of Europeans. Surely the United States does not hold the only patent on a Grand Design.

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II

The same insistence on the solution we want—and that we think Europeans should want—has been applied to the nuclear sharing problem. Thousands of pages have been written on this subject. I can add nothing new to the debate. It does seem to me, however, on the basis of the accumulated evidence, that we have handled this problem with a rather heavy hand. The Committee, to be sure, was told that the United States had not been doctrinaire on the subject of a multilateral nuclear force, that we had been "very, very careful not to try to bring pressure" on our allies to accept the Multilateral Force (M.L.F.), and that the charge that there has been pressure is "nonsense."

Our diplomats may believe that they avoided bringing heavy pressure to bear on behalf of the M.L.F. proposal, but this is not the frank opinion of most European officials directly involved and of most disinterested experts on both sides of the Atlantic. If we are so unaware of the resentment our tactics produced our antennae are in need of major repair.

Likewise, at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the United States has nearly isolated itself in insisting upon retaining the so-called European clause in our draft proposal for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This clause would leave the door open for the creation of an independent European nuclear deterrent, although the necessary precondition for such a force is a degree of political unity which Secretary Ball himself has described as "far exceeding that foreseen in the near future by even the most optimistic proponents of European federalism."

The official argument, rooted once again in our Grand Design for Europe, is that we are unwilling to foreclose the possibility that some future European Union might organize a nuclear deterrent force in which the Germans could participate. Besides, we want to preserve our option for a "hardware" solution to the nuclear-sharing problem within the Western Alliance. We say that the clause, which one knowledgeable observer has described as though written with a "ball-point corkscrew," would not lead to proliferation because it permits no increase in the total number of "nuclear entities" in the world. I wonder what our attitude toward such an option would be if mainland China announced its intention to form an M.L.F. with Albania, Mali and North

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Viet Nam, or the Soviet Union an M.L.F. with Poland and Cuba.

In any event, the State Department insists that the European clause is "not the real obstacle to a non-proliferation agreement." The Committee was told that German access to nuclear weapons, under an M.L.F. or a similar "hardware"-sharing scheme, would not even prove a serious obstacle to German reunification, which "will come about when conditions are ripe for it." Most Europeans would disagree.

Our refusal to drop the European clause seems to indicate that we have decided it is more important to bind West Germany more tightly to a truncated NATO than to improve relations with the Soviet Union. I think our priority is wrong. As far as I can determine, the other European nations at Geneva, including our allies, feel that we are mortgaging the present for the sake of a highly problematical future. In other words, most Europeans—I will mention West Germany in a moment—who would participate in a separate European deterrent and whose interests this hypothetical, if not visionary, force would presumably serve, are not pressing us to retain the European clause. Why, then, should *we* insist on keeping an option for *them* which they do not demand, or at least do not think is important enough to jeopardize closer relations with the Soviet Union? Is this in our interest—or in theirs?

In discussing the ultimate goal of our policy in Europe, Mr. Bundy said: "Settlement is the name of the game." If we are going to play the game, we must remember that the ball is labeled "relations with the Soviet Union." If we are not going to play, we will discover that the game will go on without us, and we shall soon become spectators in Europe rather than participants. However much we may doubt the Russians, most Europeans are persuaded that the danger of a Soviet attack has receded, and that, as a result of developments in the Communist world—particularly the revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe and the necessity for Russia to turn about and face the challenge of a hostile China—the time has arrived for a diplomatic assault upon the unwelcome barriers which split the Continent. For the partition of Europe at the Elbe is regarded by Europeans on both sides as transitory and unnatural.

The United States should lead its allies in their reach eastward across the Elbe, for we alone can deal, on equal terms, with the Soviet Union. But whether or not we choose to lead them, they

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will press on, believing, as more Europeans do every day, that in Europe, at least, the cold war is over. It would be tragic for all concerned—except the Soviets—if by standing so far behind our Western European allies we forced them to turn their backs on us in order to seek reconciliation with Eastern Europe, as they are bound to do.

To lead the new search for a European settlement, we need not join in the European consensus that the Russian threat has faded away. We can parley without discarding the Western Alliance, to which even France proclaims her continuing fidelity. NATO still exists as a fort for the West, should the Soviet Union turn militant again.

On the diplomatic front, the best place for a breakthrough remains Geneva, where we may have come within reach of a non-proliferation treaty. Negotiations should not be permitted to break down on the issue of retaining the European clause. It is reunification, not nuclear sharing, which concerns the Germans most. Europeans, including many Germans, hold generally to the belief that reunification can come about only after much better relations have been established between the two halves of Europe. Maintaining the option for increased German access to nuclear weapons can only add to the fears and suspicions; closing the option, on the other hand, would tend to lessen tensions. As Mr. Bundy pointed out, so would a clear public statement by the West German government accepting the Oder-Neisse line. I have the impression, and several witnesses before the Committee did too, that German public opinion is coming around to a realization of the need to strengthen the East Europeans' confidence in Germany. I would think that we should encourage the Germans to do so. I do not see why we, alone among the Western powers, seem unwilling to accept the thesis that reunification will follow relaxation. I do not see why we, again alone, continue to assert an almost mystical belief that eventually, for inexplicable reasons, conditions will somehow materialize making German reunification possible. By holding to this view, by insisting on a European clause as a prerequisite for a non-proliferation treaty, we are running the risk of not only falling between two stools but of knocking both over. For the prospect of an integrated European nuclear deterrent is most likely to prove a mirage. An empty hope can only disillusion the West Germans, causing them—more in sorrow than in anger—to pull away from NATO's close embrace.

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And even if the unfulfilled promise does not produce disaffection, another factor, considered more important even now by some in Germany, is likely to do so. That is the contradiction inherent in enticing West Germany into ever closer military ties with NATO and, at the same time, pressing for concessions from the Russians, against whom NATO's military organization is directed. While I would not presume to predict the shape of the settlement which will eventually be reached in central Europe, I am personally convinced that the State Department errs in preaching that reunification will come about by "the adhesion of the East German people to some . . . system of Western unity" —in other words, by appending themselves to a united Western Europe.

What seems far more likely is that a German settlement will be reached as the last stage in a gradual healing of the breach between the two parts of Europe. And the price the German people will have to pay for reunification will surely include abstention from nuclear arms. By preserving the option of Bonn's participation in an improbable Western European deterrent force, are we not jeopardizing the possibility of German reunification as part of a central European settlement? Many Germans think so now. Many more may think so in the future.

Hence, by retaining the European clause we will, in my view, not only fail to tie West Germany more firmly into the NATO alliance, we may also sacrifice a non-proliferation treaty with the Soviet Union. If the European clause is retained, the Russians almost certainly will reject the treaty. Of course, even if the clause is stricken, the Russians may not sign. But if they refuse, we have lost nothing in making the offer to delete it.

Quite apart from the immediate consideration of the treaty, our national interest calls for a consultative rather than a "hardware" solution to the nuclear sharing problem in the alliance, building on the work done by the McNamara Committee. This would provide a much sounder basis for German partnership in NATO—sounder because what matters is how governments decide on the use of nuclear weapons, not where governments arrange to store them; sounder because it keeps many options open for West Germany and closes none; and sounder because it is what the European allies of Germany—and, I believe, the German people—prefer.

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III

With regard to Europe, President Johnson deserves credit for a number of specific moves he has made recently. First, I commend his decision to restrain the State Department from over-reacting to de Gaulle, for I agree with Mr. Bundy that as "very few Frenchmen are anti-American . . . it remains the part of wisdom and sentiment alike that no American should be anti-French." Secondly, the President should be congratulated for ordering an end to the M.L.F. campaign, for the pressure felt by others in NATO was causing strains within the Alliance that far outweighed any possible gains. Thirdly, he has taken a step forward at Geneva by asking for new language which might break the deadlock on a non-proliferation treaty. Finally, I applaud the President's stated objective to "build bridges" with Eastern Europe.

My uneasiness arises, therefore, not from decisions emanating from the White House, but from the doctrines so deeply imbedded at the Department of State which impede, if they do not preclude, a timely and adept response to the new outlook in Europe. The same dogmatism leads also to a self-certainty which borders on condescension.

Another fault in our approach may be due to the tendency in the State Department to regard the problems of our European allies as essentially military, rather than political. Nuclear sharing, force goals and command arrangements are no longer the issues on which Europe's interests center. Now, when Europe is less concerned about defending itself than in fending for itself, less absorbed with building barriers against the East than with mending fences with the East, those who make our European policy should know both parts of divided Europe first-hand; they should be men whose background and experience—the two most important words in the manual of those who match men to the work to be done—help them in understanding, rather than hinder them from understanding, the shifting subtleties of a highly political continent.

For our fundamental national interests can easily accommodate the changing mood of Europe. We need sacrifice nothing to keep our policies relevant. But only by so doing can we preserve our influence in the Europe of today—and tomorrow.

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WHAT IS FRENCH POLICY?

By André Fontaine

THREE years after having signed a treaty of coöperation with Dr. Adenauer, designed to make the marriage of France and Germany the foundation for the regrouping of Europe, General de Gaulle has travelled to the Soviet Union to talk of rediscovered friendship, agreement and even "alliance" between the "new France" and the "new Russia." Now the latter, pending information to the contrary, is the principal adversary of the German Federal Republic, and the Soviet leaders do not hide the fact that they look upon the rapprochement with Paris as a means of gaining support against German "revanchism." We may therefore be permitted to question the degree of coherence in the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic and to wonder whether such changes of course—there are other examples—cannot be best explained by psychological factors, the first of them being excessive *amour propre.*

On the subject of travels, it is worth remarking that de Gaulle has won acclaim successively in Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Latin America and now in the U.S.S.R., to say nothing of Iran, Greece, Ethiopia and Cambodia (and way stations where, had he stopped, he could have been sure of just as warm a reception), and all along the line has achieved very concrete political results. It is tempting to speculate that the great "loner," undaunted by the grimness of the times, the size of his country and the lack of discipline of his fellow citizens, is, in the twilight of life, deliberately trying to drive out melancholy with applause. One of his ministers, in fact, compared the invigorating effect which cheering crowds have on him to the effect upon Anteus of contact with the earth.

How vast, indeed, must be the General's satisfaction in finding himself triumphally received by all those countries which during the war had made him so aware of France's weakness and his own lack of influence: Germany, which crushed France 25 years ago in the belief it would keep the victory for a thousand years; England and the United States, which one day in 1943, in Algiers, reminded him through Harold Macmillan that without them he was "nothing;" and finally the U.S.S.R., on which he had based hopes of strengthening his position vis-à-vis the Anglo-

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Saxons, a plan for which a cynical Stalin showed complete indifference.

Churchill said he had never met a man "so occupied with his own fortune." But could de Gaulle have associated enough of his countrymen with that fortune to achieve success unless it had been identified with the fate of a nation which not without reason chose the cock for her emblem? The arrogance of the President of the Republic is disagreeable and even incomprehensible to his allies; but it is not the arrogance of an isolated man, otherwise it would be only ridiculous. It is the arrogance of a man who is not resigned to anything which writes *finis* to a nation about which history has spoken without a break for a thousand years. There is nothing at all surprising, then, in the fact that this is the man who on June 18, 1940, rebelled against the legal government of France, determined in the name of French legitimacy to carry on alone the fight against the invader, and who today has pulled the French Army out of the Atlantic command. Beyond his disconcerting fits of bad humor has been the same primary objective for 20 years—to promote, in spite of or against anything and everybody, the independence of his country.

One cannot comprehend such a degree of determination unless, without dwelling too much on the man's psychic nature, one really understands his political philosophy. For him, nations are the fundamental reality of history and the essential task of political leaders is to defend the national patrimony against all who think of infringing it.

His is opposed to the prevailing philosophy of the last half-century which considers nationality less important than the system of government and requires that it dissolve in great supranational combinations in order to ensure the dominance of all who share the same ideology. From this concept flows both Marxism ("the proletariat has no country," the U.S.S.R. is "the fatherland of socialism") and the organizations planned to foil it—NATO and the European communities. But in de Gaulle's words, "the banner of ideology in reality only cloaks ambitions. And I believe it has been thus since the world was born." Ideologies are, moreover, transitory, while the fact of the nation endures —and with it the fundamental rivalries, born of geography and nourished by history, which have made the planet up to now a juxtaposition of battlefields, with war extinguished in one spot only to be rekindled in another. For centuries, the House of

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Austria, then Prussia, sought to dominate Europe, while Britain ruled the seas and prevented the formation of a continental empire. Today the United States has taken England's place, which explains why Britain finds herself so at ease in America's wake. Stalinist Russia took up the goals of the Tsars: warm-water ports, lands in Asia to feed her people, a buffer in the West to compensate for the lack of mountain or river barriers and protect against the contagion of liberal ideas. As for France, whether monarchist, revolutionary, Bonapartist or republican, she has always strained to reach her natural frontiers, the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and to secure overseas sources of raw materials and outlets for her industrial products.

De Gaulle, like all French military chiefs, was brought up in this school. At the moment of Liberation his first priority was to install France permanently on the Rhine. Just as Poincaré sent Doumergue to St. Petersburg a few weeks before the fall of Tsarism to try to obtain the support of Nicholas II for a similar claim, so de Gaulle as early as 1944 did not hesitate to recognize the Oder-Niesse line in the vain hope of obtaining in exchange Stalin's support for the rectification of the Rhine frontier. Traditional historians have always considered the existence of a centralized *Reich* a powerful threat to France, and looked on the Treaty of Westphalia, which according to Jacques Bainville set up "anarchy under our protectorate" in Germany, as a triumph of French diplomacy. Hence it is not surprising that de Gaulle vetoed the reconstitution of a centralized administration in Germany at the end of 1945, as decided in principle by the Big Three in application of the Potsdam agreements.

After great effort he obtained a minor rectification of the Alpine frontier and decided to withdraw his troops from the Val d'Aosta, an Italian province mainly inhabited by French-speaking people, only as a result of strong pressure from Truman. He drowned in blood an insurrection in the Algerian province of Kabylia at the very moment of V-Day. In the same period he called in the British Ambassador to protest Churchill's ruthless summons to the French forces to evacuate Syria, and said to him unsmilingly: "If I could, I would declare war on you." And finally, legitimately outraged over what Roosevelt and Stalin had decided, without consulting him, about the fate of Indochina, he rushed an expeditionary force there to reëstablish French sovereignty.

Again, in 1947, he could not find hard enough words to condemn

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the law drawn up by the Fourth Republic which would have given Algeria a distinct "personality." "Any policy," he exclaimed, "which under the false pretext of an evolution in reverse would have the effect of leading the French Muslims to believe they could separate their destiny from that of France would only open the door to decadence."

This is a far cry from the emancipator of Algeria, the "liberal" acclaimed by the Third World and the Communist bloc, the man who denounces, in terms which President Roosevelt would not have disavowed, the vanity of all attempts to oppose the right of self-determination and particularly of the efforts of the United States to decide the fate of Viet Nam by arms.

How could such a transformation have come about? No doubt because nationalism does not have the reactionary content for de Gaulle which it appeared for a time to have in France as a result of the Dreyfus affair and the activity of the *Action Française* and Maurice Barrès. It would have been different if in 1938 he had not found himself in agreement with the Communists and the U.S.S.R., and opposed to almost the entire French bourgeoisie, in condemning the Munich accords. When he came to London as head of the Free French and found that the politicians, the military chiefs, the governors-general of the colonies one after another disregarded his appeals, he of necessity had to accept whatever aid was offered him, including that of Freemasons, Jews, pacifists and anti-militarists—to a point where others of his caste would have been incapable of overcoming their aversion. Before long some Communists joined him. It was then that he discovered, if he had not previously, that patriotism is not a monopoly of any party, family or class; and it was then that he conceived the ambition to be the heir to the whole of the national past—Jacobin as well as monarchist—and to be so far as possible the undisputed arbiter of a nation whose pluralistic tradition and attachment to fundamental liberties he so much respected. There is, then, nothing surprising in the fact that there exist today Gaullists of the right and Gaullists of the left.

II

Their alliance would be impossible did not the defense of the nation coincide, in the General's conception, with the accomplishment of its historic mission and thus take on an essentially moral and civilizing character. He sees France, like the poet Edmond

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Rostand before him, with the traits of a "legendary princess": nothing she does can be base or contrary to the general interest of all men.

"My country, right or wrong," say the English. It is clear that for de Gaulle, his country cannot be wrong. Just as some Americans can hardly believe that what is good for General Motors might not be good for all humanity, the President of the Republic believes that what France, through him, desires is the true expression of what the world needs. He goes even further and attributes any resistance his policies may encounter to stupidity or malice. No doubt a regrettable attitude, but one which Americans should be in a good position to understand. . . .

In different circumstances de Gaulle probably would not hesitate to put other means in the service of the civilizing mission which, crusader that he is, he assigns to his country. But though by passion possessed, he is also an intellectual, a philosopher seeking to perceive the deep currents of the world's evolution; and more than once he has succeeded. He fully grasped the consequences of the advent of nuclear weapons, which forbid anyone with any sense from having recourse to war as a means to his ends, even the most legitimate ends. As we have increasingly seen, especially in the course of the recent trip to the U.S.S.R., the officer who once affirmed that "history is written with the sword" now realizes that the best human energies ought to be directed to other tasks. In any case, he does not aspire to possess the world but—something no more modest—to show it the way.

Such an ambition obviously only strengthens his determination to defend the national heritage against all comers, friends and enemies. Indeed, how could he be satisfied if his freedom of action were founded on something affected, "put on," if his voice were not purely French? His passion for independence may perhaps reveal the self-love of the prima donna, but also the consciousness of the role his country can and must play in the world if it is to be true to itself.

France had never found herself so dependent on the good will —or ill will—of others as when de Gaulle came to power for the first time. The Third Republic had been accustomed in the 1930s to do nothing except in agreement with London, which did not always return the favor. The 1940 defeat seemed to leave no choice between dependence on Germany and the protection of England. General de Gaulle's audacity, which most of his country-

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men did not perceive for a long time, was to refuse either alternative. Although he was based in London and completely dependent on Great Britain for funds, propaganda facilities and equipment for his troops, he refused all allegiance and did not change this attitude until he had regained complete independence of action. This explains his incessant conflicts, first with Churchill, then with Roosevelt, and his many efforts, revealed in Soviet documents published in 1959, to find a counterweight in Moscow to "Anglo-Saxon" influence. Suspecting, as he writes in his war memoirs, that "the so-called parallel undertakings" of Britain and America were actually centrifugal in that they would reach out into the French overseas territories, he was delighted to obtain the assurance from Molotov that, in the Soviet view, it was around him that "all the French should group themselves for the relief of France." He considered it of equal significance that "Moscow recognized that no foreign government, even the Soviet, had the right to detach" the resistance movements from his command.

A little later, fearing an American landing at Dakar and a British occupation of Niger without the participation of the Free French, he went so far as to say to the Soviet representative, Bogomolov, that in that event he would break with London, and he requested him to ask Moscow if he could then install himself and his troops in Russia. When he visited Stalin in December 1944, the only satisfaction he obtained—though he prized it—was that the Franco-Soviet pact would be distinct from the Anglo-Soviet alliance and not, as Moscow and London would have liked, a simple extension of that alliance.

France having been liberated and de Gaulle voted into power, it was not to be expected that he would put himself at the service of any of the victorious powers, especially when it became clear that none of them intended him to have any part in the Yalta and Potsdam deliberations, which would shape the postwar world. There is nothing improbable in Alexander Werth's thesis that one of the reasons he dropped the reins of government in 1946 was that he saw the impossibility of a country as exhausted as France achieving economic recovery and security in the face of Soviet expansion without becoming more or less dependent on America.[1]

So it was inevitable that he, for one, would have no part of it,

[1] "De Gaulle." New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966.

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but would remain indefinitely the symbol of a France that had not yet surrendered any part of her sovereignty. This perhaps explains his attitude during the great debates of the Fourth Republic which decided the direction of French diplomacy. Not forgotten, certainly, is the hostility he showed to all forms of European integration, seeing them only as a means of making France forever dependent on American protection; nor the decisive role he played in the National Assembly's rejection of the European Defense Community. Less remembered, because they were ineffective, were his unequivocal condemnations of the International Authority for the Ruhr, the division of Germany into zones, the creation of the Federal Republic or the formation of Euratom. But these categorical positions only threw into relief his silence, at least in public, in the face of some fundamental options: armistice in Indochina, the Algerian War, German rearmament, Suez. His partisans were apparently left without instructions and so were often divided, with the result that the Assembly approved Atlantic policies which otherwise would have been defeated. It was as if de Gaulle had decided not to oppose an inevitable trend but refused to consider it definitive and, in any case, did not intend to bear any responsibility for it.

Upon his return to power in 1958, he cleared up the ambiguities. The Atlantic Alliance, he said, is "actually necessary," but France does not intend to "confine herself to it." He began to restore full freedom of action to his government, still without endangering the security or the values of Western civilization, for which he always proclaimed his attachment.

It was not an easy job. The Fourth Republic was a prey to chronic inflation and had made itself financially dependent on the United States to the point where most premiers, as soon as they had successfully formed a government, had to go and solicit Washington's blessing in the form of new credits. It had barely succeeded in extracting itself from the hornet's nest in Indochina when it was caught in the war in Algeria, which drained away more and more French resources in human life, energy and finances. As was made plain at the United Nations, almost the entire weight of world public opinion was hostile. France was in truth the sick man of Europe.

The Fourth Republic had turned over the keys of its defense to an American commander-in-chief, dependent on the decisions of the American Government, and was on the way to turning

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over the keys to its economy to a supranational European community. It had not, however, transferred its sovereignty in any absolute or definitive way. It had loudly proclaimed its adherence to the ideal of European federation, yet it had consistently held that the world-wide responsibilities of France precluded its disappearing into a supranational Europe. It had gotten the production of its own atomic bomb under way, thwarted projects for a European army and constituent assembly, and, for all its lack of power, had not accepted American terms for the installation of missile launching-sites or American atomic stockpiles on its soil.

In order to assure his freedom of movement, therefore, de Gaulle did not have to take drastic steps on the spot. He could even preserve the essentials of the legal framework inherited from the Fourth Republic. After all, the rule of unanimity prevailed in the Atlantic pact and would still prevail for a long time in the European Economic Community; and if he was displeased by certain provisions in the treaties to which France had agreed, he could reasonably work to revise or circumvent them rather than come out with a denunciation which would have contradicted his notion of faithfulness to a promise.

The crisis in the Middle East in July 1958 gave him the first chance to show his independence. The United States having taken upon itself to land Marines in Lebanon, long an area of French influence, without asking his opinion, he rejected a proposal for a meeting of the Security Council agreed upon by Eisenhower, Macmillan and Khrushchev. When a few weeks later another crisis, in the Straits of Formosa, seemed to him to endanger the peace of Europe—also without his having a word to say—he sent Eisenhower and Macmillan the famous memorandum calling for the establishment among the three great Western powers of a general directorate of the alliance on a global scale. That directorate should have the duty, he thought, of making strategic plans to meet any conceivable crisis and if need be to decide whether to use nuclear weapons.

If that proposal had been followed, France would in the final analysis have secured a privileged role in the Western Alliance comparable to that already held by Great Britain. Needless to say, this would have been very satisfying to General de Gaulle, who had devoted a chapter of his memoirs to his efforts to give France a standing among nations commensurate with her historic

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and moral patrimony. But if one recalls the international climate of the period, it is clear that he did not have considerations of prestige in mind so much as concern to preserve French freedom of action in case of serious conflict outside the Atlantic area. His attempt inevitably failed.

The General's other steps to assure France's freedom of action met with better success. Through vigorous monetary measures, the credit for which goes largely to the first Finance Minister of the Fifth Republic, Antoine Pinay (somewhat cavalierly dismissed afterwards), the debtor nation became a holder of important reserves of strong currencies, in a position to free itself of a considerable part of its obligations. By straightening out the country's finances, de Gaulle put an end to the chronic governmental instability and rid France of her reputation for irresolution and impotence. To a degree not achieved in any other Western country, de Gaulle virtually freed diplomacy from subservience to internal politics. When he decided—not without violence to his temperament and education—to emancipate not only black Africa but also the departments of Algeria, which had been an integral part of French territory for 130 years and the basis of the platform on which he had stood since 1943, he conquered the hearts of the Third World, which knows no greater hero than a man who combines strength and magnanimity.

Before announcing on December 31, 1963, that for the first time in almost 30 years France truly had "her hands free," he needed to reconsider the various delegations of sovereignty accepted by the Fourth Republic. Europe was the principal beneficiary. As early as 1958 he had had plans drawn up for the revision of the Community treaties which were never, incidentally, to get beyond the planning stage. In 1960 he proposed to the heads of government of the Six a "political union," which among other things would have put the essentially "supranational executives under the authority of the Council of Ministers, made up of members of the individual governments. This plan was finally rejected, but de Gaulle took his revenge in 1965 by forcing his partners to give up for the time being the application of majority rule, scheduled by the Treaty of Rome to come into effect on January 1, 1967, beginning the third stage of the Common Market. To save the Community which he threatened to blow to pieces, they likewise agreed in fact if not in law to strip the High Authority and the commissions of many of their preroga-

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tives. With more reason, the Elysée opposed any enlargement of the powers of the European Parliament (which, incidentally, it refused to call by that name) as well as election to it by universal suffrage. Finally—and there is no reason to be particularly proud of it—France never ratified the European covenant of the rights of man, which permits any citizen of a country belonging to the Council of Europe to appeal to the European court in case of violation of his rights as an individual, provided he has exhausted all national means of redress.

Playing the same game with NATO, the General had already warned Washington and London in his memorandum of 1958 that if his proposition of a three-power directorate was not acted upon he would suspend the development of French participation in that organization. In this spirit, he refused any stockpiles of American nuclear weapons, and any participation in the various collective nuclear armaments plans, from the Gates Plan of 1960 through the Nassau Agreements to the M.L.F. In 1959, beginning with the navy, he started the process of withdrawing French forces from the integrated command, completed in 1966.

Finally, although it is difficult to speak seriously of membership in the United Nations as a delegation of sovereignty, France's participation in that organization has also been subject to revision. During the Korean War the French Government had associated itself with the Acheson plan to permit the General Assembly, whenever the Security Council was paralyzed by the veto, to act in its place by a two-thirds majority. Under de Gaulle the Quai d'Orsay has consistently sought a return to the status quo ante—in other words, to the primacy of the Security Council, where France has had the right of veto from the outset. Thus she does not risk becoming involved in operations against her will. Similarly, when de Gaulle refused to help finance the deficit resulting from the Congo intervention, which he had not approved, he acted not so much from ill-humor as from a settled prejudice which leads him to deplore the attitude of all those who look forward to the advent of a world order.

If one adds to this the ongoing development of a national nuclear arsenal designed to ensure the national security in any hypothetical case (the "minimum deterrent" theory), as well as various gestures such as the refusal to participate in the disarmament conference or to meet with the President of the United States, the recognition of the Chinese People's Republic or the

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trip to Moscow, no one can really dispute the fact that de Gaulle has fully succeeded in attaining his primary goal and that he has achieved complete independence for his country—or, if one wishes, for himself, which in his mind is the same thing.

Independence to do what? Couve de Murville, whom I once asked this question, replied without hesitation, "Independence is an end in itself." No doubt he thereby faithfully expressed his master's thought. But for de Gaulle, who has written that "to be great means to keep up a great quarrel," it is self-evident that national independence cannot be viewed only in its negative aspect of refusal to be dependent, and that it demands an active, constructive and original policy, the antithesis of "neutralism," the term by which superficial analysts have presumed to summarize it.

III

By "disengagement" of "blocs," de Gaulle means that France is to play her role world-wide. He is persuaded that history and geography have separated the nations which must be satisfied with a purely regional role from those with a global calling, and he has no doubt that France, which retains a presence in the five continents—directly or through the play of her alliances and friendship treaties—is justified in counting herself among the latter. In support of the contention, he can point to the fact of permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council, accorded in the San Francisco Charter, as well as membership in the "nuclear club." And he constantly emphasizes that, provided Peking is given the Chinese seat on the Security Council, its five permanent members are the five nuclear powers. His conclusion is that these powers have special responsibilities to keep the peace. Paradoxically, this comes close to the Rooseveltian conception of the "policemen of the world"—with the difference, of course, that in F.D.R.'s estimation they were limited to three, France belonging among the nations authorized to possess only rifles. Yet for these "policemen" to ensure that peace reigns they must be agreed among themselves, which evidently is not quite the case today.

If de Gaulle takes a somewhat pessimistic view of human nature, and of the nature of states (about which he wrote in his memoirs that "there is nothing in the world less disinterested"), he is deeply convinced that the advent of nuclear

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weapons has completely altered the rules of competition by eliminating all hope of gain by direct confrontation. The first condition for the normalization of the international atmosphere, consequently, is the renunciation of the use of threat. Though he does not believe there is the faintest chance this will actually occur, he was certainly in the forefront of those advocating firmness when Khrushchev used intimidation, even going so far as to veto the proposed negotiations with Moscow on Berlin favored by Washington and London. It is this same skepticism about the expediency of recourse to force which has led him repeatedly to express the conviction that the United States stands no chance of victory in Viet Nam by military means. In his opinion, the only reasonable solution to the conflict is one which would result in South Viet Nam being "neither American nor Chinese." Since he is convinced, perhaps wrongly, that France has preserved considerable influence in that part of the world, he has not given up hope of playing the mediator, either alone or together with the U.S.S.R., whose views seem to him very close to his own.

If, however, he may for a time have exaggerated the chances of ending the conflict, he no longer harbors any illusions; he expects positive results to evolve only very slowly. No normalization will be possible, however, if the place which China deserves, by its sheer size and its ancient culture, is not recognized. The Communists could have been kept from consolidating their régime in 1950 if MacArthur had been let alone, as de Gaulle himself advocated. But today one cannot pretend with a straight face that the legitimate Chinese government rests on Formosa while Mao, without anybody's help, stands up to the world. The exacerbated violence of the Chinese leaders, which is mostly verbal, is explained in large part by their continued ostracism, which by the way is parallel to the earlier treatment of Communist Russia. In order to modify their behavior and guide them toward the rational view of things which the Kremlin now holds, they must be given the chance to realize, little by little, in daily intercourse, how mistaken they are about the real intentions of the Western world. It was largely to this end that France recognized China, doubtless hoping to start a trend.

Similarly, Paris does its best to encourage the neutralism of the Indochinese states, to prove to the powers and to the Vietnamese themselves that neutralism is a perfectly viable policy

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when it is sustained by an unmistakable will for independence. With that will, combined with acrobatic talents, the Prince of Cambodia has succeeded in preserving the peace of his realm. De Gaulle sees in this completely nationalist leader—in spite of a capricious personality far removed from the Elysian majesty—one of his chosen disciples. It was to pay him respect that he stopped three days at Phnom Penh on his way to Oceania, where he went to witness a nuclear test. He has less reason to be satisfied about what is happening in Laos, where he vigorously upheld the tripartite formula proposed by Prince Souvanna Phouma which led to the 1962 Geneva negotiations. When King Savang Vatthana came to Paris last year on an official visit, the General and he had to acknowledge that the pacification of Laos depended very much on ending hostilities in Viet Nam. This clearly makes the 1962 agreement of little value.

The remaining aspect of the policy of asserting a presence in Asia is the development of relations with Japan, India and Pakistan. Clearly the aim is to counterbalance Chinese influence, for without this any neutralization of Southeast Asia would be but a sham.

The General's idea that the salvation of the former Indochinese countries lies in their assertion of independence vis-à-vis the superpowers recurs in his attitude toward the states of the Third World. It is obvious that he appreciates their interests and supports their efforts in direct proportion to their own will to be independent, excluding all ideological considerations, especially when a man appears, be he king or president, who incarnates the idea. So, too, he can be simultaneously the friend of Israel, 95 percent of whose military aircraft continue to be "made in France," the friend of Egypt and of Nasser's mortal enemy, the Shah of Iran. In visiting the Emperor of Ethiopia this summer, he was honoring a national leader who, though not caring much about democracy, maintained his power against an aggressor as well as against liberators and feudal lords; but the General still sells arms to southern Africa, the aversion of all the nationalists of the continent.

Finally, de Gaulle's trips to Mexico and South America, though their results may have been modest, signified his belief—as was the case when he spoke against the United States intervention in Santo Domingo—that Latin America cannot completely escape the general process of decolonization any more than other conti-

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nents can. But this does not prevent him from granting that every great power has particular interests to defend, although he never uses the phrase "zone of influence." This is the explanation of his efforts in 1958 to divide the command of possible theaters of operations all around the globe among the Western Big Three, as well as his unreserved support of Kennedy from the first moment of the Cuban missile crisis.

De Gaulle himself evidently intends to preserve a privileged zone of action for France in the lands of her former empire. This is the meaning of her considerable effort to aid Algeria, whose government, to put it mildly, does not always reciprocate; of the military agreements with the Malagasy Republic and other states of French-speaking Africa, notably Senegal and the Ivory Coast; and the very active participation of Paris in the development of most of these countries, with the notorious exception of Guinea, which has not been fully pardoned for having refused to follow from the beginning the Gaullist path.

Beyond what he considers France's civilizing mission in Africa, however, de Gaulle has set himself a higher task. His great ambition is to add to his other laurels those of the man who reunified Europe, so that it could play "in conjunction with America, its daughter," as he put it in the press conference of February 4, 1965, "in harmony and coöperation with a view to the development of its vast resources, the role which falls to it in the progress of two billion men who desperately need it."

"There is above all no question of separating part of Europe from any other part of Europe," he asserted as early as October 25, 1944, in newly liberated Paris. "That would be nonsense as well as poor policy, for Europe is one." If there is a point on which de Gaulle has hardly budged in the course of 25 years of public life, this certainly is it. Nothing justifies, in his view, the continued division of the Continent, which he sees as the center of civilization and the only possible catalyst for bringing about the new world equilibrium. He was not present at Yalta, but he has persisted in the face of established historical truth in promoting the myth that Roosevelt and Stalin in cold calculation divided up Europe there; and he has proclaimed his intention of remaking a settlement which was formulated at a time of European weakness now long past. In his opinion, the division of the world into two blocs will not last forever. Sooner or later Russians and Americans will go home again, leaving Europe, reunited at last,

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to resume its natural place at the very center of geography and history. Also, the Sino-Soviet break, like the latent conflict between France and the United States, seems to him another proof that the world of Yalta is little by little disappearing. There is not a doubt that Europe, "cut in two by the enmity and the greed of the Soviets, will remake itself one day for the good of men."

As he said at Westminster in 1960, several conditions must obviously be fulfilled, "in order for the evolution imposed on the one hand by human nature, which aspires to freedom, and on the other by development, which demands efficiency, progressively to reduce the opposition of the régimes" which divide Europe. This depends above all on the U.S.S.R., which must cease to "threaten," as he believes it has in fact done and as he stated during his trip to Moscow. The Soviet Union must evolve (he said February 4, 1965) "in such a way that it sees its future, not in totalitarian force imposed on its own land and on others, but in progress accomplished in common by free men and peoples" —an evolution which appears to him well under way. Finally, "the nations which Russia has made satellites must be able to play their role in a renewed Europe." The course taken by Rumania, whose head of government was received with much respect in Paris, seems to demonstrate that the régimes of Eastern Europe now have the capacity and will to exercise some measure of independence.

Therefore the time has come to initiate a détente with Eastern Europe—as de Gaulle prematurely thought it had come at the end of 1959. Then, announcing Khrushchev's acceptance of his invitation to visit France, he credited him with having discerned "that at the highest level of responsibility, service to man, to his condition, to his peace, are the realism which is most realistic, the politics which are most politic."

This is the whole meaning of Couve de Murville's travels in Eastern Europe and de Gaulle's own visit to Russia, as well as the steady development of bilateral technical, commercial, cultural and even political relations with the countries of the area. The hope is that by extending the "détente" it may one day become an "entente"—the formula which tends more and more to become the slogan of French diplomacy. In the Elysée it is increasingly clear that the entente must embrace all Europeans, including the Russians. Like all French schoolboys, de Gaulle learned that Europe extends "from the Atlantic to the Urals."

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But since he went to Novosibirsk he has been forced to persuade himself that the Urals, which are practically invisible from an airplane, are no more significant as an ethnic or political barrier than they are as a geographical one. Thus in his toast at the farewell reception in the Kremlin, he spoke of Europe "from one end to the other." This is more vague and cuts short many speculations caused earlier by his too-scholastic vocabulary.

If Russia—which since his trip there the President of the Republic finally consents after 44 years to call the Soviet Union—is by definition European, the United States has no pretensions to this title. And no doubt de Gaulle considers it a coup that the Soviet leaders, who in the Khrushchev era tended to look upon Washington as their only valid interlocutor, and sought there the ultimate solution to the problem of European security, agreed to discuss this matter with him. They even signed a joint declaration, essentially the work of Couve de Murville, which accented the European character of the desired settlement. One may wonder, however, whether they were not playing with words, since de Gaulle concedes—he said so to Kosygin and Brezhnev—that the Americans would have to join in guaranteeing that settlement. This presupposes that they would likewise be allowed to discuss its nature. By the same token, he does not dispute the American rights deriving from the war in matters concerning the German problem. In fact, he expressed the core of his thought when he said at the first working session in the Kremlin, "I am not displeased to have the U.S.S.R. as a counterweight to American hegemony," adding immediately, "and I am no more displeased to have the United States as a counterweight to Soviet hegemony."

We may conclude that the Soviet Union has its place reserved in the Europe of de Gaulle's dreams, but on condition that it give up the idea of dominating it—and he counts on the United States always to dissuade it from doing so. At bottom, his basic difference with the other NATO members is that he considers that its very power creates a temptation for the United States to dominate. Consequently, it is unnecessary for Western Europe to pay anything for American protection against the Soviets since it clearly is in the American interest to provide it; and further, no risk is involved in pressing the West Europeans to shake off some of this guardianship. The Germans, British, Italians or Beneluxians are always cautious about criticizing the

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Americans for fear of pushing them into abandoning Europe. The General does not believe for a minute in that possibility, though he uses the argument to justify the French *force de frappe.*

In any event, de Gaulle considers it inconceivable that the Continent can be reunified and the key German problem solved until Western Europe has established its independence of the United States. There is no chance of Moscow relinquishing its military presence in the heart of the Continent unless the American presence disappears as well. At the same time, the equilibrium between the two parts of Europe would be dangerously upset unless there were a political and even military unity in the West worthy of the name.

Operating from this point of view, de Gaulle as far back as London and Algiers days appealed to the nations of Western Europe to regroup. Before quitting power in 1946 he went to Mainz to speak of reconciliation with the Germans, and as early as 1958 assured Adenauer that France would adhere to the Common Market, although many of his followers—Michel Debré for one—had vigorously denounced it while in opposition during the Fourth Republic. In 1960 also, he proposed a modified form of European political union—the Fouchet Plan. He indicated to Macmillan twice, when he visited Rambouillet in 1962, that he was fully prepared to build a strategic rocket jointly with Britain. He vetoed the British entry into the Common Market because he had thought the Nassau Agreements proved that Britain continued to value its American ties above joining Europe, which meant that it could only play there the role of an American Trojan horse—but subsequently expressed the conviction that some time the United Kingdom would decide to cross the Channel. Until then there was no hope of a truly independent Europe. He signed a treaty of friendship with Germany, which in his mind as in Adenauer's was intended to force the hand of their partners among the Six, who were guilty of rejecting the Fouchet Plan. He refused to sign the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, which in his judgment would merely consolidate the privileged position of the Big Three. Finally, he increased his objections to the M.L.F. and similar proposals which would have integrated West Germany once and for all into the American defense system, thus shattering all hopes for European military autonomy.

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IV

The General's preaching has awakened echoes in various European political and intellectual circles. This has been notable in the right wing of the Christian Democratic Union. Yet since Adenauer's retirement Gaullism has been ineffectual at the governmental level. The General's decision to withdraw his troops from the Atlantic command, and to give notice to the American troops stationed in France to leave, increased the mistrust of his European partners, particularly since he did not consult with them any more than with the Americans. These measures isolate him still further on his Empyrean height, and reveal his contempt for those who in a prosaic era are called to succeed the great wartime chieftians—of whom he alone remains in power to perpetuate the breed.

Since he is absolutely convinced that history in the end will once again prove him right, de Gaulle is not a man to give in to pressure, especially from the "Anglo-Saxons." He awaits the day when the others will come to him, recognizing that all he wants is peace through the progressive reconciliation of Eastern and Western Europe and the end of the cold war on the basis of mutual concessions. For this purpose he pushes Bonn to reassure Russia, Poland and Czechoslovakia of its peaceful intentions and to give up all claims—territorial or nuclear—thus surrendering in some measure its equality of rights; but at the same time he repeats to the U.S.S.R. that it must not expect French recognition of East Germany, which is nothing but an "artificial creation," a symbol of the division of the Continent into rival ideologies. In his judgment the only equitable basis for the solution of the German problem, as for all others, is self-determination.

Now there is no denying the daring of this philosophy and the breadth of this vision. Nor can one deny that it makes a certain good sense if one grants that the balance of terror prevents either camp from attempting to impose a solution on the other. In taking over ideas which have been expressed often before by nonconformist intellectuals (among others the staff of *Le Monde*), de Gaulle gives them the backing of his personal prestige and that of a nation which after years of eclipse has regained a great deal of its international standing. He forces each one to ask himself whether the formulas repeated *ad nauseam* for years have the least chance of attaining concrete results. Already we have seen the NATO Council at its session in Brussels discuss the idea of a reunified Europe.

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Is this to say that de Gaulle has much chance of becoming the *deux ex machina* to put an end to the division of Europe? For the moment, the echoes of his ideas among the leaders of Eastern Europe are very feeble. Chiefly they see in France's position an effective counterforce to the strengthening of Germany within NATO, at a moment, too, when the war in Viet Nam is diverting the major thrust of American policy to Asia and when the permanent pound-sterling crisis reduces Britain to the role of a hardly-brilliant second to the United States. In order for them to accept the constructive aspect of de Gaulle's theses on Europe, they must be convinced that he is not a freewheeler but a spokesman of a unanimous Europe. But that de Gaulle is not. Western Europeans, including many Frenchmen, are sufficiently content with their lot to respond only moderately to the appeal for an independence which would necessarily involve them in financial sacrifice. Moreover, the language and cavalier manner of the French Head of State have rightly or wrongly created the feeling among his partners that he intends in the final analysis to substitute his own protection for that of the United States. A few gestures on his part would no doubt be enough to end these misgivings. By campaigning, for example, for a European political organ based on universal suffrage, he could obtain wide popular if not governmental support all around Europe. Unhappily, nothing indicates that he dreams of doing so, and in fact such a move would go against the grain of his nature.

It nevertheless must be stated that, in spite of all the apprehension expressed in one quarter or another, he has not only allowed the economic construction of Western Europe to proceed but speeded up the process, though this involved many concessions on his part, expurgating "supranationalism" in principle only to allow it to develop in practice. True, it has not been proved that this Community can be the nucleus of a larger and more integrated Europe. On the other hand, nothing proves the contrary. It is hard to ask a personage like de Gaulle, for a quarter of a century the very embodiment of French legitimacy, to bow to a higher authority. But it ought to be enough for him to look over the list of his possible heirs in order to be convinced that the only successor who would be of his stature, the only one who could continue to speak as equal to the giants of the modern world, is a united Europe.

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AMERICAN DEALINGS WITH PEKING

By Kenneth T. Young

IF the most powerful country and the most populous country in the world could not have a normal diplomatic relationship, they would have to invent a substitute. And they did. For eleven years the United States and the Chinese People's Republic have dealt directly with each other by means of their special if obscure arrangement known as the Ambassadorial Talks, held at irregular intervals, first in Geneva, then in Warsaw. Although the official record of the exchanges between their two Ambassadors has been kept secret by mutual agreement, official statements in Washington and Peking, together with news reports in both countries, provide some material for describing several high points of the "longest established permanent floating" diplomatic game in modern history. The United States has participated in three international conferences with the Chinese People's Republic, but in the course of them few or no bilateral discussions or contacts took place informally on the side; thus the principal American dealings with Peking have occurred in the Ambassadorial Talks. It is time to recognize and appraise these unusual dealings.

They are a distinctive paradox, empty of results but full of consequences. Through them Washington has probably had a more continuous diplomatic contact and diversified dialogue with the government in Peking than any of the non-Communist Western governments which maintain embassies there. Yet, despite the long duration of the Talks and the voluminous exchanges made in them, they have transacted only one agreement in all that time. In fact, nineteen specific proposals known to have been made by one side or the other have been publicly rejected. Nevertheless, this forum has proven of some lasting value.

The crucial feature of the Talks is that they provide a workable channel for reducing miscalculations, clarifying intentions and explaining proposals. The President has a dependable "switchboard" immediately available to talk with the Politburo in Peking about Viet Nam, nuclear disarmament, the improvement of relations or anything else. The responsible leaders in Peking have the same facility in reverse when they choose to use it. Each government can note the varying emphases and slight

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nuances in the official expressions which pass across the table in the privacy of the conference room. And the cumulative experience has established some credibility for both sides, indispensable to any form of diplomatic dealings.

So far, only six men have constituted this forum and created this credibility. On the American side have been three professional diplomats and a former Postmaster General.[1] The meetings have always been held on neutral ground, never on the premises of either side. Until 1958, the United Nations provided a conference room in its Geneva Headquarters. Since then the Polish Government has made accommodations available in a small old palace in Warsaw. Since the Talks moved from Geneva to Warsaw, our Ambassador to Poland has been the American representative. Two well-placed members of the Chinese Communist Party—both named Wang—have in turn represented the People's Republic of China. Altogether there have been some 130 numbered meetings, several special sessions and various informal and social occasions. However, the Chinese have discouraged the casual interchanges which the Americans have suggested in recent years.

The frequency of the Talks has varied; sometimes they have been held daily, sometimes several months apart. The current schedule is at the leisurely pace of about four times a year, but a meeting can be called on short notice. The format is rigid and ritualistic, copied from the style of Panmunjom, where the Korean truce was negotiated. At each session the American and Chinese Ambassadors alternate in giving the opening statement, and then take turns in speaking until neither has more to say. The Ambassador who did not begin the meeting then automatically proposes a recess until the next session; no meeting can adjourn until a date for the next one is agreed upon, thus assuring continuity. The meetings generally last about two hours, including time for translation. While hardly cordial, the tone and atmosphere are serious, businesslike and straightforward. Each "side," as they impersonally call themselves, either reads from prepared material or makes spontaneous replies or rebuttals, always in its own language. Questions are asked, clarifications made—and everything meticulously noted down separately by each side for the careful scrutiny of the Foreign Ministry in Peking and the State Department in Washington, but no official transcript of the secret record is jointly prepared. Each Am-

[1] U. Alexis Johnson, Jacob Beam, John Moors Cabot and John A. Gronouski.

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bassador has three highly skilled aides to interpret, to take notes and to consult with their opposite numbers between sessions. This in itself is an important link, too.

II

This "sub-diplomatic" system of Ambassadorial Talks got started in mid-1955 at Geneva as a result of extensive diplomatic persuasion involving the United Nations, many governments and leading statesmen. In a simmering crisis over Taiwan, Peking took the initiative at the Bandung Conference in proposing to "sit down" with the United States to discuss and negotiate the "elimination of tensions" in East Asia, meaning the Taiwan situation. Capitalizing on the world-wide aura of coexistence highlighted in the Summit Conference of July 1955, the Communist Chinese government apparently hoped to secure control over Taiwan by improving its own international standing. At first Peking was the challenging negotiator in the Talks. In contrast, Washington was not then anxious to deal directly with a régime which it refused to recognize and wished to isolate. Nevertheless, many diplomatic considerations induced President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles in 1955 to accept an arms-length discussion with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. They did so reluctantly, as a matter of expediency, to probe Peking's intentions regarding Taiwan and to negotiate the repatriation of some 40 Americans incarcerated in Chinese Communist jails; this was the bait on Peking's hook. Washington made clear at the outset, and has constantly maintained, that it would not negotiate any matter with Peking which would vitally affect the Republic of China on Taiwan, America's treaty ally.

The agreement on repatriation of prisoners, issued on September 10, 1955, was the only transaction successfully concluded between Washington and Peking in the eleven years of the Talks. It took up all the first fourteen meetings in hard-boiled negotiation. After exchanging a series of draft texts in English and Chinese, the two sides argued amendments and accepted compromises. Interestingly, the agreement provided identical paragraphs for Americans in the Chinese People's Republic and for Chinese in the United States, to make it appear perfectly reciprocal. All but four of the imprisoned Americans were eventually repatriated; the others were kept for what to Washington seemed bargaining purposes, in defiance of its interpretation of the agree-

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ment. This poisoned the atmosphere of the early Ambassadorial Talks and prevented discussion of several subjects which Peking was then pressing.

This is the one publicly recorded agreement in eleven years of meetings. Nevertheless, the total of nineteen definite proposals rejected, plus the numerous resubmissions of rejected or revised texts, indicates that a major diplomatic effort was made by the two governments. Over the years, Washington has reportedly turned down Peking's propositions for changing Taiwan's status, holding a bilateral Foreign Ministers' meeting, ending the American embargo and opening trade with China, exchanging newsmen, establishing cultural relations with the United States, agreeing on atom-free zones in Asia and elsewhere, convening a world-wide or nuclear powers' conference on disarmament, making a bilateral pledge to refrain from using nuclear weapons against each other, and negotiating a withdrawal of the United States from Viet Nam. For its part, Peking has reportedly rejected Washington's proposals for a joint renunciation of force with respect to Taiwan, the immediate return of all imprisoned Americans (thus implementing the one agreement faithfully), various arrangements for the neutralization of the offshore islands and the stabilization of the Taiwan Straits, adherence to the Test Ban Treaty, participation in general disarmanent, a reciprocal pledge that neither would be the first to use nuclear weapons against the other (to come into effect concurrently with signing the Test Ban Treaty), a reciprocal or unilateral exchange of newsmen, an ending of travel barriers to scholars, scientists, doctors, businessmen and others, arrangements for shipments of surplus food, and various proposals to negotiate the conflict in Viet Nam. Each rejection has its own historical explanation; many stood no chance whatever of acceptance. As a whole, the rejections reflect a reversal of roles in the course of time, perhaps the most interesting feature of the Ambassadorial Talks. The negative results tend to obscure the positive consequences.

III

The dealings between the United States and Communist China divide into two fairly distinct phases. In the first phase, from 1955 to mid-1958, Peking pressed for agreement on several specific proposals "comparatively easy to settle," like a bilateral Foreign Ministers' conference, trade and exchange of newsmen, without

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insisting that the United States agree to withdrawal from Taiwan as a condition for discussion or agreement. The Americans refused to discuss these matters until Peking released all American prisoners and agreed to a joint renunciation of the use of force, specifically in respect to Taiwan.

The first three years of the Talks were a duel between the revolutionary of the Long March, Chou En-lai, who proved a versatile challenger, and the negotiator from Wall Street, John Foster Dulles, the resourceful defender. Then, after the Taiwan crisis in September 1958, each side reversed itself for its own reasons. Peking ended its thrusts for concessions from Washington when it found its primary target, Taiwan, unobtainable by negotiation without making some compromise. It then replaced its duel of manœuvre with a diplomacy of stalemate which dead-ended every approach not involving concessions as regards Taiwan and downgraded the Talks to a waiting game. Reversing completely its position in the first phase of the Talks, Peking has insisted since 1960 that the Americans unconditionally accept the principle of total American withdrawal from the Taiwan area before it will discuss or negotiate any specific agreements on the lesser matters which two years before it had considered "easy to settle." Again in contrast, Washington since 1959 has modified the priority which it put on principle and has tried to negotiate agreements on various specific proposals, particularly on an exchange of reporters and others. Especially since 1965, Washington has vigorously and repeatedly sought to undo the snarls and to establish new lines of contact with Peking, but to no avail. Taiwan remains the knot. So far, then, the second phase of the Talks has been sterile in negotiating specific results.

Yet, notwithstanding rejections and reversals, the Ambassadorial Talks have had several special by-products of considerable value outside the framework of the original intentions. These have included the prevention of specific miscalculations involving Laos, Taiwan and Viet Nam, discussion of nuclear proliferation and disarmament, exchange of views and proposals on Viet Nam, and problems of mutual relations. Moreover, the Talks have deeply affected the triangular relationship among Washington, Peking and Moscow. They also have reassured our allies and many other governments that Washington is not recalcitrant about dealing with Peking.

When a crisis seemed to be building up over Laos in 1961,

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President Kennedy reportedly used the Ambassadorial channel in Warsaw to warn that the United States would be compelled to intervene militarily, however unwillingly, if a cease-fire did not precede the opening of negotiations in Geneva. Peking informed Washington via the Warsaw channel that it was serious about wishing to negotiate rather than fight and that it hoped that the United States would coöperate in working out an acceptable agreement for the neutralization of the country. By preventing a serious miscalculation, Peking's notification averted a potential military clash and helped assure the diplomatic alternative of the Geneva Conference.

An even more dramatic signalling of intentions and lessening of tensions came in 1962 when the Chinese Nationalists gave the appearance of preparing to harass and invade coastal China and Chinese Communist forces began to build up opposite Taiwan. In this grave confrontation, President Kennedy used the Warsaw channel to tell Peking that the United States would not support any such undertaking by the Chinese Nationalists, but on the other hand would defend Taiwan if Peking mistakenly resorted to force. The signal went through, for the crisis abated. This may well have been the most valuable single consequence of the Ambassadorial Talks, making all their frustrations and failures worthwhile.

While the Talks have not settled the pivotal issue of Taiwan —Peking's prime interest from the beginning—they did permit an extensive exchange of views about the dispute, which helped make it less combustible if not less intractable. Even when the two governments were at a complete impasse over Taiwan, they were not totally in the dark; and the Ambassadorial Talks succeeded in cooling down the most serious of all the Taiwan crises, that of 1958.

The incident left indelible scars on the relations between Peking and Moscow as well as between Peking and Washington. China's manipulation of force and diplomacy in manufacturing the crisis backfired. The United States assembled the most powerful striking force in history and at the same time tried strenuously in the Ambassadorial Talks to negotiate a new status for the offshore islands; Secretary Dulles was apparently ready for a bilateral ministerial meeting with the Chinese Communists, and to go on from an agreement on the islands to even more consequential matters. Peking's failure to take him up lost a real

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opportunity for possibly significant negotiations, with the result that—as in Korea before and later in Viet Nam—a much greater American military presence emerged in East Asia than might otherwise have been the case. As for Moscow, the Talks during the Taiwan crisis of 1958 gave it the opportunity to make a show of support for Peking without offering an unconditional guarantee, as well as a chance to give Washington a warning without running the risk of nuclear involvement. With Washington and Peking resorting to diplomacy, Moscow was able to exercise some influence on both, increase its options and restrict its entanglement. It was of lasting significance that the triangular interplay impaired Sino-Soviet relations and has deadlocked Sino-American negotiations ever since. Peking made the bitter discovery that its ally put limits on challenging Washington regarding Peking's national "irredenta." Partially in retaliation against ally and enemy alike, Communist China is now uncompromisingly hostile to both and prevents negotiation with either.

More recently, Viet Nam has been the subject of the Talks in Warsaw. While the exchange has not reduced tensions on the surface, it has communicated official intentions, delineated the options open to both sides and prevented careless or ignorant miscalculation. The United States has emphasized and reiterated at Warsaw the limited nature of its aims: that it desires negotiations, that it has no intention of destroying the Democratic Republic of North Viet Nam or of seizing its territory; and that it is not its policy to threaten the security of the Chinese People's Republic or to invade it. Washington reportedly has expounded a plan for political settlement based on the Geneva Accords of 1954 and has proposed a reciprocal de-escalation of military operations in Viet Nam as a prelude to negotiations. However, the Chinese People's Republic has been as intractable about Viet Nam from the American viewpoint as the United States presumably seems to the Chinese Communists on the Taiwan issue. Apparently Peking rejected all Washington's explanations and proposals about Viet Nam and demanded that Washington cease its "criminal aggression," withdraw completely and accept the proposals of Hanoi. Whether these official exchanges at Warsaw will keep a ceiling on the crisis and facilitate an eventual negotiation remains to be seen.

Another significant and little known product of the Ambassadorial Talks has been the extensive and serious exchange of

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views regarding the nuclear issue and general disarmament—apparently the only such exchange during the past three years between the Chinese People's Republic and any non-Communist government. During his whole Administration, President Kennedy was deeply concerned about the prospect of an expansionist China armed with nuclear weapons and expressed his foreboding frequently, even in his last news conference. Through the Ambassadorial Talks he urged Peking in 1963 to adhere to the Test Ban Treaty. However, Peking denounced the Treaty as a fraud and instead invited President Kennedy directly by letter (also sent to all heads of government) to join in a world-wide summit conference which would prohibit and destroy all nuclear weapons. Instead of turning down this proposal outright, Washington presented Peking with the documents, supported by lengthy oral arguments, concerning a detailed and comprehensive plan of carefully staged and controlled disarmament which it also laid before the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Washington hoped that Peking would at least discuss this plan or answer its questions about the Chinese proposals and, if at all possible, defer making bombs of its own; but to no avail.

After it had set off its first nuclear device in October 1964, Peking proposed both publicly and in the Ambassadorial Talks that the nuclear powers, present and potential, hold a summit on nuclear weapons. President Johnson, also much concerned about China's nuclear policy, instead had the general American proposals reiterated in the Ambassadorial Talks. Apparently they were ignored, but later Peking quietly proposed a joint agreement not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against the other; since China was not a nuclear power, but had large conventional forces, this was hardly a reciprocal offer. The United States in effect rejected the proposal on the grounds that public declarations were no substitute for carefully staged and controlled disarmament. Most of this particular exchange was secret until May 1966, when Prime Minister Chou En-lai divulged the fact that his government had proposed the joint pledge and that the United States had rejected it. At the Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw on May 25, the Americans suggested a reciprocal undertaking: Washington would sign the pledge if Peking would sign the Test Ban Treaty. Because of newspaper reports of this meeting—such, at least, was the pretext given—Peking rebuffed the American proposal angrily and publicly.

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In sum, although these secret exchanges over three years on the critical nuclear issue were unproductive, they served three purposes. They confirmed Communist China's intention to proceed with its own nuclear development regardless of American representations; they brought Peking into the international stream of analysis and discussion of disarmament and arms-control problems, rather than leaving it ignored on the outside; and they involved Peking and Washington in an initial bargaining situation over "no-first-use" pledges which might germinate something feasible in the future.

The Talks at Warsaw have as yet reached no agreement on further contacts because Washington will not accept Peking's demand, apparently repeated at every meeting in Warsaw, that the United States vacate "China's territory." Nevertheless, Washington has put forward several variations of previous proposals for an exchange of newsmen, even indicating a willingness to let Chinese reporters come to the United States without any reciprocal opportunity for American newsmen to go to China. Washington has also urged an exchange of scholars, scientists, doctors, businessmen and persons in public affairs. The American government has also indicated that it is reviewing the question of trade with China, and is encouraging private organizations to continue seeking the contacts there which up to now have been refused.

Unfortunately, President Johnson's widening efforts to promote contacts have been paralleled by an intensification of the conflict in Viet Nam and the development of a political struggle inside the Chinese People's Republic. As Washington has pressed for an "opening up" diplomacy, Peking has foreclosed it, scorning all the recent proposals publicly as "old tricks and conspiracy." Despite Washington's considerable efforts—whatever may have been its mistakes in emphasis and timing—the net result after eleven years of discussion is that the gap between the two governments is growing and the prospects for closer contacts seem remote.

IV

What about future prospects for American dealings with Peking? First, we have learnt from the Ambassadorial Talks that Chinese Communist negotiators are tough, able and determined. As Chinese and Leninists they generally negotiate with a long-

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range view; they are in no hurry and show endless patience and imperturbability. American negotiators can be put at a disadvantage in dealing with the Chinese Communists because the American public wants quick results and the traditional American style is to get a negotiation over with. The Chinese negotiator also operates from a Sinocentric, Leninist, Maoist world-view, which is antithetical to ours. He is the prisoner of dogma, but his indoctrination and discipline convince him of his inevitable victory. To him, negotiation means the capitulation of the "enemy," not accommodation with him. The Chinese Communists nevertheless are sensitive to any signs of unequal treatment and demand reciprocal arrangements. This does not, of course, inhibit them from trying to trick the other party into unwittingly conceding the basic dispute in a negotiation by the manner in which an item is merely listed on the agenda. They try to fix the substance of the negotiation. And they will try to bargain one concession twice in the well-known technique of the "double sell."

But, for the long pull, we need not spend all our time trying to figure out what is at the back of a Chinese Communist negotiator's mind if we first focus our efforts on making sure that he is left in no doubt about what is on our mind. For that vital purpose this special channel seems likely at present to be available indefinitely. Washington and Peking seem to prefer, for contradictory reasons, to maintain their direct dealings rather than end them. Neither appears ready to assume the onus for breaking them off and each leaves the impression of expecting to gain some benefit from them eventually. Of course, Maoist hard-liners might suddenly close out the long game. For its part, Washington has increasingly emphasized that it will seek to maintain and improve "direct diplomatic contacts" with Peking, "an opening through which, hopefully, light might one day penetrate." And however fragile and unproductive it may have seemed, the link between Washington and Peking has ameliorated the anxieties of many governments which fear a collision between the United States and the Chinese People's Republic.

The unique "sub-diplomatic relationship" described here, however frustrating, should remain for a time the exclusive and regular diplomatic contact between the United States and the Chinese People's Republic. In some respects, the Talks express a continuity in the Chinese style for dealing with foreigners at a distance and in perplexing circumstances; indeed, there is a slight

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similarity here between 1966 and 1866. For the present, they can continue to cushion to some extent the encounters between the two countries and just possibly they might create the materials out of which an eventual accommodation can be made. It makes sense to defer formal recognition and normal diplomatic relations until both countries have safely overcome their heavy incubus of antagonism and frustration. Before moving too fast, too soon and perhaps irreparably away from the Ambassadorial Talks, we should first seek to improve them. We might, for instance, suggest that the meetings be held alternately at each Embassy, and that the talks be conducted by special Ambassadors assigned for the purpose. In any event, we should urge more frequent meetings and try to increase the number of informal discussions and documentary exchanges.

An American policy of encouraging better relations with Peking, despite rebuffs and epithets, can help influence the course of events as China changes. It will reinforce the efforts of others to modify Peking's view of the world and its relations with it. If and when a new and more responsive outlook is detected across the table, our patience in probing and proposing will be rewarded. Meanwhile, a workable line of communication can offer a diplomatic alternative to the military confrontation. If we persist long enough in our "sit-in," it might some day become a place for a meeting of minds, not just of men, to explore such critical tasks as a guaranteed settlement for Southeast Asia, nuclear control, the internal requirements of China, the regulation of the Taiwan Straits problem in all its aspects, and the evolution of the triangular relations between Peking, Moscow and Washington.

However much the present leaders in Peking may challenge us with a litany of hate, our purpose and manner in dealing with them and the people of the Chinese People's Republic can challenge them with our very different articles of faith and with our own revolutionary perspective for the future. A period of American forbearance, patience and vision—looking beyond a generation—will not just be marking time. It may be essential for maturing the present unformed association between two of the foremost world powers into a peaceful and constructive relationship.

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REPORTS OF BRITAIN'S DEATH . . .

By Iain Macleod

"IN the middle of the twentieth century," declared Richard Cobden, nineteenth-century apostle of free trade, "there will be only two great powers in the world, the United States and Russia, and they will overshadow all the rest." Alexis de Tocqueville had, of course, said much the same thing at much the same time. But the Frenchman's prophecy, it must be remembered, came a generation after his own country's decisive defeat at Waterloo. The Englishman's, though less familiar, is in a sense more remarkable; for it was made in the heyday of Britain's preëminence in world affairs.

This preëminence, though not quite so unchallenged or protracted as nostalgia now tempts us to think, was based upon three material advantages. The first of these was that we were the pioneers of industrial capitalism. Technological ingenuity of a small handful of Scots and Englishmen, combined with an intrepid pursuit of opulence on the part of the entrepreneurial class, made Britain for a time "the workshop of the world." The second of our advantages was the existence of the British Empire. Though romantically alluded to as a "white man's burden," the colonies provided a large and open market for our manufactured goods and significantly augmented our military and diplomatic strength. To these industrial and imperial advantages was added, thirdly, the supremacy of the Royal Navy. This not merely safeguarded our strategic and trade routes in all the world's oceans, but made our island a fortress—as impregnable to Napoleon's flat-bottomed boats as it had been to the Spanish Armada.

Cobden was not alone in discerning the transient nature of these special advantages. "It is a delusion," said the future Conservative leader Benjamin Disraeli in 1838, "to suppose that the Continent will suffer Britain to be the workshop for the world." Other nations, outside as well as inside Europe, were bound to apply and to improve upon the techniques of industrialization which we had pioneered. Many of them—particularly the United States and, later, Russia—would overshadow the advantage of our earlier start by virtue of their greater size, population and resources. Moreover, the very fact that we had started early would subsequently impose upon us both a physical and psy-

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chological handicap. Physical, because the earlier you start the larger the legacy of outdated attitudes, techniques and capital equipment you inherit. Psychological, because the advent of competition is bound to reduce your relative position as an industrial power even though your absolute position may be markedly improving.

Those who foresaw the passing of Britain's commercial supremacy had equally few illusions about the future of imperial dominion. The American War of Independence had established fairly firmly in the British mind the proposition that no nation could hope permanently to govern another. "These wretched colonies," wrote Disraeli brusquely and brutally in 1852, "will all be independent in a few years and are a millstone round our neck." He was referring specifically to the Canadian provinces, which did indeed become self-governing fifteen years later. It is true that Disraeli changed his mind, or at least his tune, and that for a brief moment at the end of the nineteenth century, the vision of a federated Empire was much discussed. The discussion reached its climax at the Diamond Jubilee celebrations in 1897 when the Premiers of the imperial territories were sumptuously feted in London. Wilfrid Laurier, the Canadian Prime Minister, jested amidst these junketings that every Jubilee guest would need a new constitution. But no new constitution was forthcoming for the British Empire. Within a hundred years of Canada's achieving her freedom, that Empire "on which the sun never set" had been reduced to thirty minuscule territories with a total population approximately equal to that of Michigan.

More fundamental even than this spectacular change has been the ending of the centuries' long invincibility of the British islands. To invade Britain has, since the days of the Norman Conquest, been a singularly difficult operation. The reason is clear, and was succinctly stated by G. M. Trevelyan at the outset of his great "History of England." "A well-organized State, with a united people on land and a naval force at sea," he wrote, "could make itself safe behind the Channel even against such military odds as Philip of Spain, Louis XIV and Napoleon could assemble on the opposite shore. In recent centuries these conditions have been fulfilled, and although an invading force has sometimes been welcomed, as when Henry Tudor or William of Orange came over, no invasion hostile to the community as a whole has met with even partial success owing to the barrier of the sea." Though this

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barrier continued to prove an insuperable obstacle in the two twentieth-century wars against Germany, changes in weapons and tactics had already by 1914 shaken our old security. The possessor of the Channel ports could, by long-distance guns, airplanes and submarines, threaten our existence much more formidably than the enemies mentioned by Trevelyan. Today, with the development of nuclear bases and missiles in Eastern Europe, no country in the world would be more certainly menaced with destruction in the event of another war than ours.

II

History is littered with nations that have been broken forever by the stress of lesser changes than those I have outlined. But the British are a very old, a very tough, and on the whole a pretty sophisticated people. We are not so easily broken. There are of course weak sisters among us, as there are in every community. And the weak sisters often have strong voices—advocating a "holiday from history" or telling us our day is done. At the other extreme we still have a few robust Canute-like figures who refuse to acknowledge contemporary realities and bellow at them to go away. Neither group must be taken to represent the broad consensus of British opinion. Most of us by now have shed outdated delusions of grandeur and are looking for ways of adjusting our society to the last third of the twentieth century. But most of us understand also that there can be neither prosperity nor security for Britain if we simply retreat into our shell and attempt to ease domestic problems by abdicating from our world responsibilities.

After all, it is nothing new for the British to find themselves inferior in strength to their great antagonists. They always have been. Sea power, as I have said, gave us a marvelous self-protection. But none of the strong, aggressive powers, whose domination of the Continent it has been British policy to oppose over a period of four hundred years, could have been defeated by Britain alone. We were never much more likely to win a war against Spain or France or Germany on our own than we would be today against a major power. We depended, as we do now, on having allies. We depended on creating a league of defense or, in the language of diplomacy, a balance of power.

Is it too fanciful to suppose that, in pursuing this policy, we were profiting from the memories of our earliest history? Number-

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less generations of grammar-school boys across the centuries must have construed that passage in Tacitus where he describes how the Britons, faced with Roman aggression, were weakened by their internal divisions. "Nothing has helped us more in war," wrote the Roman historian, "than their inability to coöperate. It is but seldom that two or three states unite to repel a common danger; fighting singly, they are conquered wholesale." What was true of Britain then became relevant to Europe later. Time after time a policy of uniting to repel a common danger preserved the Continent as well as ourselves from tyranny. Today the common danger has become global instead of continental. But the principle remains the same.

In the great confederacy against Communism, the broadest shoulders have borne the heaviest burden—and those shoulders, as the nineteenth-century prophets foretold, are America's. But Lord Avon was obviously right to point out in a recent issue of this review that the burden would be "more tolerable to Atlas if friends both sympathize and do what they can to share and lighten it."[1] At the present time it is, of course, in Southeast Asia that the burden weighs heaviest and the involvement is deepest. There can be no question but that the gradual and reluctant intervention of American forces was essential to preserve South Viet Nam from armed conquest. But far more is at stake in that struggle than the future of South Viet Nam itself. For unless aggression is held there, the Communist tide will be free to roll on to Thailand, to Burma and ultimately to Malaysia.

It is almost certainly true—and the argument has been increasingly heard in Britain in recent months—that the ultimate balance of power in Asia must be held by Asians themselves. But until the great (or potentially great) Asian powers have both the economic capacity and the political will to contain or restrain Communist expansion, the burden rests upon us. By "us" I mean primarily America. But now that Malaysia has been preserved by British defense operations from the "confrontation" mounted by Indonesia, Britain too must retain in the Indian Ocean sufficient resources to help when help is called for. As *The Economist* recently put it: "Britain may not be a superpower by American and Russian standards; but it is a super-pike in the Indian Ocean pond." We have direct responsibility for the internal security and external defense of many territories east of Suez, and treaty ob-

[1] Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, "The Burden of Leadership." *Foreign Affairs*, January 1966.

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ligations both bilateral (like that to Malaysia) and multilateral (like those to SEATO and CENTO). How long and in what strength Britain should stay east of Suez is certainly still a matter of serious debate. Whether we should stay is not.

However, as the threat to peace and security shifts from Europe to other theaters, we may well need to reconsider the commitment under which we have maintained substantial land forces on the Continent. We certainly cannot be expected to suffer a perpetual drain on our balance of payments in order to do so. Our NATO allies must be asked to take a global view of the vital interests of the Western Alliance. They must make it possible for us to contribute, and they might themselves be encouraged to contribute, to the defense of those wider interests. This does not mean that there is any disposition in Britain to doubt the continuing importance of collective defense to maintain a balance of power in Europe. Still less, of course, do we share the Gaullist heresies or believe that defense can be adequately secured in the modern age by bilateral arrangements. On the contrary, if a NATO mobile force were to assume responsibilities outside the NATO area, an integrated system of defense would become doubly important.

III

Britain's responsibilities in the world are by no means confined to the problems compendiously described as the cold war. The Empire is gone. But in its place we have created a new Commonwealth, stretching over every ocean and continent and comprising a quarter of humanity. Some cynics have suggested that a main purpose of this Commonwealth is to enable us to feel that, in changed circumstances, we still enjoy the reflected splendor of our imperial past. If that were really a main purpose, or indeed a purpose at all, the British would by now have surely given it up as a bad job. For in truth, there is scarcely a feature of the old Empire that the new Commonwealth reflects or retains.

It is not an assembly of like-minded nations under British leadership. On the contrary, agreement can be found only on very limited fronts or on the most general expressions of opinion. It does not enjoy (though "Whitaker's Almanac" still insists it does) "a broadly common pattern of institutions, legislative, executive and judicial." Either as a result of personal ambitions or the paramount need for a strong executive, most of the new

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nations have moved far away from the careful balances of British democracy. Again, the Commonwealth is not, and is not seeking to become, an exclusive economic or trading bloc. Almost without exception its members desire the widest possible expansion of multilateral arrangements. Least of all is the Commonwealth a defensive alliance. To Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan we are linked in collective security pacts, and to Malaysia by defense agreement. But most of the African and Asian members pursue that "system of neutrality and impartiality" which John Adams enjoined on the United States in the days of its youth.

No, the Commonwealth does not pander to British self-deception, nor to any wistful imagining that the past has not gone beyond recall. What it does do is to hold out to the British people contemporary ideals that are worthy of their effort and sacrifice. In this way it fulfills the need so strikingly expressed by John Strachey in "The End of Empire," where he wrote: "Nations which have known empire may simply break their hearts if they do not find a higher ideal than personal enrichment by which to live." The British can find this higher ideal in the Commonwealth because the Commonwealth sits astride two of the most dangerous divisions in the modern world—the gulf between the white peoples and the colored, and between the rich nations and the poor. These divisions present a moral challenge which the Commonwealth both highlights and provides opportunities to bridge.

It was against this background that Britain herself had to take the agonizing decision to limit the flood of immigrants from the Commonwealth which began a dozen years ago. The decision was right, because it made it easier for the common sense and morality of the British people to assert themselves in face of what was, to most of them, a new problem. By reducing the potential size of the social difficulties involved, it increased the likelihood that immigrants could be absorbed into our community with tolerance and without friction.

But a very different problem presented itself to the white communities in Africa, whose capital and skill had built prosperity, and who feared the consequences of political power for an African majority. In Kenya a successful settlement of this problem was achieved. And because of the settlement in Kenya, a settlement in Zambia became possible. If now there is a basis for optimism about Rhodesia, it is because of what I once called "the infection

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of peace spreading southwards." There can be little doubt that the possibility of a reasonable settlement already exists. It is for Britain and Rhodesia alike to show the statesmanship and the moderation by which the opportunity may be seized.

The Commonwealth structure itself enables peoples of infinite variety, race and culture to work together in confidence. The creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Commonwealth Foundation are recent examples of this strong coöperative spirit. So are the educational, legal and medical conferences which harness the individual experiences of member countries to the common good. It would be appropriate if Britain's own responsibilities for economic development in the Commonwealth were to be shared more equally among the sovereign members, some of whom enjoy living standards as high or even higher than our own. Meanwhile, thousands of British men and women are serving in the developing countries of the Commonwealth as teachers, doctors, nurses, engineers, agriculturists and technicians of every kind. Tens of millions of pounds—as much as can be spared without placing an intolerable burden on our balance of payments—go yearly to build up the economies of these new nations. No country in the world is so liberal as Britain in providing them with access to her markets. But it is not enough for one country to be liberal in this respect. What is needed above all is a much freer system of world trade and an improved world monetary system to sustain it.

IV

Britain herself must live by world trade—and the more world trade there is, the better we can live. We are the world's largest market for foodstuffs and rely on imports for nearly all our industrial raw materials. To pay for these we have to export goods and services currently representing one-fifth or more of the gross national product. Of the output of our manufacturing industries alone, about two-fifths goes abroad. For many years British exports have been described as "the Achilles' heel" of the economy, and unending "league standings" have been produced illustrating Britain's declining share of world trade. As I have already explained, this development is neither particularly new nor wholly avoidable nor (so long as world trade is itself expanding) necessarily undesirable. Certainly there was nothing on earth which could have preserved to Britain the share of world trade she en-

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joyed in the nineteenth century when her competitors were few, or in the immediate postwar years when many of them were prostrate.

A much newer and equally striking development has been in the geographical distribution of British exports. In 1932, when the Ottawa Agreements enshrined the principle of Imperial Preference, the industrialization of what are now called the Commonwealth countries was in a very early stage. So it was still possible to agree on a pattern of trade in which Britain exported manufactured goods to the Commonwealth and received mainly primary products in return. But now the situation is much changed. The development of its own industries has become an ambition of almost every Commonwealth country, old and new. Thus the value of British trade preferences has been eroded by the quite legitimate desire of Commonwealth countries to protect their growing industries or to develop new channels of trade outside the Commonwealth.

A generation after Ottawa, the Continent overtook the Commonwealth as Britain's biggest customer. Between 1958 and 1964 the total value of our exports to the Commonwealth remained almost stationary. The proportion of our trade that they represented fell from 38 to 29 percent. In the same period the total value of our exports to Western Europe (E.E.C. and EFTA) practically doubled. The proportion of our trade that they represented rose from 24 to 34 percent. These new facts of world trade were one of the reasons which decided the British Government—in 1961, right in the middle of the period for which I have quoted statistics—to negotiate on entry into Europe. For there could be no doubt that this continuing trend emphasized the central importance of tariff advantage in Europe to our future as a commercial power.

A second new and striking development has been in the commodity composition of British exports. A very high proportion of what we export today consists of goods that before the war were either unheard of or undeveloped. Melancholy treatises seeking to prove "the economic decline of Britain" are apt to demonstrate how, a half-century ago, we had 62 percent of the world's trade in shipbuilding, and in the sixties only 16 percent; 26 percent of the world's coal trade, and today only 6 percent; 40 percent of the world's trade in cotton spindles, and now only 11 percent. But against these facts, which belong to Britain's past,

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must be set other facts which belong to the world we now live in: the fact that Britain is the world's largest exporter of radioisotopes and one of the world's largest exporters of electronic equipment and components, that half the world's ocean shipping is equipped with British radar, that more than half the world's gas-turbined aircraft are powered by British engines, that one British firm alone has produced more than 90 percent of the world's submarine cable.

These examples point clearly to where our economic future lies. The old skills in the old craft industries may long be needed. But if Britain is not to turn into an Old Curiosity Shop, they are not enough. We must keep abreast and compete on level terms in all the new, revolutionary processes—electronics, automatic equipment, computers, miniaturization, supersonic flight, space development, telecommunications. In this way we can not only maintain a position as an industrial leader but also apply these new techniques with great benefit to our more conventional branches of production. But the characteristic of the kind of manufactures I have mentioned is that they require very heavy capital outlay on research and development, compensated by large-scale production which can be absorbed only by a sophisticated and continental-sized market. The United States has such a market. Russia is developing such a market. Only in a united Europe can the individual European countries find such a home market. It is therefore precisely in this direction of advanced technology that Europe offers Britain its greatest economic attraction.

V

No one supposes that the mere act of joining the European Community would provide a panacea for Britain's economic ills. Inside or outside Europe, we will certainly need to improve our rate of growth, and we shall not do that unless we adopt the right policies at home. We need new tax incentives to encourage individual men and women to earn more and to save more. We need a new attack on restrictive business practices so as to keep competition keen and prices down. We need a new drive to expand management education of all kinds and at all levels. We need new trade-union laws to prevent pointless strikes and provide a code of sound industrial relations. We need new systems of training and retraining so as to secure the best use of our most precious asset—the skill, resourcefulness and character of our

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working people. We need new techniques of organization to increase the efficiency of government and public services. Indeed, were I not committed to a predominantly nonpartisan analysis for a predominantly non-British audience, I should be tempted to add that we need a new Government too.

Even so, there are some things—and they are among the most important things—which Britain cannot do for itself and by itself alone. Our balance of payments, for example, has been a recurring worry for twenty years and more. How difficult it will be for us to solve this problem depends quite largely on whether we can persuade other countries, including the United States, to join in creating enough world liquidity to match the expansion in world trade. There can, of course, be no question of reducing sterling's role as a key currency without the assurance of something better to put in its place. But it is a matter of urgent concern to us that our currency can come under severe strain for reasons outside our direct control, and force upon us internal policies which check our rate of growth.

Concluding this article as I do in the midst of the umpteenth economic crisis that Britain has suffered since the war, it would be neither surprising nor shameful if doubts assailed me about the future of my country. But even on a dark day, to quote Boswell, cheerfulness is always breaking in. The critics may dismiss this cheerfulness as "relentless frivolity." But since when was it a reproach to be known as Merrie England? And for all our trials and tribulations we have some causes left to be "merrie." Mine is still a very good country to live in. Its institutions are popular. Its justice is even-handed. Its press is free. Its tolerance and gentleness are still a byword. Its standard of living is among the highest in the world. It leads in many branches of pure science and applied technology, and excels in more than one of the arts. It has continued to shoulder large and proud responsibilities, to the Alliance and to the Commonwealth. Now it waits for the first favorable opportunity to augment its status and influence by helping to create a new power grouping in Europe—coöperative with the United States, but rivalling it in size, skills and resources. The conviction grows daily that Britain's responsibilities can best be maintained if she returns to the Continent of which she was once geographically, and has always been spiritually, an integral part.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF "SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM"

By Arthur P. Mendel

JOSEPH SCHUMPETER gave us the perfect definition of Marx's scientific socialism when he called it "preaching in the garb of analysis." After observing this illusory fusion of science and ethics for more than a century, we are fully aware of its consequences: the concentration of absolute power in the hands of self-appointed executors of history's "laws," and their easy justification of deprivation and oppression as the "scientifically" necessary price to be paid for a future good society.

Before socialists claimed to be scientists, or, as in the case of the Marxist revisionists, after they abandoned the claim, their behavior was ethically consistent with their goals and, in fact, differed little from that of their bourgeois opponents. But when they insisted that their goals were not only just, but also scientifically necessary and historically inevitable, they moved from this shared ethical code to one radically inconsistent with the moral foundations of socialism, one allowing the fullest scope to violence, cynicism and implacable conflict.

But if we are only too familiar with the dangers inherent in Marx's secular chiliasm, we have also learned something about the conditions that help promote it. Parallels between the emergence of Marxism in Germany and its later spread to Russia suggest, for instance, that one such circumstance is the prevalence of what might be called vulgar positivism, a theory of knowledge that favored the easy formulation and uncritical acceptance of allegedly scientific laws of history by assuming an essential affinity between the study of human society and the study of nature.

A second, more important condition would seem to be the dramatic failure of earlier radical movements, such as those in western Europe in the 1840s and in Russia during the "populist" 1870s, and the consequently powerful attraction for defeated rebels of doctrines preaching inevitable success. The effect of that failure is seen in the progression of Marx's own career, from the voluntaristic idealism of his philosophical notebooks, through the mid-century debacle to the long, arduous research in the British Museum in order to construct a myth that would make History do for the rebels what they had failed to do for themselves.

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The direct relationship between failure to realize radical goals and the strong appeal of pseudo-scientific doctrines assuring victory was most dramatically demonstrated in Russia. Against the background of a still largely feudal society, with only the glimmerings of something that one might call developing capitalism, were set G. V. Plekhanov's proclamations in 1884 that "we indeed know our way and are seated in that historical train that speeds us to our goal," and that history as the Marxists saw it was "proceeding to its logical conclusion with the ineluctable character of astronomical phenomena."[1] Victor Chernov, a leader of the defeated populists, frankly conceded the Marxists' triumph: "Undoubtedly, the Marxists were at the time [the 1890s] the 'rulers of thought' of the younger generation, and all efforts to swim against the current were usually destined to complete failure."[2]

The early history of Russian Marxism supports the view, therefore, that scientific socialism flourishes mainly in backward nations where conditions are least favorable to social progress. In more advanced countries, where such progress is apparent and can reasonably be expected to continue, there is no need for the encouraging myth of scientific socialism.

But what does a Marxian socialist do in an underdeveloped economy that has just begun its transformation? The early Russian Marxists supported the transformation unswervingly, worked for rapid industrialization and all the concomitant political, social and psychological changes that Marx considered prerequisites for a flourishing socialist society. As Nicholas Berdiaev put it in 1901, in the last years of his Marxist phase: "The ideal of *maximum productivity,* of maximum economic attainment, to which we must adjust ourselves, has in our eyes great value as the only means of achieving idealistic aims." Consequently, he continued, "everything that fosters the productive forces is progressive; everything that impedes them is reactionary."[3]

Those like the Russian Populists who were deeply troubled by the human costs involved in the transformation and hoped—vainly—to defeat it were dismissed as mere "weeping ideologists" with nothing to offer but "melancholy lamentations and ethical accusations." Following the example of Marx, "who never shed

[1] *"Sochineniia"* (Collected Works). Moscow, 1922, 2nd ed., v. II, p. 239 and 340.
[2] *"Zapiski sotsialista revoliutsionera."* Berlin, 1922, p. 276
[3] *"Subektivizm i individualizm."* St. Petersburg, 1901, p. 124.

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tears over the 'painful paths' of economic development," the Russian Marxists were protected from such moral weakness and intellectual nonsense and "were not afraid to look bravely into the eyes of reality." Of course, as readers of "Capital" knew better than anyone else, the reality of industrialization was hardly pleasant: "Life for contemporary man is far from strewn with roses," but "he lives in the future as well as in the present and is therefore basically an optimist."[4]

Thus besides the prevalence of vulgar positivism and the frustration of radical opposition movements we have a third and still more essential condition favoring the adoption of Marxist scientific socialism—economic backwardness. Its record in developing economies makes clear, in fact, that the principal function of scientific socialism is precisely to support rapid industrialization. Since it has now gone the whole cycle, the history of Russian Marxism is particularly instructive here.

Being well-educated westerners, most pre-revolutionary Russian intellectuals favored the urban style; they relished their frequent trips to the great cities of the West and envied the material wealth and individual liberties that so sharply, and for them painfully, distinguished the advanced societies from their own. But a variety of influences encouraged a strong antipathy toward the very social system that had created all this. The disdain of the gentry for the bourgeoisie, along with its commerce and industry and its "formal" freedoms, affected even the most bitterly anti-aristocratic plebeian rebels. A feeling of guilt before the "dark people," the peasant masses just recently and, it seemed, only technically freed from serfdom, led to the demand that the "debt to the people" must be paid before any further benefits for the educated classes—such as urbanization and political freedom—were attained. Finally, there was the impact of pre-Marxist European socialism, which corroborated the dismal image of bourgeois society propagated by the gentry.

At a stroke, Marxism demolished all these arguments and countered all the attitudes that stood between the progressive intelligentsia and the westernized society they deeply craved. By

[4] These quotations are drawn from the following works by early Russian Marxists: Berdiaev, *op. cit.*, p. 63, 118, 227; P. B. Struve, *"Nashi utopisty," Novoe slovo,* March 1897, p. 19 and *"Moim kritikam," Na Raznye temy* (St. Petersburg, 1902), p. 14, 34; Nemo (S. N. Bulgakov), *"Prostaia rech o mudrenykh veshchakh," Novoe slovo,* June 1897, p. 55 and "Manifest *'Narodnoi partii,'" ibid.,* August 1897, p. 23–24. For a fuller account of the changing theories of Russian Marxists at the turn of the century, see the author's *Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.

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becoming Marxists, the young radicals fully reconciled what they themselves wanted and what they now knew was really best for the people. Social justice *via* socialism, of course. And Marx had proved for them that industrialization and urbanization were the indispensable prerequisites for this. How, for example, could anyone talk of just distribution before there was high productivity? How could production leap forward unless the abysmally stagnant rural economy was replaced by an economic system based on modern science and technology and overwhelmingly industrial? What about the high cost of industrialization, the immense burdens on the peasantry and even on the emerging proletariat, destined to suffer the bourgeois exploitation so luridly described by Marx? "Why blame us?" the Marxist could honestly retort. It was all inevitable. This was the way of History, and History proceeds dialectically. They were no more responsible for the painful paths of History than is the meteorologist for the hurricane he predicts.

Here we see one of the sources of that fundamental paradox, by now so familiar, in the theory and practice of the "scientific socialist": the persistent sacrifice of precisely that segment of the population, the working classes, whose interests all socialists must claim to serve. Or, stated in terms of the present argument, the appeal to science and analysis in the hope of facilitating the realization of ethical ideals has had, perversely, the opposite effect of promoting their total betrayal.

II

Since scientific socialism has long since become irrelevant in the advanced Western countries, it is only incidentally important that we are now thoroughly aware of this tragic history. But it is immensely significant that since Stalin's death this awareness has been boldly and brilliantly expressed throughout the Soviet bloc, including Russia itself, and, as often as not, by Party members. The revisionist statements published in Poland and Hungary during the 1956 revolutions are still the most forceful of these expressions. "What right do I have," wrote the young Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, "in the name of that speculative dialectic of the future, to renounce at present the highest values of human existence? . . . I will not support any form of historical existence solely because someone persuades me that it is unavoidable—even if I believe in its unavoidability,

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for which at present there is no evidence. If crime is the law of history, is the realization of this law reason for me to become a criminal? Why should that be so? . . ."[5] The Hungarian author Gyorgy Paloczi-Horvath expressed the same judgment still more poignantly: "They fell in love so deeply with the generation of tomorrow, with the mankind to come, that there was hardly any love left for those who happened to live in today's world. They were brought up in a manner which only filled their hearts with cold and abstract feelings, and they thought that the generation of the day after tomorrow could be happy even if it was conceived in suspicion and fear."[6] It is therefore not only "the relics of capitalist culture" that scholars are now urged to avoid but also the "thought-patterns of more recent origin, dating from the times of the grim myth with which those who were reconciled to the existing state of affairs salved their consciences: the myth of historical necessity as revealed to those who wield power."[7]

It was precisely on these grounds that many early Russian Marxists, including those quoted above, converted at the turn of the century from Marxism to neo-Kantian idealism, which, in their eyes, gave the desired precedence to present values over future promises, to the existing human generation over the claims of scientific history. In 1903, only two years after publishing his Marxist "Subjectivism and Individualism," Berdiaev, for example, wrote: "The paths to the future are many and diverse, and there cannot be here any exact sociological prediction, since there are no historical laws according to which the ideal of a better future will be realized by some fatalistic necessity."[8] Sergei Bulgakov, another convert from Marxism to Kantianism, wrote that the "absolute character of the imperative, 'desire the good for its own sake,' is not linked to any chance conditions fostering the realization of the good in history. . . . Merely because a particular process is actually occurring, does it follow that I should be attracted to it as something morally desirable?"[9]

[5] As quoted in "Bitter Harvest," ed. Edmund Stillman (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 94–95. See also p. 244.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[7] Stanislaw Ossowski, "Class Structure in the Social Consciousness" (Warsaw, 1957; New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), as quoted by Leopold Labedz, *Survey*, October 1963, p. 170.

[8] "*Kritika istoricheskogo materializma*," *Mir Bozhii*, October 1903, p. 29.

[9] "*Osnovnye problemy teorii progressa*," in "*Problemy idealizma*," ed. Pavel I. Novgorodtzev (St. Petersburg, 1902), p. 30, 37–38. Bulgakov summarized precisely the crux of the transition from Marxism to idealism: "Progress is not a law of historical development, but a moral task . . ." *Ibid.*, p. 37.

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The ideological careers of some Polish and Hungarian Communists in 1956 or of some Russian Marxists at the turn of the century tell us little, however, about the contemporary Soviet mind. What of current Soviet historical thought? Do those who concern themselves with historical theory still insist on the affinity between history and natural science? Do they continue to focus their attention on general laws and patterns that permit confident prediction, rationalize past, present and future political actions and guarantee ultimate victory?

Judging from recent publications in Soviet historiography, no. Rather than emphasizing the similarities between science and history, stress now is put on the differences; rather than concentrating on general laws and patterns, a veritable campaign now under way seeks to promote the study by historians of concrete events and situations; and, finally, rather than concerning themselves with impersonal forces, historians are urged to attend to the uniquely human, "flesh-and-blood" qualities of experience long ignored by generalizers in search of laws.

"Each historical event possesses individual attributes characteristic of it alone," writes A. V. Gulyga, one of the most prominent contemporary Soviet historiographers, "and to disclose these and preserve them for posterity is just as much the responsibility of the historian as is the generalization of materials studied by him."[10] Obviously, this responsibility can hardly be met by "skimming over the surface, describing facts from the point of view of already prepared, well-known conclusions."[11] In the words of another outspoken revisionist, A. I. Gurevich, "A scholar is necessarily concerned with a geographically limited and relatively brief phase of the historical process, during which a general law may be only partly expressed by merely a few of its aspects or even a single one, or it may not appear at all." He concludes, "It is obvious that History requires concrete explanations of occurrences, and mere references to sociological laws do not solve problems."[12] At a major conference on historical methodology held in early 1964 this theme was restated again and again, usually in connection with attacks on the cult-of-personality

[10] *"O kharaktere istoricheskogo znaniia," Voprosy filosofii,* no. 9, 1962, p. 32.

[11] P. N. Fedoseev and Iu. P. Frantsev, *"O metodologicheskikh voprosakh istoricheskikhoi nauki," Voprosy istorii,* no. 3, 1964, p. 21. This is a condensed stenographic account of the 1964 conference referred to in this article. A more complete coverage of the conference was published under the title *"Istoriia i sotsiologiia"* (Moscow: *Akadamiia Nauk S.S.S.R.*, 1964).

[12] *"Obshchii zakon i konkretnaia zakonomernost v istorii," Voprosy istorii,* no. 8, 1965, p. 16.

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period, "when facts and documents were arbitrarily forced into preconceived patterns." The author of this last statement, P. A. Zhilin, a military historian, went on to make the following hopeful declaration: "It is necessary to elevate the *responsibility* of the historians for the facts they use, for their authenticity. . . . The value, the authority of historical investigation lies in its objectivity, in the truthfulness of the description of events and phenomena."[13]

And no longer can the historian so easily escape this responsibility by reverential citations from the classics, piling up "stock formulas, based on nothing but a clever selection of quotations and often having nothing at all to do with the circumstances, country, or period about which a particular historian is writing."[14] One participant at the conference was still bolder in opposing this familiar Soviet scholasticism: "Can one really limit oneself when explaining one or another set of historical phenomena to a few statements from the classics of Marxism that were relevant to concrete situations, and that were, moreover, based on a study of sources and literature accessible to them at that time, before the appearance of a great deal of new factual data?"[15]

The full importance of all this insistence on the study of concrete facts becomes apparent when those who urge it go on to argue that such concern with the specific rather than the general distinguishes history from natural science. "The fact in historical science is not supplanted by the generalization; it is an end itself," Gulyga stated categorically.[16] Consequently, he wrote elsewhere, "factual material plays a special role, one that is different from that played in purely theoretical disciplines. The latter use factual data only to support generalizations." For the historian, he continued, bringing out the fundamental point, "the fact is not only material for generalization, not simply an example illustrating the action of a general law which can be left out or replaced by others."[17]

The direction of such thought is hostile to the entire tradition of Marxism-Leninism, since the foundation for both, as well as the principal source of Party legitimacy, is the unqualified conviction that Party policies—past, present and future—derive

[13] *"Istoriia i sotsiologiia,"* p. 244–45.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 274.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 292.
[16] *"O metodologicheskikh voprosakh,"* p. 37.
[17] *"O kharaktere,"* p. 32–33.

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from a knowledge of social and historical laws that are as objective and "necessary" as those uncovered by natural scientists. There is no question about the fundamental role of prediction in traditional Marxist politics and historiography or politicized history. It is amazing, therefore, to watch Soviet historians and philosophers severely qualify its relevance in historical study. As long as oversimplified economic determinism prevailed, historians could easily knock together superficially convincing patterns and predictions. But for a variety of economic and political reasons Stalin undermined this essential doctrine, and its demolition has continued since Stalin's death—to the point where Soviet authors now scoff at "vulgar" Marxist economic determinists in the West.[18]

Economic determinism may have some validity in general sociology, Gurevich conceded, but he emphatically stated and restated that "the concrete historical actions of people depend on the most diverse causes, among which, besides production, one must find a place for natural environment, national characteristics, psychology, ideology, external influences, all sorts of traditions, the level of cultural development, biological and demographic factors and many others."[19] Oh, for the simple days of "substructure" and "superstructure," when one could outline tidy paths to the future! But in this cornucopia of influences, factors and causes, "Every historical event is the result of a convergence of many contributing conditions. A different convergence might result in a different event which would in turn lead to consequences different from those that in fact occurred and, thus, there would begin an entire chain of events and phenomena—a different variant of development. . . ."[20] However useful the historians' findings may be for defining future prospects, Gulyga said on his way toward abdicating the prophet's role, history itself does not deal with them; "its view is retrospective: its attention is centered on results already achieved."[21]

Significantly, the renewal of interest in the humanity of history is explicitly associated with the separation of history from science. The role of "laws" in history is fundamentally different from their

[18] See, for example, M. M. Rozental, *"O sviazi filosofskikh teorii s ekonomicheskim bazisom," Voprosy filosofii,* no. 3, 1960, p. 146.
[19] *"Obschii zakon,"* p. 19.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 26.
[21] "The Subject Matter of Historical Scholarship," *Soviet Studies in History,* Spring 1965, p. 54.

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role in natural science, Gulyga wrote, because unlike the world of nature, where forces act blindly and where the resulting laws are immediately clear, "society consists of people endowed with consciousness and will who set for themselves specific aims and strive to realize them."[22] There is no room in authentic historical scholarship for "stilted schematism," said one speaker at the 1964 conference, because history "is always factual in the best sense of the word; it reconstructs the past in all its full-blooded, many-colored, living clarity."[23] Using for his vehicle a discussion of Gogol as historian, a leading Soviet medievalist, L. V. Cherepnin, devoted a lengthy article to this theme, recalling Gogol's opposition to all abstractions, his concern with "all the shifts and shades of feeling, excitement, suffering and joy," and his belief that a work of history should be at the same time a work of art.[24]

Once attention returns to the human individual, to his personal aims and will, and to his concrete and uniquely human experience, the way is open to the study of the emotional and psychological facets of that experience. Gurevich has already emphasized the importance of social psychology for the study of the past. The historian, he urges, "must consider in each concrete case how the social life he studies is reflected in the minds of people, articulated into concepts, images and feelings and how, after undergoing an appropriate subjective transformation, these factors determine peoples' actions, moving separate individuals as well as social groups and masses to one or another activity." A notable feature of Gurevich's attitude, although by no means peculiar to him, is his sympathy toward Western bourgeois historians who have in his view given due attention to these subjective dimensions of past human experience. He is especially attentive to Huizinga, whose "Waning of the Middle Ages" he summarizes justly and at length.[25]

It is worth noting, incidentally, that the revision in Soviet historians' descriptions of the aims and character of historical study has had a corresponding impact on their thoughts about historical methodology. Most remarkable, perhaps, is the tendency to replace the scientist by the creative artist and writer as the model for historians. "The proximity of history to art has long

[22] *O kharaktere,"* p. 31.
[23] *"Istoriia i sotsiologiia,"* p. 322.
[24] *"Istoricheskie vzgliadi Gogolia," Voprosy istorii,* no. 1, 1964, p. 77–78, 82, 90–91.
[25] *"Nekotorye aspekty izucheniia sotsialnoi istorii," Voprosy istorii,* no. 10, 1964, p. 54, 55 and 66.

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been known," Gulyga wrote. "In antiquity this idea found symbolic expression in the image of Clio, the muse of history. Voltaire, Schiller and Pushkin embodied in their creative works a vital union between these two spheres of human culture. . . . History is dualistic by nature; there coexist here the abstract and the sensitively concrete, the conceptual and the visual picture of the past."[26]

III

But how enduring are these trends in historical thought? May what I have called the fall of scientific socialism, the separation of "ethics" from "analysis" and all that this implies, be another passing phase in the familiar zigzag of Soviet politics? Supporting a more optimistic outlook is the parallel between these trends in Soviet historical thought and highly significant developments in many other areas of contemporary Soviet thought and life.

To the extent that current tendencies in Soviet historiography represent a loosening of the ties binding scholarly inquiry to narrow political values, they seem a modest echo of more dramatic developments in the same direction occurring in other disciplines. The liberation of Soviet natural science from extra-scientific values has been particularly thorough, and although this process has been well reviewed in the West it may be worth while to stress its specific contribution to the fall of scientific socialism. The most obvious and important point here is that Marx's scientific socialism represents a transposition into sociological and historical terminology of classical mechanics, now radically undermined by the theories of relativity, quantum physics, probability and indeterminacy. All of these approaches of the "new physics" today are frankly accepted by Soviet science.

One need only recall the impact of these discoveries in natural science on social and historical theory in the West to appreciate the direction of their influence in Soviet thought, that is, toward subjectivism, relativism and uncertainty—all fundamentally incompatible with the character of scientific socialism. Moreover, since Marx's scientific socialism was based on a monistic worldview that argued a virtual identity between the natural and the social sciences, the pressures exerted by a modernized Soviet science on social and historical theory are probably even greater than they were in the intellectually more pluralistic West at the

[26] *O kharaktere,*" p. 36–38.

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turn of the century. Salvation for the scientific socialists in Russia might be attained if the Stalinist attack on the new physics were resumed. But that is most unlikely, for reasons that Soviet scientists themselves make abundantly clear. If they had accepted the philosophers' definition of cybernetics as a pseudoscience, the eminent physicist Kapitsa argued, "we may safely say that our conquest of space, of which we are so justly proud and for which the whole world respects us, could never have been made a reality, since it is wholly impossible to steer cosmic vehicles without having recourse to cybernetics." Kapitsa then turned to a still more persuasive argument for freedom in science. "Many of us still vividly remember how some of our philosophers, dogmatically applying the methods of dialectics, were proving the unsoundness of the theory of relativity. . . . And so the physicists went ahead and brought about nuclear reactions, verifying Einstein's law not in terms of single atoms, but on the scale of atomic bombs. . . . Think of the position in which they [the physicists] would have placed our country had they not been ready to apply practically the achievements of nuclear physics!"[27]

With such weighty arguments, the scientists have virtually won their battle for objective, apolitical inquiry. "As one of the most distinguished Soviet physicists informed me," writes Leopold Infeld, the Polish physicist, "physicists no longer read the Soviet philosophical journals and they don't care a damn what the philosophers have to say."[28]

Constantly present both in life and in literary representation, this triumph cannot but set a model for aspiring scholars in other disciplines. The blow dealt by science against scientific socialism is thus double. First, it provides a dramatic example of the separation of politics from scholarship, of validation by objective proof instead of scholastic quotations and exegises of sacred texts. Secondly, as discussed above, the specific direction of modern science undermines the very foundations of scientific socialism by promoting uncertainty, indeterminacy, relativism and subjectivism.

Of all the social sciences, economics, as one would expect, has been quickest to follow the lead of the natural sciences. Motivated and favored by goals as tangible and compelling as those supporting the "liberals" in natural science, Soviet economists since

[27] "Theory, Experiment, Practice," *The Soviet Review*, June 1962, p. 18–19.
[28] "As I See It," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1965, p. 14.

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Stalin's death have shown their impatience with ineffectual dogma and their willingness to substitute rational procedures and institutions for ideologically grounded ones. Rational price, profit, interest calculations, marginal utility theory and advanced mathematical and "cybernetic" models are, consequently, replacing primitive techniques associated with the sacred labor theory of value and the fetish of maximum "command" planning. In short, as is the case in the natural sciences, increasingly sophisticated and ideologically secular specialists are adopting rational means to reach specific material ends.

Attributing these hopeful trends only to pragmatic goals, however, is both an incomplete explanation of the developments concerned and an injustice to the individuals involved. The insistence on objective truth and honesty appears so frequently and in so many areas of post-Stalin Soviet life and thought that it must certainly reflect a deep concern for these values as ends in themselves. And after the Stalinist experience no reaction would be more natural. The historians' return (albeit still restricted) to the archives and the natural scientists' and the economists' demand for data instead of dogma all exemplify this commitment. But more than anywhere else this yearning for professional and personal honesty finds expression in Soviet literature. Evgeny Evtushenko, who, if anyone did, expressed the feelings of young Russia in the decade after the seminal Twentieth Party Congress, crystallized this mood when he wrote, "I envision Communism, symbolically, as a state in which truth is president. . . ."[29]

The theme is a constant one. Indeed, if there is a single *leitmotiv* to characterize post-Stalin Soviet literature it is this, "the tradition of honesty with [oneself] and the reader," in the words of the novelist Yury Nagibin.[30] It is because of the strength, persistence and obviously passionate sincerity of this devotion to truth, this revulsion against Stalinist mendacity and corruption, that I consider it a major influence in the qualified return to objectivity in various areas of Soviet thought. The stress on archival research, the relatively fair treatment of opposing Western views, and the other manifestations of this reorientation in

[29] *Survey*, January 1963, p. 29.

[30] Quoted by A. Gaev, "Soviet Youth in Literature," *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.*, February 1963, p. 3. See also the relevant quotations and statements in "The Year of Protest, 1956," ed. Hugh McLean and Walter Vickery (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 132, 150, 177; Ilya Ehrenburg, *Frantsuzskie tetradi* (Moscow: *Sovetskii Pisatel'*, 1958), p. 121, 130–31; and Merle Fainsod, "Khrushchev's Russia," *The Australian Outlook*, December 1963, p. 246.

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historical study discussed above, provide, in a way, even stronger evidence for this contention than do corresponding tendencies in science and economics. With regard to the latter one could easily attribute the revival of rational inquiry to the pressing needs of the economy and national defense. But what does the Party lose by dogmatism in history? Rather is the opposite the case: traditional dogmatism in history has provided invaluable rationalizations and justifications for the Party throughout its career, and the régime, it would seem, has everything to lose and nothing to gain by permitting the developments discussed here.

A commitment to truth as an end in itself in both science and history seems to be, therefore, a major force behind the demise of scientific socialism. But there is another, closely related cause that similarly seems a natural reaction to the Stalin era. Let me recall the statement quoted earlier: "They fell in love so deeply with the generation of tomorrow, with the mankind to come, that there was hardly any love left for those who happened to live in today's world." There seems to me to be the closest relationship between this judgment and such methodological statements as Gulyga's, at first glance purely academic, "the fact in historical science is not supplanted by the generalization; it is an end in itself," or Cherepnin's strong emphasis on the need to study all the many-sided, vital qualities of human experience. The great service of scientific socialism was to explain the necessity of present sacrifice and to assuage the conscience of those forced, usually by conditions in underdeveloped economies, to sacrifice the very stratum of society that they supposedly served, the deprived masses. The renewed emphasis on the concrete and the appeal to historians to write about characteristically human experiences rather than concentrating on impersonal abstractions may well reflect, more than anything else, a radical reaction to the persistent sacrifice of the living individual both in fact and in theory.

> I am sick of being a bridge between the old and the new world. I no longer want to go around with a sore and bloody back. Let me rest. . . . I am tired of struggling . . . struggling in science . . . struggling for bread . . . struggling for atomic energy . . . struggling for the development of the virgin land. Even for a quiet rest it is necessary to struggle. That's enough struggle for me! Give me a chance to live as a human being![31]

[31] G. Mdivani, "Ominous Days" (*Teatr*, no. 12, 1958), as quoted in Fainsod, *op. cit.*, p. 245–46.

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With this we come to what may be the fundamental reason for the withering away of scientific socialism. The Soviet citizen can begin to relax. Russian society has come close enough to where it was really heading—and the direction had nothing to do with idyllic Communism—to give up, at least partially, the encouraging myths. The gains have already been immense and there is reason to expect that they will continue to accumulate, that the dominant classes will both give and receive adequately to maintain satisfactory progress and stability. The present can now be better served instead of persistently sacrificed, and the pseudo-scientific theories devised to justify the long sacrifice can gradually be abandoned. It is probably no coincidence that the historian is urged to concern himself with the concrete, "flesh-and-blood" human experience at the same time that the economist is devising more rational ways of meeting increasingly finicky consumer demand. In sum, "preaching" and "analysis" can begin to go their own ways. The politicians can proclaim their promethean ideals as absolutes, justified by their inherent value and by long humanist traditions rather than by allegedly objective laws of science and history. Conversely, the scientists and scholars can begin to return to their customary concerns, abandoning the hateful obligation of corrupting their talents in the service of dogma.

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MAO'S LAST REVOLUTION

By Roderick MacFarquhar

FOR the Chinese Communist Party, this year's "great proletarian cultural revolution" has meant the most serious purge since the disgrace of Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai and two other Politburo members during the Great Leap Forward. P'eng Chen, effectively the sixth-ranking member of the Chinese Politburo, has been dismissed from the key post of first secretary of the Peking municipal party committee together with his senior colleagues. At least one other Politburo member, propaganda chief Lu Ting-yi, has been sacked along with many subordinates throughout the country. The long-missing Chief-of-Staff of the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) has been replaced and the army has undergone its third struggle over professionalism versus political control. Finally at a giant rally in Peking on August 18, it was revealed that Mao's heir-apparent of twenty-years standing, head of state Liu Shao-ch'i, had been demoted several steps in the national hierarchy and had been replaced as Number 2 by Defense Minister Lin Piao. It is a startling picture of disarray in a Communist party which for most of the 31 years of Mao's chairmanship has been a model of solidarity at the top. What has happened to dispel the spirit of comradeship in that generation which participated in the Long March? Is the Chinese party now to undergo the periodic purging which has been the fate of the Soviet party ever since the death of Lenin? Are we witnessing a struggle for the succession to China's aging if still active father figure? Or is Mao himself turning into a Stalin in his old age?

Over the last few years Mao has been obsessed with one problem above all others: the danger that his brand of Communism will degenerate in China after his death. As the Sino-Soviet dispute over foreign policy has worsened, Mao has examined the internal situation of the Soviet Union with increasing foreboding. His worries were finally expressed in codified form in the last of the nine great polemics which the Chinese party directed against Moscow between September 1963 and July 1964. After stressing the danger of a "restoration of capitalism" in the Soviet Union and prescribing a number of long-term policies to prevent its occurring elsewhere, he stated that "we must not only have a cor-

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rect line and correct policies but must train and bring up millions of successors who will carry on the cause of proletarian revolution." He went on:

> In the final analysis, the question of training successors for the revolutionary cause of the proletariat is one of whether or not there will be people who can carry on the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary cause started by the older generation of proletarian revolutionaries, whether or not the leadership of our Party and state will remain in the hands of proletarian revolutionaries, whether or not our descendants will continue to march along the correct road laid down by Marxism-Leninism or, in other words, whether or not we can successfully prevent the emergence of Khrushchev's revisionism in China. In short, it is an extremely important question, a matter of life and death for our Party and our country.[1]

But the problem of training revolutionary heirs and successors raised another, prior problem in Mao's mind. Were the potential trainers—not just educators but writers, artists, journalists, anyone likely to have influence over the minds of the masses—revolutionary enough themselves to be entrusted with this supreme task? If not, could they not prove a more immediate threat than the "peaceful evolution" to capitalism? The Soviet Union provided Mao with an example of how revisionist leaders could seize the reins of power; and in Hungary the Petofi Circle[2] had demonstrated how Marxist intellectuals could set a nation alight.

As Mao surveyed the Chinese ideological scene in the early sixties, he evidently became increasingly worried—and apparently with good cause. In the aftermath of the crisis brought on by the Great Leap Forward, three disastrous harvests and the withdrawal of Soviet technical assistance, hitherto trusted stalwarts started to question his policies and perhaps even his leadership. The situation was made worse by the régime's desperate need for the coöperation of all trained personnel in the enormous task of getting the economy moving again. To this end, a new "let a hundred flowers bloom" campaign was launched in 1961. Although it was hedged about with qualifications to prevent a repetition of the unfortunate results of the 1956–57 episode (as the recent purge literature has now revealed), it did encourage widespread criticism of the party and of party policies by officials, scholars and journalists throughout the country.

[1] The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 477–8. This year a party official revealed that the author of this ninth polemic was Mao himself.

[2] Named for the Hungarian poet and patriot killed in the revolt of 1848–49, the Petofi Circle was formed in Budapest in 1955 to encourage free debate among students and intellectuals. The Hungarian uprising occurred a year later.

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By the autumn of 1962, perhaps anticipating an economic upturn, Mao had decided to stop the rot. At the Central Committee's Tenth Plenum in September, Mao warned the party, "Never forget the class struggle." The following year a "socialist education campaign" was launched as the first major attempt to vaccinate the heirs and successors against the virus of revisionism. But Mao was still dissatisfied with the socialist educators. In December 1963 he informed intellectuals that "problems abounded" in all forms of art: Communists showed absurd enthusiasm for advancing feudal and capitalist art but no zeal in promoting socialist art. Six months later, Mao bluntly told the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles that in the fifteen years since the founding of the People's Republic, they and most of their publications had failed to carry out party policies. They had slid to the verge of revisionism and if serious steps were not taken to remold them, they were bound at some future date to resemble the Petofi Circle.

II

It is not yet clear when Mao finally decided that the remolding he was demanding of party intellectuals could not be carried out by the existing agitprop apparatus and that there would have to be wholesale sackings and a fresh start with new men. As early as February 1964, he sanctioned a national campaign to "learn from the experience of the People's Liberation Army in political and ideological work," which in retrospect seems to have indicated his impatience with the normal channels of political education. Nor could he have been pleased with the results of his repeated prodding of the party's cultural bosses. "Bourgeois" literature and drama still dominated the stage and although a number of senior party intellectuals were to come under fire that year, they were but a small fraction of those who had been "stirring up an evil flurry of attacks on the general line" in 1961–62.

What does seem certain is that from the start of the present purge, Mao was operating very much on his own, outside the normal party machinery. He entrusted the executive responsibilities to his former Political Secretary and alternate member of the Politburo, Ch'en Po-ta, who was put in charge of a new ad hoc body, the "group in charge of the cultural revolution."[3] Mao

[3] While the thesis that the purge has been planned and directed by Mao can be buttressed both by quotations from the Chinese press and by an analysis of how the main thrust of the purge dovetails with Mao's principal policy aims, the role of Ch'en Po-ta provides an important

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chose three bases for the new campaign, which was launched at some form of Central Committee meeting in September 1965: the Shanghai party organization, the P.L.A. and the party's theoretical journal, *Red Flag,* edited by Ch'en Po-ta. The *Liberation Army Daily* made most of the attacks and supplied much of the venom, while *Red Flag* magisterially directed the pursuers toward the principal victims. But the first salvo was fired in the Shanghai party press on November 10 and other important articles appeared there from time to time. After November 26 Mao disappeared from public view until it was reported on May 9 that he had received the visiting Albanian Premier. Presumably he went off to hibernate as usual in the warmer climes of south-central China, but this winter he had also to devote himself to running the purge.

The top propaganda officials must have known something about Mao's new crusade. Chou Yang, probably the most important deputy director of the propaganda department and for over two decades Mao's literary czar, used the term "socialist cultural revolution" and spelled out what were to be its major propaganda themes in a speech to spare-time writers last November. His superior, propaganda director Lu Ting-yi, was reported touring the provinces as late as April, instructing local party committees on how to run the new Mao-study campaign. But clearly, if Mao's planned climax of the campaign was the elimination of Lu and Chou, he could hardly have taken them into his confidence, although he had to string them along for a while. Nor until he was ready for the denouement could he use the normal propaganda channels, which were under their control. This accounts for the unusual disarray in the Chinese press during most of the campaign. Significantly, the leading party newspaper, the *People's Daily,* which is edited by another deputy director of the propaganda department, was trailing behind Mao's chosen organs in its denunciations until shortly before the announcement of P'eng Chen's removal on June 3. It seems to have been just before June 1 that the new propaganda officials took over.

The first target of the "cultural revolution" was a noted historian, Wu Han, who was also a deputy mayor of Peking. Al-

additional "kremlinological" clue. On the only other occasion when Mao has gone it alone—during the 1965 collectivization drive—it was Ch'en whom Mao chose to explain his ideas to the Central Committee. And when in 1958 at the launching of the Great Leap it was felt necessary to set up a new party theoretical journal, *Red Flag,* it was Ch'en who was made editor.

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though not a party member, he had always been very correct during drives against intellectuals. Now in the Shanghai article of November 10, 1965, he was denounced for writing a Peking Opera drama about a Ming dynasty official which had been performed in 1961 under the title "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office." Allegedly, in order to support the 1961 attacks on the communes and demands for restoration of peasant ownership, Wu had built up a historically false picture of an honest official who advocated "return of land" to the peasants and "redressing of grievances."

The unexpected attack on Wu Han caused confusion and consternation in Peking. For not entirely disinterested reasons, some of Wu's friends on the municipal party committee attempted to defend him, or at least to divert the attack. They "made unscrupulous attacks on the Shanghai municipal committee . . . and used the propaganda organs in their hands to try in every way possible to resist and block the article." When, at the end of December, Wu felt compelled to apologize in print if his play had encouraged the wrong sort of people, he still felt confident enough to defend the accuracy of his history and the purity of his motives. And in the new year it looked as if Wu had a chance of getting lost in the crowd as the attack widened to embrace other writers and historians. But it is now clear that behind the scenes the attacks on Wu had produced a major confrontation between the mayor of Peking, P'eng Chen, and Mao Tse-tung.

From P'eng Chen's point of view, Wu Han was probably expendable. But Wu was closely linked with two of P'eng's senior aides on the municipal committee, Teng T'o and Liao Mo-sha. From 1961 to 1964 these three men had collaborated on a column entitled "Notes from a Three-Family Village" which appeared in the Peking party's theoretical journal, *Front Line,* edited by Teng T'o. Official critics were later to assert that "Notes" and another column, "Night Chats at Yenshan," which Teng T'o wrote for the *Peking Evening News,* used fables and historical vignettes to cloak vicious attacks on party policies, particularly those of the Great Leap, and to urge reëxamination of the cases of disgraced "right-opportunist" opponents of the Leap like P'eng Teh-huai.

Casting an eye over back issues of his party publications, P'eng Chen must easily have appreciated that his subordinates might be open to attack. Nor did he need the *Liberation Army Daily* to remind him of Mao's injunction that "since he has become

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first secretary, he should assume all responsibilities for all shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the party committee." In fact, some months later *Red Flag* was to accuse P'eng of regarding the Peking municipality as an "independent kingdom, watertight and impenetrable, and nobody was allowed to intervene or criticize it; it was like a tiger whose backside no one dared to kick." P'eng evidently felt he had no option but to "shield the sinister anti-party and anti-socialist counter-revolutionary gangsters" in order to protect himself.

The crunch must have come around the end of March, between the 29th when P'eng Chen made his last public appearance and April 3 when, after a month of virtual silence, the newspaper attacks on Wu Han were resumed. The new attacks represented a sharp escalation of the campaign, for it was now that Wu was first accused of supporting the P'eng Teh-huai group in 1959. P'eng Chen was presumably already in disgrace for defying Mao, who had personally intervened to criticize the Peking committee. But P'eng apparently had not yet been deprived of the reins of power; at least he was still able to communicate with his "faithful lackeys." As *Red Flag* later revealed, "even after Comrade Mao Tse-tung criticized the former Peking municipal party committee, they continued to carry out organized and planned resistance in an attempt 'to save the queen by sacrificing the knights'." On April 16, the Peking party press published a self-criticism for printing not merely Wu Han's articles but those of Teng T'o and Liao Mo-sha, who had not so far come under attack.

Possibly the manœuvre caused Mao to think again about disgracing P'eng, for it was not until May 8 that this self-criticism was denounced as a fraud by the *Liberation Army Daily*. A week later, *Red Flag* asked the Peking press, "Who directed you to play such tricks of sham criticism?" It was then presumably only a matter of choosing the appropriate time to break the news of P'eng Chen's dismissal. On the afternoon of June 3 the names of the new first and second secretaries of the Peking municipal committee were announced. P'eng Chen was not mentioned then or since, for it seems to be normal Chinese Communist protocol that Politburo members are not attacked publicly by name.

III

P'eng Chen is by far the most powerful man to have been disgraced during the current purge. Effectively number six in the

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Politburo, second secretary of the party's secretariat under Teng Hsiao-ping and boss of the Peking region with considerable control over the troops of the capital's garrison,[4] he had some chance of being Mao's successor. But although his dismissal should therefore have logically been the climax of the purge, in fact it appears now to have been a side issue.

The main targets remained the party intellectuals and propagandists, although it was not until P'eng Chen's opposition was crushed that the "cultural revolution" could really get under way. On April 14, Shih Hsi-min, a deputy minister of culture appearing before the standing committee of the National People's Congress, discussed the importance of "firmly carrying through the socialist cultural revolution to the end." (This speech led China's top intellectual, Kuo Mo-jo, president of the Academy of Sciences, to exclaim that all his writings were fit only to be burned.) Four days later, the *Liberation Army Daily* proclaimed that "a new upsurge of the great socialist cultural revolution has taken shape and is now assuming the form of a mass movement."

Initially, the central thrust of the campaign was the renewed drive against Wu Han. After May 8, the attack shifted to the whole "three-family village" and especially to Teng T'o. On June 2, another phase of the campaign began with the publication in the press of the contents of a poster that had been stuck up at Peking University denouncing the university president and party first secretary, Lu P'ing, along with his second secretary. At just after midnight on June 3–4, only a few hours after the announcement of the reorganization of the municipal committee, Peking's new second secretary dramatically arrived on the university campus to relieve Lu P'ing and his deputy of their jobs. Lu P'ing was accused of following the instructions of the notorious Peking party to turn the cultural revolution onto a revisionist path. But when, within days, university officials came under attack throughout the country—many in areas where the local Communist parties remained in the clear—it became evident that the events at Peking University had to be seen as part of a drive against the men in charge of higher education, not merely as fallout from P'eng Chen's disgrace.

The strategy of attack seems to have been much the same in universities and schools from Peking to Yunnan. "Revolutionary

[4] Liu Jen, the Peking party's second secretary who was dismissed with P'eng, was political commissar of the Peking garrison.

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leftists" among the students and faculty would denounce one or more of the top university officials, presumably at the instigation of emissaries from Ch'en Po-ta's cultural-revolution group. The officials, unaware of the credentials of their critics, rallied their own supporters for a counteroffensive. For two or three weeks the campus would be seething with mass denunciations, poster wars, and sometimes physical violence. It seems that during this period no one but the few instructed agents knew who was favored to emerge on top. Then a delegation would arrive from the local or provincial party committee to sort out the revolutionary good guys from the counter-revolutionary "monsters" and to put a work-group in charge of reorganizing the campus branch of the party and the university administration.

By mid-August, more than a dozen university presidents and many more vice-presidents and university party secretaries had lost their jobs. The full extent of the purge cannot yet be seen. Perhaps the most relevant evidence is that during the last purge of educational administrators after the Hundred Flowers in 1957 —when many of today's hares were the hounds—a thousand party officials were moved into the universities and secondary schools, two hundred of them as presidents or vice-presidents.

But the purge of educators has been only one aspect of a frontal assault on all the men responsible for shaping the mind of China: journalists, writers, publishers and—most important—party propaganda officials from the local and provincial level right up to Lu Ting-yi and Chou Yang. Chou Yang was first denounced on July 1 and with increasing venom and velocity thereafter. Lu Ting-yi, as an alternate member of the Politburo, like P'eng Chen was not attacked by name. He was revealed to have lost his propaganda post when the first secretary of the party's central south bureau, T'ao Chu, turned up with Lu's title at a reception for Afro-Asian writers on July 10.[5]

All the purge victims have been accused of a syndrome of sins which add up to favoring "expertness" over "redness" or failing "to put politics in command." The president of the Shanghai Conservatory of Music, for instance, is said to have performed "sad symphonies" which depressed the masses. The chairman of the department of economics of the Academy of Sciences is said to have wanted to out-Liberman Liberman. In local papers across the country, duplicates of Peking's "three-family village" are said

[5] Lu Ting-yi may have been dismissed as early as the end of April.

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to have criticized party policies in the dark days of 1961–62. Whether they did or not may never become fully clear, since the truth or falsity of the accusations depends in many cases on whether historical essays were intended to be allegorical. But at least some of the party's accusations seem to be well founded.

It seems unlikely that incorruptibles like Lu Ting-yi and Chou Yang did in fact promote an anti-Maoist whispering campaign. But it is conceivable that at a time when the leadership's prestige had been severely dented, Lu, Chou and their equally orthodox subordinates had felt obliged to loosen the reins of doctrinal control.

From July 1, with the cultural revolution well under way, Mao began gradually to dispel the mystery that surrounded the purge. It was on that day, in an editorial on the 45th anniversary of the founding of the Communist party, that the *People's Daily* went through the extraordinary exercise of first stating that "one's attitude toward Mao Tse-tung's thought is the yardstick distinguishing the genuine revolutionary from the sham revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary, the Marxist-Leninist from the revisionist," and then pointedly quoting approving remarks on Mao's thought from Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. That these four of Mao's closest comrades-in-arms should have to be publicly given a clean bill of ideological health is a startling revelation of how far rumor and suspicion must have gone.[6] Shortly thereafter the top officials unaffected by the purge were paraded at receptions, presumably to inform a bemused public who was still who.

In mid-July, Mao himself reappeared to signal a return to what the Chinese call normalcy and straightaway plunged into the Yangtze to prove his fitness. On August 8 a Central Committee decision laid down the future guide-lines for the cultural revolution in an evident attempt to minimize confusion. Then the Central Committee, after its first plenary session in four years, issued a communiqué retroactively approving the whole series of measures leading up to the cultural revolution and clearly attributing them to Mao.

IV

The purge has been the most dramatic aspect of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" but it has only been the negative

[6] The omission of a paean from 80-year-old Chu Teh, number four in the Politburo, was possibly a mark of respect to Mao's oldest colleague, on the assumption that he at least should be above suspicion. But he too has now been demoted.

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first stage. What is needed is not just new men but new measures. It is in the educational field that the most drastic changes seem to be contemplated. On July 17 the party and government announced a six-month postponement of this year's enrollment of students in higher educational institutions. The aim is partly to allow high schools and colleges to complete the cultural revolution, but more importantly to provide time for a thorough recasting of the present admissions system. It has been decided that entrance examinations give too much weight to academic ability and too little to political reliability, thereby preventing the large-scale admission of revolutionary peasants, workers and soldiers. A presumably inspired letter from some high school girls which appeared in the press has proposed that after graduation all schoolchildren should normally enter productive labor and be selected for college on the basis of the "ideological diplomas" they could win among the peasants and workers.

According to the August 8 decision of the Central Committee, another major move will be to shorten courses of study and make them simple and concise. "Teaching material should be thoroughly transformed and part of it should first be simplified." A second students' letter, indicating another possible innovation, complained that education lasted too long: "Seventeen years of hard academic study really wastes one's youth and leads the young generation astray."

If even greater politicization is to be the watchword in academic life, the method is to be to de-professionalize literature and the arts. Before being purged Chou Yang had proclaimed the ultimate aim: "By the time Communist society is achieved, all writers will probably be amateur ones." Mao seems to feel that full-time intellectuals, by the very private nature of their work, can never be properly remolded. Even frequent contact with workers, peasants and soldiers is not enough. To be really safe for the revolution, intellectuals must *be* workers, peasants or soldiers. And since intellectuals notoriously drag their feet at this prospect, it is possibly more effective in the long run to start at the other end.

Mao's aim is in fact the total amateurization of all activities, the rearing of 700,000,000 universal men. "With hammer in hand they will be able to do factory work, with hoe or plough they will be able to do farming, with the gun they will be able to fight and with the pen express themselves in writing," the *People's Daily* declared on August 1, though by using the phrase "where condi-

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tions permit" when describing practical steps towards amateurization, the paper indicated a cautious approach would be adopted.

All this is highly reminiscent of the Great Leap Forward and indeed the communiqué of the Central Committee's Eleventh Plenum declared that there was a "new all-round leap forward emerging." However, the phrasing here and earlier suggests that the party is trying to boost morale rather than recreate the apocalyptic atmosphere of 1958. As early as April, Premier Chou declared—descriptively rather than prescriptively—that industrial production "has taken a new leap forward." Chou, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, and now the Central Committee have all stressed improvement in quality, whereas in 1958 the operative word was quantity, and quality was thrown out the window. Significantly, too, the Central Committee in its decision on the cultural revolution took special pains to reassure scientists and technical personnel, the people most likely to get alarmed at the prospect of another leap forward.

If the heady wine of a leap forward is to be eschewed, revolutionary zeal will presumably have to be maintained by the new propaganda department and the People's Liberation Army, the original "school of the revolution." Yet curiously enough, although the Army is still held up as the unquestioned political paragon, it too has been undergoing a major if quiet convulsion. On August 1, an "acting Chief-of-Staff" held the reception for Army Day, indicating that Lo Jui-ch'ing, absent from view since November, had gone the way of his two disgraced predecessors. At least seven top officers have now been sacked over the past eight years, though one has reappeared. On August 1, the *Liberation Army Daily* revealed that the P.L.A. had "not very long ago" experienced its third major struggle over the issues of political control and professionalism. Even the former security chief, Lo Jui-ch'ing, who had apparently done such a good job of helping Lin Piao politicize the Army after the purge of P'eng Teh-huai and his Chief-of-Staff in 1959, had evidently finally adopted the anathematized "purely military viewpoint."

The *Liberation Army Daily* did link Lo implicitly (he has not yet been denounced by name) with P'eng Chen and the propaganda chiefs, describing him and his other disgraced colleagues as "important members of the counter-revolutionary, anti-party, anti-socialist clique recently uncovered by our party." But while Mao may find it doctrinally neat to link all these men, the timing

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of Lo Jui-ch'ing's disappearance suggests that, though he may have also disapproved of what was then only a projected cultural revolution, he is unlikely to have had the opportunity of joining P'eng's later resistance to it. What is interesting is that only now is the disaffection of Lo and his colleagues revealed, possibly because Mao did not wish the country to know before the cultural revolution got under way that the model he was displaying for emulation had feet of clay. It is significant that, having brought the matter up, the P.L.A.'s journal seems since to have dropped it, as if fearful that people may get the idea that soldiers are no more revolutionary than anyone else. What may be even more significant is that only the P.L.A.'s own journal was allowed to mount an attack on the army leaders. This fact, coupled with the curt announcement that the P.L.A. would carry out its cultural revolutionary tasks according to the directions of the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee, suggests that the central party *apparat* may exercise little control over the P.L.A.

V

Mao's grand design is no less than the total transformation of the nature of Chinese man. According to the *People's Daily:*

> The proletarian cultural revolution is aimed not only at demolishing all the old ideology and culture and all the old customs and habits which, fostered by the exploiting classes, have poisoned the minds of the people for thousands of years, but also at creating and fostering among the masses an entirely new ideology and culture and entirely new customs and habits—those of the proletariat. . . . This great task of transforming customs and habits is without any precedent in human history.

When one realizes the extent of Mao's ambition, it is not difficult to understand why he has been prepared to sanction the incredible cult of his thought (the "compass" of the revolution) and himself (its "helmsman") and to cut a gigantic swathe through the ranks of the party—though unlike Stalin he does not kill. The loss of a few hundred or even thousand old comrades must seem a small price to pay for hundreds of millions of revolutionary heirs and successors.

Mao can presumably survive the destruction of the Yenan camaraderie—though even he might be counter-attacked if what is shaping up as an educational leap forward proves disastrous. But what of his successor? At the great cultural revolution rally on August 18, 59-year-old Defense Minister Lin Piao clearly emerged as Mao's heir. The cultural revolution was not the result

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of a succession struggle but it gave Mao the occasion to settle the succession. He has opted for Lin because in the younger man he apparently detects the qualities needed in a future leader charged with preserving militant Maoism.

It is still difficult to understand how a man who practically never is able to appear in public can be healthy enough to run the country. But even assuming Lin's fitness, he will face major problems in ensuring the loyalty of many of his principal colleagues once Mao goes. Chou En-lai's adherence has been secured, probably in exchange for an undertaking not to launch a new leap forward. But the manner of Lin's rise must have angered many top people and he may seek to buttress his personal position by packing the central committee and politburo with loyal army cadres. He would need to diminish the importance of the full-time party officials in these central organs, for the party apparatus could be the power base for a challenge to his leadership.

The outcome of such manœuvres would have far wider importance than the rise and fall of personalities. It would inevitably involve the whole role of the army within Chinese society. Already under Mao the army is the tutor of the nation. Its cadres have been lent to farms and factories to put over the Maoist way. The name of the new revolutionary youth organization, Red Guards, and its olive-drab uniforms, suggest army assistance in its foundation. Even the new acting Minister of Culture was recently a soldier. At the August 18 rally, second-echelon army officers were given precedence over vice chairmen of the national legislature, and Mao himself appeared in military uniform to symbolize the army's prime importance in national affairs.

What may be happening is not a Bonapartist takeover in the ordinary sense—after all, Lin Piao and his officers are supposed to be the reddest party members of them all. But the country is increasingly dominated by military men and, in the long run, a peacetime army is not a suitable vehicle for guiding the revolution. Political leadership cannot be its sole major task; and besides, even the reddest army cadres are subject to conservative pressures from their more professionally minded colleagues which, however often criticized, have an effect. Ultimately the influx of army cadres into the top party organs would adulterate party leadership. By handing the baton to Lin, Mao may have undermined what he considers the very basis of proletarian dictatorship.

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COMPUTERS, PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By John Diebold

TWO recent Presidential directives provide the framework for testing the application of the newest tools of information technology to the conduct of foreign affairs. If such tools are effectively applied and gain wider acceptance they could radically affect the management and even the substance of international relations.

On October 12, 1965, the President "directed the introduction of an integrated programming-planning-budgeting system [P.P.B.S.] in the executive branch," including the State Department. The system is a management method for measuring the effectiveness of expenditures in reaching program goals and had marked success when introduced by Secretary McNamara in the Defense Department. In implementing this system within the Defense Department there has been wide use of computer technology. Similar systems and technology are now being proposed and tested for the needs of the State Department.

The second directive was issued on March 4, 1966, when the President "directed the Secretary of State . . . to assume authority and responsibility for the overall direction, coördination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas." Within certain limitations, the Secretary now has the charter to become the manager of our foreign affairs rather than merely the coördinator.

The success with which the Secretary manages the State Department will depend to a major extent on his ability to meet its requirements for information and communications. These are now so complex that the question is no longer whether technology should be applied to meet them, but how. The success of such technology within the Department depends critically on three factors: (1) sound analysis at the highest level of the information needs of the Department; (2) the effective application of information technology to these needs, rather than simply the mechanization of the current inadequate information systems; and (3) the communication of the information thus collected to those who need and must act upon it.

To those who conduct our foreign affairs, as to the manager of a

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private enterprise, information technology poses not only questions of application but also challenges of change. For the application of technology not only changes the method by which an operation is performed, but frequently changes *what* is performed. Just as businesses are now able through technology to provide entirely new services to ever-increasing numbers of people, so will the scope, conduct and substance of foreign affairs change as technology is applied. Let me emphasize that what I foresee represents no panacea, no automated Foreign Service. My purpose here is to underline the fact that these new technologies raise major questions and require the most thoughtful planning.

The choices of instruments for decision and action are widening. The old obstacles to judgment and service are receding and are in the process of taking on new and, at this time, unpredictable shapes. It is my judgment, however, that as the new technology becomes applied to foreign affairs, reliance on personal judgment and personal and national moral standards will increase—not decrease. As the horizons of factual ignorance and misinformation fade, the decision-maker will be presented with vast new areas of choice.

If, for example, information systems are perfected by technology, what will be the role of the Ambassador? He could have available instantly all of the information and analysis available to the Secretary of State but might still lack the latter's overall view of national priorities and interests. Two or three hundred years ago, when it required days, weeks, months or, in some cases, years for an Ambassador to reach his assignment or to communicate with his sovereign, he was indeed plenipotentiary. There was no choice. He knew more than anyone at home about conditions in his assigned country, and orders regarding the most fundamental and long-term actions could not, in most cases, reach him in time to be relevant. Over the past one hundred years, with the coming of the telegraph, the wireless, the express train and the jet, the role of the Ambassador has diminished, at least in terms of his power to act. At home the number of people who know as much about his mission as he does has increased. As a matter of fact, the Ambassador's home office has at its disposal sources of information and analytical talents to which he has no access.

Now, however, the situation is changing again. If we so decide, the Ambassador will be able to have all the information relevant

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to his assignment. He could once more be designated in fact plenipotentiary if this were the wish of his superiors. On the other hand, as his home office will be able to be in even closer touch with his mission than before, the need to rely on the judgment of the man-on-the-spot could diminish even further. When the leaders of nations can confer for hours, face to face, on closed-circuit television, will the Ambassador's role become even more limited to that of an information-gatherer, pulse-taker and "holder of hands?" It is interesting to speculate on the kind of summitry we will have when such technologies really become effective.

Thus, the areas of choice between effective courses of action widen. Who makes the decisions? Who is the instrument of response? Other examples, perhaps more portentous in nature, will appear later. But even in this case of the Ambassador, the implications for foreign-affairs management are not to be dismissed lightly. If some sort of middle course is chosen, let us say by making the power of the Ambassador dependent on the sensitivity of his post or on his personal abilities, serious consequences to the prestige of our envoys could result. The fact that this problem has been developing for some time does not diminish its implications for the future. For, as the distance between alternative policies lengthens, deliberate or unconscious inconsistencies become both more obvious and more fraught with consequence.

II

Sir Winston Churchill, in discussing the process of making strategic wartime decisions, wrote: "Success depends on sound deductions from a mass of intelligence, often specialized and highly technical, on every aspect of the enemy's national life, and much of this information has to be gathered in peace-time." How much simpler the decision-making process might have been for him had it been possible then, as it is becoming increasingly so now, to centralize such information technologically.

In the State Department in Washington, some 2,000 telegrams are processed every day and an average of 70 copies is made of each. The resultant 140,000 pieces of paper daily are filed both centrally and in various user files. The Central Foreign Policy file alone grows at the rate of 600 cubic feet (400 file drawers) a year. The Intelligence staff has 200 professional employees who read

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and try to analyze some 100,000 documents monthly. Most of this information is filed to meet the personal requirements of those in charge of various bureaus and offices. Its existence is not known or useful to others. Senior officers must wade through stacks of telegrams and airgrams to get a few bits of significant information. The new or most important information is mixed with the old or trivial. In an emergency situation the central filing system is ignored almost entirely and a crisis team of experts on that particular situation or country is called together to offer its analysis and advice.

The problem of information-flow and use has been recognized in the foreign-affairs community of our government. Since 1946, some 363 projects and studies in information management have been undertaken, 172 of them in the State Department and 167 in the various successor agencies concerned with foreign economic assistance.

In one informational area of foreign affairs, technological solutions are being vigorously tested—collating information about the State Department's resources. A Foreign Affairs Programming System (F.A.P.S.) was established with the objective of bringing together all the strands of United States activities and resources abroad, country by country, to give both the Secretary of State and the Ambassadors a coherent instrument of command and control. Now elements of the F.A.P.S. are being refined to serve the P.P.B.S. being introduced at the President's direction.

In the spring of this year, Dr. Charles Hitch, formerly with the RAND Corporation and then, as Comptroller of the Department of Defense, architect of the programming system introduced by Secretary McNamara, was designated as the chairman of a newly appointed advisory group on foreign affairs planning-programming-budgeting. This advisory group is charged with developing a P.P.B.S. for the State Department. The Stanford Research Institute, State Department personnel, the Bureau of the Budget and the P.P.B.S. personnel of other agencies will work closely with the advisory group. It is expected that by fiscal 1969 a full P.P.B.S. cycle can be developed for Latin America—the first test region.

But major problems remain. Richard Barrett, Director of the Office of Management Planning in the State Department, puts it this way: "Secretary McNamara, in introducing P.P.B.S in the Defense Department, had a definite managerial concept and

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strategy in mind. State is trying to formulate a managerial strategy at the same time as it is trying to develop a system to support that strategy." The question is, in the absence of a management strategy, will the computer—now an integral part of the P.P.B.S. system—be used merely to decorate and speed up already obsolete processes? Will information technology simply be applied to existing information-gathering processes? Will more information be gathered only to become useless because the persons who need it do not get it, or get it at the wrong time? P.P.B.S., which is principally concerned with planning and budgeting, is only a small part of this dilemma. The problem becomes more complex and urgent, say, in the implementation of policy or crisis management.

But those who plan carefully may be able to learn much from business experience with the application of advanced information technologies. There are some 35,000 computer systems operated by private industry in this country today. But in 1954—just thirteen years ago—only the first few were being installed for commercial use. The lessons have been and still are learned by business the hard way: mounting costs for useless data, duplication of functions and personnel, large-scale errors in business operations and decisions. The key problem resides in the inability or unwillingness of management to ask itself what it really wants from technology. What kind of information is needed by which persons at what times? What is the relation of the costs of this information to the benefits derived? More and more such questions are being formulated with insight and imagination and, as a result, the latest technological capabilities have made possible not only a change in the methods but also in the substance of business operations.

For example, certain items can now be mass-produced by inserting a magnetic tape into a computer which guides the machine in the manufacturing process. Instead of manufacturing such items at headquarters and shipping them where required, it may be cheaper to ship the magnetic tape and manufacture the items in the market areas. Imaginative thinking through of technology makes entirely new processes and procedures possible.

Banking systems, credit-card companies and airlines are among those operations whose present scope of service would be impossible without the relatively intelligent use of information technology. One can only imagine the chaos if, for some reason,

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governmental operations—from traffic control to internal revenue collection—were to return to the limitations imposed by pre-computer administrative and clerical routines.

Today one can no longer think of just the computer. One must think in the more comprehensive terms of information technology or information systems. This fact is brought home dramatically by a review of costs. Ten years ago, the computer or central processor represented some 75 percent of the total cost of an automatic data-processing system. The so-called peripheral equipment—input/output devices, outside storage and communications links—accounted for some 25 percent. This is changing radically and by 1972 the cost relationships will be completely reversed. The cost of information processing and storage within the computer system will decrease 97 percent between 1963 and 1972, while the cost of communicating with the computer center will decrease by some 50 percent. The computer is emerging from its glassed-in throne room and, as it becomes increasingly accessible to those needing its services, the links between it and society proliferate both in number and in complexity.

This complexity itself simplifies the relationship between man and machine and makes the machine more and more an integral part of society. The information systems of today already are beginning to provide us with the ability to ask the computer questions through keyboard desk sets, light pencil drawings on a television-like screen, or, still to a limited extent, by voice. Answers to such questions come back through a print or on a screen, or both. For instance, an engineer can make a sketch with a light pencil on the screen; the computer converts this sketch into a precise engineering draft which appears on the screen and can be rotated in perspective or altered at will. When the engineer gets what he wants he can either have the design printed out in hard copy or converted to a tape which runs a machine tool which, in turn, cuts the designed part out of metal. A typical multi-station system in a large corporation allows hundreds of managers across the country—and eventually across the world—to query a centrally located computer from their desk sets and receive instantaneous replies in visual form.

The key questions that have to be answered in order to build these systems and make them work usefully are: (1) Who needs the information? (2) What kind of information must be made available, in what detail, and how currently? (3) Must the sys-

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tem be complex enough to allow for machine guidance of the questioner if the question is unclear or unanswerable in the form presented?

In other words, what do we want from our technology? As our commercial systems are beginning to demonstrate, we can get what we want.

III

In the management of foreign affairs, information technology gives us usefully the chance to review what we are doing as well as what we want to do. I shall try to show that it will affect not only who makes the decisions or who is the instrument of response, as in the case of the Ambassador, but that for this and even more complex questions it will also change what the decisions are about. Further, it will determine whether decisions or conscious responses in particular instances are necessary at all, or are built into the system automatically.

The question of what we want raises, in turn, numerous questions which must be solved organizationally. Who will make the initial and continuing decisions on the data to be fed into the information system? How is data to be weighted for analysis and summary conclusions? Should more than one system be set up—for example, one for the State Department and one for the Central Intelligence Agency? Who should have access to the information from one or more systems? Should there be a switching center which controls who gets what?

However, I shall not concern myself here with these organizational questions. The answers to them will depend in large part on how we envisage the total impact of information technology on the substance of foreign-affairs management. The form we want the conduct of international relations to take—and we still have the weight in the world to shape that, if we assume the leadership—will have a profound effect on what the world looks like.

When Hitler embarked on the direct course leading to World War II, beginning with the announcement that Germany would rearm and culminating with the occupations of the Rhineland, Austria, the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, three principal arguments were made by those who counseled against intervention: (1) Hitler could not threaten Europe because Germany did not possess the means for all-out war and, therefore, he should

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be permitted to assert claims which might be legitimate; (2) Hitler already possessed enough power to make intervention too costly; and (3) Hitler, after he achieved Germany's immediate demands, would live in peace with his neighbors.

The first two arguments were based on information which was inadequate. The third argument was based on an inadequate appraisal of the man and of the psychological forces in Germany which supported him. The proper use of the kind of information and communications technologies now or soon to be available to us could have placed in perspective the first two arguments. Vast quantities of intelligence, most of it not secret but only undigested, on production, manpower, foreign trade, resources and technological probabilities could have provided the Allies at any stage with an accurate picture of German versus allied capabilities. The imponderables would have remained—questions about who would side with whom, about Hitler, the man, and the psychology of his nation—but even these could have been subjected to analysis aided by information technology. This is not to assert that history would necessarily have been changed; information can still be ignored or misused, and those who make policy are influenced by many factors, some of them essentially irrational. But technology cuts down the area of the unknown, narrows the basis for rational decision.

Many treaties are based on promises to do or not to do things which the partner cannot know about. This is so especially with nonaggression or disarmament treaties and their corollaries. If the ability to collect and process vast quantities of data, ranging from atmospheric samples to economic and transportation statistics, can give any one nation an increasingly accurate picture of trends and unusual activities in other nations, will the universal realization that others can divine a break in faith make such treaties obsolete? This could make the response of one nation to certain actions by others automatic, perhaps pre-programmed through simulation. Such "gaming" on the part of many competing powers could give them such an improved view of the possible consequences of their actions as to save them from many hazardous international experiments. Perhaps, in a crude way, this already is happening. The nuclear test-ban treaty might be considered just a formalized acknowledgement of mutually perceived facts. Can the use of information systems which are increasingly becoming more responsive and accurate push

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forward this kind of acknowledgement into broader areas of arms control and, someday, even make certain kinds of treaties obsolete?

Both in the negotiation of trade agreements and in their execution, an agreed-upon data base can make almost automatic the evaluation of the impact of concessions and of the responses to the withdrawal or tampering with concessions. Perhaps the principal function of the future trade negotiator will be, first, to arrive at an agreed-upon data base and, second, to negotiate on the basis of his evaluation of the national interest involved in facts known to all. On the other hand, it may be decided that, although this procedure would simplify one part of the negotiations, the facts are of such a proprietary nature as to preclude their use in this manner. In either event, the choice of action will be broadened significantly.

Undoubtedly, information systems for the conduct of foreign affairs will have to include major techniques for the forecasting of technological and socio-economic change. In order to prepare for the consequences of economic development in the emerging nations, and in the international exploitation of ocean, sub-arctic and extraterrestrial resources, substantial revisions in international law and economic policy obviously are going to be required. Information technology could be applied immediately to the collection of relevant socio-economic data both on the emerging nations and on newly developing resource areas, and eventually could relate them meaningfully to alternative courses of action—what kinds of investments should be made and by whom, what should be the distribution of costs and benefits, etc. On this basis of information, the substance of the decisions in these fields could be altered fundamentally. National and international concern could be concentrated on real issues and realistic alternatives.

These are but a few examples of how information technology may have an impact on the conduct of foreign affairs. The form and substance of what we do in this field are already changing. It is essential that we understand this and act upon the understanding systematically, imaginatively and with the best techniques available to us.

In the same decade that the new technology has emerged, the number of countries with which the United States conducts relations has more than doubled, the number of departments and

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agencies involved in foreign affairs has vastly increased and our sources of information have taken a quantum jump. The very process of decision-making has become infinitely complicated. Under these circumstances, the challenge of conducting our foreign affairs intelligently, of grounding policy on the best possible information, is a challenge to modern management and its use of organizational systems and technological tools. Is modern management now being applied to the conduct of United States foreign affairs? I think that a beginning has been made. Perhaps in this beginning we may also find that our statesmen—not the technicians, but those who must decide what is to be demanded of the technicians—have begun to think about what they want. For, once again, this is the central question: What do we want from our technology? If we know, we can get it.

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NEW PERSPECTIVES BEHIND THE WALL

By Welles Hangen

ON June 29, after almost five months of discussion and preparation, the East German Communist régime denounced an agreement for public debates to be held in both German states between its spokesmen and the leaders of West Germany's opposition Social Democratic Party. The plan for a high-level confrontation, the first of its kind since Germany was partitioned at the end of the Second World War, was the result of an East German initiative. It had aroused intense interest and some exaggerated hopes among Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

The East German Socialist Unity, or Communist, Party (S.E.D.) had sought a "dialogue" with the West German Social Democrats (S.P.D.) with the avowed aim of causing dissension among the major parties in Bonn and splitting the S.P.D. leadership from the party rank and file. As it turned out, however, Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin, the S.P.D. chairman, won the support of his own party as well as Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's grudging endorsement of the proposed talks. Sixteen days before the first debate was to be held at Karl-Marx-Stadt (formerly Chemnitz) in East Germany, the Communists canceled the arrangements on the flimsy pretext that a newly adopted West German law guaranteeing S.E.D. speakers immunity from arrest in the Federal Republic infringed East German sovereignty.

There is no doubt that the S.E.D. lost prestige by backing out of the debates. But the episode still enabled the East German Communists to achieve their long-standing goal of persuading West German leaders to agree to direct talks on all-German problems. By sanctioning the plan the Bonn government tacitly abandoned its contention that it is pointless, and indeed immoral, to engage in political discussions with the Soviet-sponsored East German government. Brandt called it "the beginning of a great dialogue" when he spoke over West German television on July 14, the day the first debate was to have been held in Karl-Marx-Stadt. "There may be setbacks," he told East German viewers, "but one evening we will be with you over there, speaking to you."

West German political leaders, including Chancellor Erhard

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and his Foreign Minister, Dr. Gerhard Schröder, now acknowledge the need to deal directly with Walter Ulbricht's régime in order to maintain contacts with the 17 million Germans under Communist rule, although they insist that formal recognition is out of the question. Vice Chancellor Erich Mende, the Free Democratic Party leader, has gone so far as to speak of "negotiations" with the S.E.D. All parties in Bonn have come to recognize that intensified contacts are necessary to maintain a feeling of national solidarity among Germans on both sides of the Wall. Mende has recalled that as late as 1919 the Austrian parliament unanimously adopted a resolution calling for union with Germany, whereas today Austria wants no part of union. Like many of his fellow countrymen, Mende fears that the prolonged partition of Germany is fostering a similar estrangement between East and West Germans. He therefore advocates more strenuous efforts to promote trade and cultural exchanges. West German anxieties are also reflected in Bonn's insistent demands for new "initiatives" by its Western allies, primarily the United States, to win Moscow's agreement for German reunification.

The new element in the situation, which accounts for much of the present malaise in the Federal Republic, is the emergence of East Germany as a power in its own right rather than a mere pawn of Soviet policy. The self-styled German Democratic Republic (*Deutsche Demokratische Republik,* or D.D.R.) now ranks as the second most important trading nation in the Communist world and the fifth or sixth largest industrial producer in Europe. Western economists are inclined to accept the D.D.R.'s claim that it has surpassed the highest gross industrial output of the prewar Reich, which had approximately four times East Germany's area and population. The D.D.R. is now Russia's most important trading partner, accounting for one-quarter of Soviet imports in such vital sectors as chemicals, machine tools and precision instruments. East German office machines, optical goods, railway cars and complete plants are exported today to more than one hundred countries, including many in Western Europe.

This economic advance is being accelerated by a sweeping overhaul of prices, credit policy and industrial management that goes considerably beyond the Liberman reforms adopted by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. "The New System of Economic Planning and Directing the Economy,"

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announced by Ulbricht in July 1963, has decentralized economic authority and created a system of monetary incentives aimed at getting factory and branch managers to produce for the market at home and abroad instead of simply fulfilling planned targets of physical output. Application of the new measures has been erratic in some cases but substantial progress is already evident. East German textile machinery is now licensed for production in the United States. Last year the D.D.R. attained an industrial growth rate of 7 percent, comparable to West Germany's. The quality of many products is now up to Western standards. Economic gains have already been translated into a marked improvement in East German living standards (now the highest in the Communist world) and more assertive behavior toward the Soviet Union and its allies as well as toward West Germany and West Berlin. The East German Communists clearly believe their "rump state" has come to stay.

II

It is ironic that the prerequisite for the régime's successes remains its worst humiliation. The wall built through Berlin on August 13, 1961, regarded as an admission of failure by the West, created the essential conditions for economic and political stabilization in the former Soviet occupation zone. It halted an epic human hemorrhage that threatened East Germany's biological survival—an outpouring of refugees in numbers as high as 2,000 a day. Before the Wall, East German officials reckoned that at least one out of every five professional school graduates would defect to the West before taking his first job. Hospitals, schools, theatres and research institutes were denuded of staff. Factory managers arrived on Monday mornings to find dozens of workbenches deserted. Entire apartment houses would be emptied of their occupants in a single weekend.

The Wall has ended all that. The era when East Germans could vote with their feet is gone. The Wall has not only stabilized the labor force; it has created a climate of acquiescence that did not exist before. For the first time Germans living between the Elbe and the Oder realize that there is no easy way out. They must face death on the Wall or come to terms with their unloved régime. Although as many as a dozen still try to crash the barriers every week, the overwhelming majority have now set to work with typical Teutonic zeal to improve their conditions and,

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at the same time, to remedy the D.D.R.'s still considerable economic shortcomings. The growing accommodation between population and régime is responsible at least in part for the record 6.5 percent increase in productivity reported by the government last year.

The counterpart of the East Germans' acceptance of Communist rule is their increasing alienation from West Germans. The same words no longer mean the same thing on both sides of the Wall. Disparities in living standards, although narrowed in recent years, have bred resentments among East Germans. The often patronizing attitude of West Germans toward the "poor brothers and sisters in the Zone" irks many East Germans. Official West German broadcasts to the D.D.R. now make a point of paying tribute to the "achievements" of ordinary East Germans, thereby further stimulating pride in what has been accomplished despite Soviet exactions and the S.E.D.'s own blunders. The contrast between the hectic materialism and individualism of West Germany and the officially propagated collectivism of the D.D.R. does not always make East Germans eager to leave home and take their chances in the West, even when they have the opportunity. It is significant that of the 2,000,000 pension-age East Germans whom the régime has allowed to travel west since November 1964, barely two in a thousand have chosen to remain abroad. Younger, more mobile East Germans would of course leave in large numbers if the Wall were opened, but even they increasingly identify their fortunes with the D.D.R.

Although there are at least a dozen former Nazis on the S.E.D. Central Committee and more than fifty in the D.D.R. *Volkskammer* (People's Chamber), Communist propaganda has convinced many East Germans that West Germany is a nest of old Nazis. Material from the Potsdam archives has enabled the D.D.R. to incriminate several highly placed Bonn officials who previously served Hitler's Reich. The belief that Bonn is indulgent toward ex-Nazis has been further strengthened by West Germany's often ambiguous policy on war-crimes trials.

The East German Communists are now seeking to create a national mystique compounded of Prussian tradition, anti-Nazism and socialist patriotism. "Red Prussia," as younger S.E.D. members like to call the D.D.R., claims to be the true heir of classical German humanism as well as the Prussian virtues of discipline and self-denial. West Germany is pictured as the bas-

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tard offspring of decadent American imperialism, a truncated "Rhine Union" manipulated from Washington and the Vatican. As Erich Mende has observed, "In the Soviet Zone pride in progress could easily turn into national pride." To foster such national pride the régime has converted Buchenwald and other former Nazi concentration camps in East Germany into shrines of the new order, whose saints are German Communist resistance fighters and "progressive" anti-Nazis. The use of wartime slave labor by firms now prominent in West Germany is emphasized in order to link the Federal Republic with Nazi barbarism.

The régime's first aim is naturally to instill the new nationalism in the 1,750,000 members of the S.E.D., equivalent to about 10 percent of the population. Many party members are pure opportunists but the number of those committed to the Prussianized version of Marxism-Leninism now being preached in East Berlin is growing. Special efforts are made to indoctrinate the 190,000-man National People's Army, almost all of whose officers and half of whose noncoms are party members. The goose-stepping young East German soldiers changing the guard with Prussian precision in front of the "Memorial to the Victims of Fascism and Militarism" on *Unter den Linden* symbolize the disparate strands of German tradition that the régime is now trying to weave into a national ethos.

More immediately important to East Germany's viability as a state are the régime's efforts to provide more tangible economic benefits for its citizens. The impetus for these efforts comes from a remarkable group of young manager-technocrats who have virtually wrested control of the East German economy from the S.E.D.'s doctrinaire old guard. Erich Apel, former chairman of the State Planning Commission, who committed suicide last December rather than sign a discriminatory five-year trade agreement with Moscow, was the father of East Germany's economic reforms and leader of the pragmatic new generation of officials and managers. His struggle to free the economy from ideological shackles is now being carried on by such men as Dr. Guenther Mittag, 39-year-old chief of the S.E.D. Politburo's industry bureau; Dr. Werner Jarowinsky, 38 years old, who is Central Committee Secretary of Trade and Supply; and Rudi Georgi, 37-year-old Minister of Processing Machinery and Vehicle Construction, who headed the sheet-iron and metalwares industry until last December.

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In their efforts to put East German industry on a profitable basis, the young technocrats have enjoyed unexpected support from Walter Ulbricht. The aging autocrat clearly regards the economic reforms as his last opportunity to win a measure of popular acceptance. But at 73 Ulbricht is unable and probably unwilling to shed all the mental habits of a Stalinist *apparatchik* acquired during a lifetime of service to the Communist cause. Moreover, he is subject to strong pressures from dogmatists and hardliners in the party, prominent among whom is Erich Honecker, 54-year-old heir apparent to the post of First Secretary.

Honecker joined the Communist Young Pioneers in Weimar Germany at the age of ten and has been a party member since he was seventeen. He has been in charge of defense and internal security since returning in 1957 from two years of "special training" in the Soviet Union. As a full member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee, he now regularly deputizes for Ulbricht when the party boss is ill or out of East Berlin. His wife Margot is Minister of Popular Education. Although his views are ill-defined and his personality colorless, Honecker has always been identified with doctrinaire Stalinist elements. Perhaps significantly, it was he who sent the message to Mayor Brandt last June postponing the scheduled debates, and he is believed to have played an equally important part in the later decision to scuttle the project entirely. As Ulbricht's successor, he could exploit his control of the secret police (S.S.D.) and the army to silence opposition in the party or among the population, but Honecker would lack Ulbricht's personal authority and prestige. It is also unclear how Moscow would regard him in the top position. If he does inherit the First Secretaryship, Honecker's reign is likely to be short.

In its fight against Honecker and the other hardliners in the party, the new managerial class often finds itself aligned with the restive intellectuals. The symbol of the intellectuals' revolt is Robert Havemann, a former professor of physical chemistry at Humboldt University, whose lectures on "Natural Scientific Aspects of Philosophical Problems," clandestinely reproduced, are passed from hand to hand in East Germany as if they constituted a manual on subversion. In a sense Havemann's eloquent plea for the right of dissent in a de-Stalinized D.D.R. is the most dangerous form of subversion. It is interesting that Erich Apel, shortly before his suicide, is reported to have discussed with Have-

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mann an article in which the professor called for a parliamentary opposition in East Germany. Apel would probably not have gone that far, nor would most of his fellow technocrats who now occupy important positions. But the overlap between the objectives of the economic reformers and the intellectual liberals is obvious.

Havemann's history is impeccable. He joined the German Communist Party in the early 1930s and narrowly escaped death on a Nazi gallows during the war. After 1945 he became one of the S.E.D.'s leading theoreticians and an uncompromising foe of "revisionism." His change of heart came after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin before the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. Since delivering his heretical lectures in the winter of 1963–4, Havemann has been stripped of his teaching position, expelled from the party and barred from the East Berlin Academy of Sciences. He still refuses to recant or to take refuge in the West, as the régime would be glad to have him do. Despite intense pressure, the S.E.D. failed in March this year to muster the required three-quarters majority of the Academy of Sciences to get him expelled from that body. It was later announced that he had simply been "struck off" the membership rolls, and Academy members are forbidden to see him. But the S.E.D. is finding it difficult to forget his case. The Italian Communist Party has come to Havemann's defense, publicly warning the East German comrades that "No persecutory measures should intervene in the confrontation of opinions."

When the Politburo of the S.E.D. first denounced Havemann in February 1964, it accused him of carrying the noxious seeds of revisionism spawned in the "Prague Spring," the cultural thaw then prevalent in Czechoslovakia. For more than a decade the S.E.D. has been at odds with most of its "fraternal" socialist allies in Eastern Europe on the question of artistic freedom. The easing of East German policy toward the intellectuals has not been achieved by Bonn's clumsy attempts to intervene in their behalf, but by the pervasive winds of liberalization blowing now from Warsaw, now from Budapest and even sometimes from Moscow. One reported reason for Havemann's obstinate defiance of the party leadership is his close ties with a number of liberal Soviet academicians.

Because it is subjected to pressures from other countries in the bloc, the D.D.R.'s cultural policy has wavered. During a "soft"

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phase in 1963 the party sanctioned the publication of "*Der geteilte Himmel*" ("The Divided Sky"), the first East German novel to deal honestly with the reasons that prompted more than five million East Germans to flee to the West before the Wall was built. For many months the book was the leading best seller and its 34-year-old author, Christa Wolf, achieved a unique position among the country's writers. "The Divided Sky" is the story of a young East German engineer who is driven to despair by obtuse Communist bureaucracy and finally decides to escape to West Berlin. His fiancée follows him there in a vain effort to persuade him to return. After only one day in the West, where she feels completely foreign, she decides to go back alone to her East German collective. The girl's decision fits the party line but the rest of the novel is a signal departure from the canons of "socialist realism."

As a successful writer and candidate member of the Central Committee, Christa Wolf has been allowed to make frequent trips to West Germany and to enjoy other privileges denied ordinary citizens. But, like many other intellectuals who have received the régime's favors, she has not accepted the party's narrow notion of artistic freedom. Last December she clashed with the powerful Margot Honecker at a Central Committee meeting called to reassert party control over wayward writers and artists. Despite the current crackdown on intellectuals, neither Christa Wolf nor Robert Havemann nor even the iconoclastic balladeer, Wolfgang Biermann, is about to go on trial on charges of "undermining the workers' and peasants' power." In the not so distant past a telephone call by the Minister of State Security would have disposed of such troublemakers. Now the worst that happens is that they are denied the right to publish or practice their chosen profession.

III

East Germany is changing because the rest of the Soviet bloc is changing and because the S.E.D. leadership feels secure enough to permit some relaxation of control, even in the highly sensitive area of political science and sociology. Since the brief wave of terror that followed the building of the Wall in 1961, the régime has amnestied so many political prisoners that it risks losing a lucrative source of ransom money from the West German government. The S.E.D. has also relaxed its pressure on the churches, inaugurated a five-day work-week every other week and lifted

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restrictions on receiving Western radio and television broadcasts. To listen in private is now permitted. To disseminate what one hears or invite others to listen is considered spreading "imperialist propaganda." Even if the party outlawed all reception of Western broadcasts, most East Germans would continue listening avidly, not because they always like what they hear from West Germany or West Berlin, but because the programs lessen their feeling of being cut off from the rest of the world. Nothing vexes East Germans more than the régime's refusal to let them travel abroad, even to other Communist countries.

One of the most striking changes that a visitor notes in East Germany today is the readiness with which complete strangers, including S.E.D. members, criticize the régime. Pride in what has been accomplished makes many people more impatient than ever with bureaucratic obstacles and ideological cant. East Germans are somewhat more restrained in their comments on foreign affairs, but they no longer fear to express friendly feelings toward the United States. Candles were lighted in thousands of windows in East Berlin and other cities the night President Kennedy was assassinated. Communist propaganda about the Viet Nam war has made little impression; even party members often privately express understanding for American efforts to contain Chinese expansionism. In fact, fear of Communist China runs very deep in the D.D.R. as elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

Popular attitudes toward the Soviet Union range from apathetic to hostile, although there is little animosity toward individual Russians. After holding up Soviet experience as the model of perfection in every field for almost twenty years, the S.E.D. is now assuming a more critical stance toward its mentors in Moscow. The Russians are now often disparaged at closed party meetings. After Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964, Ulbricht boasted that the D.D.R. had not adopted "a single one" of the Soviet leader's nostrums in the field of agriculture. (In fact, it had slavishly copied the Khrushchevian cult of corn although much of East Germany is unsuited to growing corn.) Peter Florin, head of the Central Committee department dealing with foreign Communist parties, adopted a coolly superior tone at a meeting last year of the U.S.S.R.-D.D.R. Friendship Society:

> The Soviet Union has not yet reached world standards in all sectors, for example, in agriculture. Our Soviet friends have to overcome a series of difficulties in agriculture. . . . How can we show our friendship in the realm of

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agriculture? We have decided to increase our agricultural production even faster. We are doing this also in order to be able to reduce agricultural imports from the Soviet Union. At the same time we would like to impart to our Soviet friends our experiences in agriculture in order to enable them with the help of these experiences—together with their own—to solve their problems more rapidly. . . . At present the Soviet people are trying to improve the management of their entire economy. In this context they are interested in the experiences of the D.D.R. . . . The German comrades have worked out many new solutions for complex problems in managing the economy. . . .

S.E.D. members now remind Western visitors that they never split their party according to the "production principle" applied by Khrushchev and most East European Communist leaders. The East Germans also boast that they are ahead in carrying out economic reforms. They scorn suggestions that their "agricultural production coöperatives" are anything like Russian *kolkhozi.* Party theoreticians privately insist that the D.D.R. completed the transition from the dictatorship of the proletariat to "socialist democracy" in fifteen years whereas it took the Russians forty.

Like other East European Communist parties, the S.E.D. is exploiting the opportunities for tactical manœuvre provided by the Sino-Soviet rift. Some East German functionaries have shown partiality to Peking's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, but the majority in the party, including the leadership, prudently opts for Moscow. The presence of 300,000 Soviet troops in their country makes it unlikely that the East German Communists will ever allow themselves to fall into China's embrace, however much unsolicited political support Peking offers them.

Nevertheless, the S.E.D. now ostentatiously asserts its equality in the Marxist-Leninist fraternity, and has let it be known that the price of its allegiance in the endless doctrinal broils engaging the Communist world is going up. When the Soviet leaders visit East Berlin these days, they are received with no more fanfare than any other Communist potentates. In April 1965, the S.E.D. brought pressure on the Russians to retaliate against the Allies' decision to allow the West German Bundestag to meet in West Berlin. After bitter behind-the-scenes wrangling, the Soviets briefly interfered with Allied traffic on the Berlin autobahn, and the East Germans demonstrated that they could wage their own war of nerves against West Berlin by sending military helicopters over the Allied sectors of the city. Last fall for the first time East German officers commanded a Soviet division in joint Warsaw Pact war games.

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The East German leadership professes to be reconciled to Moscow's refusal to sign a separate peace treaty with the D.D.R., giving Ulbricht control over Allied access to West Berlin. But the S.E.D. has repeatedly and publicly reminded the Russians of their obligations under their 1964 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Coöperation to defend East Germany against any Western attack. The credibility of Moscow's commitment to its German ally has not been enhanced by the lagging Soviet response to American bombing of North Viet Nam, as S.E.D. members now freely admit to Western visitors.

Russian tanks still wield the ultimate sanction in East Germany, but they are largely powerless against the kind of evolutionary change now taking place within the S.E.D., Moscow's chosen instrument for ruling the D.D.R. The Russians can afford neither to write off East Germany as a lost cause nor to reassert dictatorial control over their proconsuls there. The latter course would involve a disastrous loss of prestige for Moscow in the eyes of the world Communist movement. The Russians are further hamstrung by the fact that many of the changes in East Germany today are inspired by liberalizing tendencies in the rest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. Moreover, there is now no leader in Moscow who exercises Stalin's or Khrushchev's authority in the D.D.R. or elsewhere in the former Soviet empire. The result is fragmentation throughout the one-time monolith and a loosening of Russian control everywhere, including East Germany. Moscow's overwhelming military power is a diminishing and often unusable asset in keeping the former satellites in line, as the Rumanian example demonstrates. The S.E.D. is now often able to improve its image at home by championing East German interests in Comecon (the East's economic and technical coöperation organization) and the Warsaw Pact, even when they conflict with Russia's.

IV

Developments in Eastern Europe have already prompted Bonn to revise its policy toward all the former satellite states except East Germany. The Federal German Government still professes to believe it can isolate the D.D.R. from other East European states and eventually persuade the Russians to liquidate their stake in East Germany in return for promises of good behavior from a future all-German government. In fact, however, West

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German officials no longer believe that time is on their side. They concede that a process of consolidation is under way on the far side of the Wall. In any case the policy of isolation overlooks the fact that an East Germany deriving its existence solely from the Soviet Union is more likely to be ready to do Moscow's bidding and, therefore, more valuable to the Russians than a state with alternative outlets for its trade and with developed relations with the rest of the world.

Despite Bonn's approval of S.P.D. participation in the abortive scheme for debates, the Federal Republic remains officially committed to the doctrine that the D.D.R. is nothing more than a disguised Soviet occupation zone. It continues to return official communications from East Berlin unopened. It still insists that other countries, especially its NATO allies, should boycott the D.D.R., although trade between the two German states is now running at an annual rate of more than $600,000,000. Unfortunately for Bonn, this commerce can no longer be used to extract political concessions from Ulbricht because it now accounts for less than 10 percent of the D.D.R.'s total foreign trade.

The changing outlook has exacerbated differences in the coalition government of the Federal Republic on how best to deal with the D.D.R. Chancellor Erhard's Christian Democrats are generally hesitant to break new ground in this or any other field. The Free Democrats advocate a "contact offensive." As a result, Bonn's policy on trade and cultural contacts has vacillated. Erhard first rejected Ulbricht's proposals for a limited exchange of newspapers between East and West Germany; now legislation has been approved permitting the import of Communist publications into the Federal Republic. In the past, West Germans visiting the D.D.R. have been prohibited by West German law from engaging in "political discussions" with S.E.D. functionaries, and official East German visitors have often been arrested by the West German police on what proved to be trumped-up charges of endangering the "constitutional order"; now the Federal Republic is trying to promote a two-way traffic in persons and ideas despite recent signs that the East German régime is in a regressive phase.

The proposal made in Washington last June by Dr. Rainer Barzel, majority floor leader in the Bundestag, to allow Moscow to station troops in a reunited Germany and obtain preferential trading rights from a future all-German government, represented a notable departure from Bonn's official policy on reunification.

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Although Erhard and the Christian Democratic parliamentary group formally dissociated themselves from Barzel's suggestions, the reaction in the West German press and public was surprisingly favorable. There is a widespread realization in the Federal Republic today that the old dream of German reunification by free all-German elections has been fatally impaled on the Wall and that alternative solutions must be found. The first step seems to be some sort of continuing dialogue between the two German states aimed at keeping alive the concept of a single German nation.

Bonn's dilemma is also Washington's. The United States must sooner or later answer the question whether it should seek to expand its contacts with the D.D.R. or continue officially to ignore it. Washington has sold wheat to East Germany (for dollars) and licensed the export of synthetic fiber manufacturing technology and medical isotopes there, but has hitherto shied away from broader exchanges for fear of offending Bonn. Britain, France and other NATO countries have been less squeamish, although they too have withheld diplomatic recognition.

Recognition would severely impair Washington's relations with Bonn without yielding significant advantages for the United States. But if one grants that the D.D.R. cannot simply be wished out of existence and that its Communist rulers will not allow themselves to be voted out of power, it follows that a policy of liberalized trade and cultural exchanges could effectively promote present tendencies toward a more independent form of Communism. Given East Germany's pivotal economic role in the Communist world and its strategic position in the heart of central Europe, American policy-makers would be foolhardy to assume that the present and future leaders of the S.E.D. are simply Soviet puppets immune to the heady currents of self-assertion now flowing through Eastern Europe.

Whatever policy the United States and other Western countries pursue, it is now clear that the D.D.R.—a state that has already outlasted the Weimar Republic and Hitler's "thousand-year" *Reich*—will not easily be swept away.

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QUEBEC CHANGES GOVERNMENTS

By Claude Ryan

WHEN Mr. Jean Lesage, after serving only three and a half years of a five-year mandate as Prime Minister of Quebec, decided to call a general election for June 5 of this year, few observers thought that the incumbent Liberals would be out of office ten days after the election.

Mr. Lesage had been remarkably successful as head of a generally honest and efficient administration. He was considered by most observers far superior to his rival, Mr. Daniel Johnson. He could count on a team comprising at least a half-dozen front-rank stars. Nobody had got the impression during the last session of the provincial legislature that the National Union party was a serious contender for power. Mr. Lesage and his colleagues went into the election as if it had been business routine. They were so confident of winning that Mr. Lesage boasted on a couple of occasions that Mr. Johnson himself would hardly be returned to the legislature.

Things turned out quite differently. To his great discomfiture Mr. Lesage got 47 percent of the total vote but only 51 seats in the House while Mr. Johnson's National Union, with only 41 percent of the vote, took 56 seats. According to Canadian parliamentary tradition, Mr. Lesage had no choice. Ten days after the stunning result, he handed over the reins of government to his rival. Ever since that fateful day, observers in Canada and other parts of the world have been asking two questions. What caused the defeat of Mr. Lesage? What should one expect from Mr. Johnson and his party?

II

Whatever the result, the last election in Quebec was an honest one. It was fought for the first time under a new law which provides for much stricter control of candidates' expenses and for substantial financial contributions from the state to leading candidates in each constituency. Secret election funds of the past were not entirely absent, but occult financing was not a major factor in deciding the outcome of the election.

Since the National Union party was in opposition and could

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not therefore use the power of the police to its own advantage, nobody can claim that Mr. Johnson stole the election. One has to look for sounder explanations than the classic "I was robbed" argument in order to understand what happened.

The first reason for Mr. Lesage's failure to win a majority of seats has deep roots in the political history of Quebec. The electoral map of Quebec used to be terribly lopsided in favor of the rural areas and small population centers. Up to about five years ago, the Montreal area, with over one-third of the total population, had about 15 percent of the seats in the legislature. Some ridings (electoral districts) in Montreal had as many as 75,000 voters, while others in rural areas had barely 10,000 to 15,000.

Mr. Lesage tried to correct the situation by appointing a nonpartisan commission of experts to recommend possible improvements. The commission produced a report suggesting that constituency boundaries be redefined so as to bring each riding within a maximum 25 percent deviation from a general average, using strict "rep by pop" logic. But Mr. Lesage ran into strenuous resistance on the part of members for thirteen constitutionally protected ridings, whose boundaries could not be changed, according to the Constitution, without the consent of a majority of their residents. The only recourse that Mr. Lesage had was to amend the Constitution, but for this he would have had to count on the support of the upper chamber, of which the majority were National Union members. He had learned from authoritative sources that the upper house would oppose any such move on his part. Rather than risk a stalemate between the two Houses of the legislature, Mr. Lesage opted for a partial solution. He kept all the existing ridings and created thirteen new constituencies, eleven of them in Montreal. The basic imbalance between the large metropolitan constituencies and the small rural ones was thus reduced but not really eliminated. On June 5, the Liberals got 53 percent of the vote in the district of Montreal and nearly 70 percent of the seats (18 out of 26). In the rest of the province they received nearly 45 percent of the votes but only about 40 percent of the seats (32 out of 82). The results in the case of the National Union were still more disconcerting. With only 45 percent of the votes in the areas outside of Montreal, Mr. Johnson's party collected over 60 percent of the seats, whilst in Montreal it had only six seats but about 30 percent of the vote.

As the shrewd and experienced politician that he is, Mr. Daniel

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Johnson quickly saw where his chance lay. Rather than engage in a propaganda war against Mr. Lesage and the Liberal team at the provincial level, he chose to fight the election with a riding-by-riding strategy. He merrily abandoned to the Liberals all constituencies with strong English-speaking majorities. In Montreal he picked about ten ridings in which he felt he had a chance to win and more or less forgot about the others. In the remaining eighty ridings he concentrated on presenting stronger local figures than the Liberals and insisted to his friends that they had a fair chance to win provided they forgot about the broader provincial scene and aimed their guns at local issues in their respective ridings. In line with this thinking, Mr. Johnson prudently avoided a televised confrontation with Mr. Lesage, and his senior colleagues studiously refrained from any direct contact with the enemy. The Liberals were addressing themselves to the province as a whole. The National Union was aiming for the "little people" —the unemployed, the peasants, the small shopkeepers, the sports lovers, the anxious housewives who were at a loss to understand why their children had to attend school 50 miles from home.

Mr. Johnson coupled this strategy with a provincial manifesto which, while not too original, had plenty to match some overly generous pledges in the Liberal platform. The Johnson group had been short of generous proposals in the last two elections; this was no longer true. The National Union had also become identified as a party of old hats; this time they came up with a slate of candidates 80 percent of whom had never run before and whose average age was just above 40, as against an average age of 45 for the Liberal candidates.

The voters heeded the Johnson appeal. On election night Mr. Lesage retained a strong hold over cosmopolitan Montreal, but he had lost the heartland of Quebec, including his own region of Three-Rivers, the Eastern Townships, Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, the Richelieu valley and Joliette. To Mr. Lesage's claim that the Liberals had obtained more votes than the National Union, Mr. Johnson could reply that the Liberals' numerical advantage had accrued to them as a result of the overwhelming support of English-speaking voters and that a majority of French-Canadians had voted for the National Union.

In trying to assess Lesage's defeat, one must consider the role of the separatist and independent candidates in the election. Quebec's provincial elections are generally fought on a firm two-

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party pattern. In 1956, the two leading parties shared between them about 96 percent of the total vote; in 1960, their share rose to 98 percent; in 1962, it reached 98.5 percent. In 1966, the figure dropped to 88 percent, about 12 percent of the vote going to splinter parties and independent candidates. For the first time in Quebec history two parties with strong separatist platforms made their appearance: the *Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale* (R.I.N.) and the *Ralliement national* (R.N.). The former is resolutely separatist; its well-conceived program has strong socialist undertones but it remains perfectly acceptable according to Western standards; it has a good following among college and university students, intellectuals and white-collar workers. The *Ralliement national* was the outcome of a late alliance between a group of *Créditistes* (who went into provincial politics without the blessing of their federal leader, Réal Caouette) and some former R.I.N. members who could not go along with what they considered the secularist thinking of men like Pierre Bourgault and André D'Allemagne. None of these parties made really impressive gains in the June election. The R.N. got only 3.2 percent of the vote; the R.I.N. got 5.6 percent, but here two facts stand out: the R.I.N. received about 9.3 percent of the vote in the metropolitan area of Montreal and about 7 percent of the vote in the ridings in which it ran candidates, spelling defeat for the Liberal candidates in about a dozen constituencies. Mr. Bourgault, the leader of the R.I.N., claimed shortly after the election that his party had been largely responsible for the defeat of the Liberals. Nothing could have been closer to the truth. In their first major test at the polls, the separatists had demonstrated that they can exercise great power in shaping the overall result of an election. Mr. Lesage had once said that the separatists would be crushed in any election which they might care to join. He must still wish he had never uttered those foolish words.

One last reason—or perhaps a pair—involving the Liberals themselves must be invoked to explain the Liberal defeat. One has to do with the nature of the policies they initiated. These were in most cases long-range policies not destined to produce immediate benefits for the average voter. They were meant to improve the general situation of the province, not necessarily to cure the individual ills and dissatisfactions of each citizen. Mr. Gérin-Lajoie's educational reform promised to yield great dividends in five or ten years; in terms of the average man's sons and

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daughters, it often meant numberless complications and difficulties. Similarly, Mr. Lesage had introduced a new Labor Code which probably was the most progressive piece of labor legislation in North America; but this did not prevent his government from being confronted with a disquieting succession of labor conflicts in the five or six months before the election.

Mr. Laporte, the Minister for Municipal Affairs, showed courage and vision in promoting a radical revision of municipal boundaries and jurisdiction; in the process he alienated the sympathies of hundreds of local leaders who felt they were being deprived of old privileges which they liked to cloak under the respectable mantle of local autonomy. In most departments of government, patronage in the appointment of civil servants had been eliminated, or at least substantially reduced; this had been lauded in the press but was coolly received by dozens of local and regional party organizers in search of appropriate rewards for deserving Liberals.

The farmers felt that they were more or less forgotten by Mr. Lesage and his team. They were not so prosperous under Duplessis, but at least once every second or third year they could count on a few yards of free pavement in front of their properties and a modest grant for a son to be sent to college or settled on an adjacent piece of land. Under Mr. Lesage they had lost the individual favors and were still longing for the radical reforms promised by the government. As for civil servants, under Mr. Lesage they had obtained the right to organize and to bargain collectively with the government, but the immediate effect of the new legislation was to place the government under the threat of a general strike of civil servants only a couple of months before the election.

Not only had people at the local level grown wary of the increasing cost of the Lesage program of reform, they also had reason to complain about the men who had become identified with the new program. The Liberal Party in Quebec has never been solidly rooted in the working classes. It still derives its main support from the professionals, the businessmen, the white-collar workers and the intellectuals. Liberal leaders are more at ease in the refined circles of Quebec and Montreal than in the plants of Drummondville or the taverns and poolrooms of east-end Montreal. After six years in power they had become more or less isolated; they spent a lot of time working out new programs in

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close consultation with upper-echelon civil servants, but they had lost touch with the average voter. In Montreal this was bound to affect them only slightly, since ideas and "public image" factors are more important in shaping the urban vote than direct contact with the candidates. In other areas members of the legislature up for reëlection were bound to suffer considerably unless they belonged to the inner circle of policy-makers, for they had been deprived of their old role of providing jobs and favors, and spending seven or eight months a year attending sessions of the House in Quebec had made them remote from their constituents. That's where the National Union struck. It spent considerable time recruiting as candidates men with impressive records of local service, men recognized for their ability to do things, as opposed to the Liberals' gusto for "empty words."

III

The new Prime Minister of Quebec is not an intellectual. He is not doctrinaire. Ever since he took up law at the University of Montreal in the late thirties, he has been recognized as a sociable man. He likes to meet people. He has friends everywhere. He is not a domineering type. His practical knowledge of intermediate bodies in the Quebec society is considerable. He was elected president of the Students' General Association at the University of Montreal and later had similar jobs in the Catholic Action organization, the Junior Chambers of Commerce and the French-Canadian Association of Weekly Newspapers. He even served for a time as legal adviser to labor unions. But his prime interest has always been politics and it was no surprise that after managing patronage activities for many years in the traditionally Liberal riding of Bagot, south of Montreal, he won the seat for the National Union in 1946, at the age of 31. He has been re-elected ever since.

The late Maurice Duplessis was then at the height of his power in Quebec. The "boss," as Duplessis was called by his followers, had no opposition either inside or outside of his party and, save for a few respected advisers whom he cautiously selected from outside the ranks of the cabinet, he treated his colleagues as a schoolmaster of the old school would his students. He loved them and could be extremely generous to them. But he had no respect for them because he realized that he was superior to all of them.

Johnson was liked by Duplessis because he shared the old

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master's political flair and passion. In typical Duplessis style, Johnson still likes to refer to *"les bleus"* and *"les rouges"* when he talks about his party and the Liberals. (In Quebec politics, it used to be said, in the good old days of Cartier and Laurier, that the sky is blue and hell is red.)

But nobody ever knew to what extent Johnson condoned some abuses which darkened the last phase of Duplessis' rule. Some people say he subserviently acquiesced to every word that came out of his master's mouth. Others insist that, as a junior minister, he suffered bitterly under the extreme authoritarianism of Duplessis and vowed that he would later devote himself to restoring the principle of collective responsibility in the party.

Johnson's election as head of his party in 1961 was greeted by many observers as a victory for the "old guard," *i.e.* for the die-hard schemers who had caused the defeat of the party at the hands of Lesage in 1960. The "new guard" was then represented by another leadership candidate, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, who had also served under Duplessis but had refrained even then from any overly partisan attitude and had thus kept the respect of independent observers. Very wisely, Johnson pledged to reform the party and, to prove his sincerity, he publicly invited Bertrand to become his chief deputy. The conservative elements were pleased with Johnson as leader; the more liberal elements were kept in the fold by the prospect of a close association between him and their own leader.

The National Union is an odd political entity. Until 1936, Quebec had known only the traditional opposition between Liberals and Conservatives, *les rouges* and *les bleus*. But under the influence of men like Henri Bourassa and Abbé Lionel Groulx a new nationalist group had come into existence. The group comprised a large number of disgruntled younger members of Liberal and Conservative families and also many of the professional people educated in the classical colleges by the clergy. Maurice Duplessis clearly saw in 1935 that his old Conservative Party had no chance to unseat the powerful Taschereau Liberals unless he worked out an alliance with the new nationalists who had then come together under the banner of *L'Action libérale nationale*. He successfully negotiated the new party out of existence and came out of his conversations with Paul Gouin and other leaders of the A.L.N. with a new name for his own party (National Union), and with the assurance that the A.L.N. would soon be dissolved.

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He also emerged with a platform which took him farther left on social and economic matters than he would himself have gone. After his first victory, in 1936, Duplessis rapidly got rid of his key nationalist associates, though he seemed determined for a time to implement some of the social pledges which he had inserted in his platform. After a few years, he had completely swallowed his nationalist allies of 1935 and his party had become once again for all practical purposes a conservative party in the classic sense of the term. It still clung, however, to a formal, juridical brand of nationalism which, coupled with the magnetism of its leader and the provincial Liberals' subservience to the centralizing policies of their Ottawa friends, sufficed to keep him in power for nearly a generation.

The key to the Lesage victory of 1960 may have been the unseen shift of the independent nationalist vote from the National Union to the Liberals. Under Lesage, the provincial Liberals had become resolutely nationalist and autonomist. They could also point to increasing signs of corruption in the National Union government, which most independent-minded Quebec nationalists, particularly those who favored a positive, dynamic interpretation of the concept of "provincial autonomy," now wanted to turn out of office.

Lesage did so well in meeting the aspirations of Quebec's independent nationalists that up to about a year ago he seemed to have alienated them forever from the National Union. In all matters of federal-provincial relations he literally wrested the leadership away from his opponents. He scored so many brilliant successes at federal-provincial conferences that observers outside Quebec began to grumble about the unavowed Lesage hold on the federal government. This lasted until Lesage gave his ill-considered assent to a new formula for amending the Canadian Constitution. The formula—known as the Fulton-Favreau formula—would have tended to make constitutional progress in Quebec too dependent upon the will of the other provincial governments and the federal government. It was unanimously rejected by Quebec nationalists. They found a powerful ally in Mr. Johnson, who in turn began to lure them again toward his party as the traditional guardian of Quebec's constitutional rights.

Between 1963 and 1966, Mr. Johnson did in fact reëstablish the authority of his party as the surest defender of Quebec's constitutional prerogatives. He also reëstablished its old relationship

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with progressive social thinking in the province. The immensely successful conference which the party organized in Montreal in March 1965 and the impressive manifesto unveiled at the outset of the electoral campaign of 1966 were not improvised affairs. They were conceived in close consultation with independent experts and leaders of opinion. They meant that the old dream of an association between nationalist conservatives and social-minded nationalists was again becoming a reality. A conservative party with no support in nationalist circles has little chance of success in Quebec. Mr. Johnson must be credited with having bridged the gap between his party and the people, which had widened since the death of Duplessis in 1959. He mobilized enough fresh ideas and new men to claim with some justification that the National Union of 1966, like that of 1936, was more than a mere conservative party; it was an alliance of people with different political opinions who see it as the best instrument to carry Quebec forward in the world of 1966. Thousands of voters believed him.

IV

If the National Union is not to be dismissed as a reactionary party, what then distinguishes it from the Liberal Party of Mr. Lesage? It is too early to predict that with the experience of power the progressive nationalist and social element will again be swallowed, as happened under Duplessis, by the more conservative element in the National Union. For the time being one must try to read honestly the genuine intentions of the new government before passing judgment upon it. In the short period since Mr. Johnson came into power, a certain pattern has begun to emerge which I shall try to describe as objectively as possible.

In the constitutional field, Mr. Johnson's predecessor always stood for a pragmatic evolution of the Canadian Constitution toward greater freedom of action for Quebec. But Mr. Lesage shied away from formal redrafting of the Constitution on the grounds that English Canada was not ready for that difficult task. He based his claim on the impressive record of gains which he had been able to achieve within the present constitutional framework. In fiscal matters, his position was that Quebec must get an ever larger share of the tax dollar, but he always declined to commit himself to any definite figures that might curtail his freedom of manœuvre in negotiations with Ottawa and the other provinces.

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Mr. Johnson, on the other hand, had seemed in recent years to move closer to a position akin to "associate statism" if not downright separatism. He publicly endorsed the "two nations" theory which normally leads as a logical conclusion to the formula of associate states. To his book on the subject he gave the fiery—yet ambiguous—title, "Equality or Independence." Mr. Johnson has stated repeatedly that he favors a complete overhaul of the Constitution and in his election manifesto claimed that Quebec must control 100 percent of the personal and corporate income tax.

This program would appear radical if it were to be applied literally within a year or two. In fact, the new Premier has never set any clear deadline for the attainment of his objectives. He has not even spelled out clearly what kind of equality he had in mind when he invited his readers to choose between "equality and independence." In the fiscal field, he indicated after the election that the basic claim of his party to 100 percent of the income tax revenue must be read in the light of important concessions which would be made in connection with revenues drawn from indirect taxes. Since a radically new sharing of the indirect tax dollar will be extremely difficult to work out, one may conclude that Mr. Johnson is willing to submit his original claim to the due process of negotiation. All this seems to indicate that the new Quebec line with Ottawa may be verbally harder but will amount to much the same in practice. Mr. Johnson will no doubt be pressed to take a tougher stand by some of his younger colleagues who would gladly opt for immediate separation if it were economically viable, but this will be counterbalanced by the influence of older men like Bertrand and Dozois, who do not want to give up on the Canadian idea before it is given at least one more honest try.

In the economic field the National Union spoke clearly in its election manifesto in favor of private enterprise. This was a refreshing rejoinder to the ambiguous attitude of one of Lesage's most influential colleagues, René Lévesque, whose statements had had a disquieting effect on business and industrial leaders. But this statement in support of private enterprise was immediately followed by an equally strong commitment to the objective of state-sponsored economic planning. During his years in opposition, Mr. Johnson personally went abroad to study the French and Scandinavian experience, and he returned with the

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conviction that thorough economic planning must be attempted in Quebec. He strongly qualified his support for the principle of nationalization but he also added that he would not hesitate to resort to nationalization if and when necessary. One example of what he meant is provided by the steel industry. Mr. Lesage had launched a mixed enterprise in which the state would have an important—though not a controlling—voice. Johnson's position was and still is that this sort of enterprise should be the direct responsibility of the government.

One factor which will probably help distinguish Mr. Johnson from Mr. Lesage is the changed economic circumstances. Mr. Lesage came to power at a moment when the credit of Quebec was exceptionally good and the money market was unusually dynamic. The situation is now different. Huge commitments by the Lesage administration have curiously shrunk the borrowing possibilities of Quebec and money has become extremely scarce on both the Canadian and the American markets. A new sense of thrift will inevitably inspire the major decisions of the Quebec government in the months ahead. This will come very naturally to men like Johnson, Bertrand and Dozois, who learned at the school of Duplessis that a government's real strength lies, in the last analysis, in a healthy balance sheet rather than in verbose affirmations of grandeur. These men are fundamentally conservative in matters of public finance. They will do by instinct what Mr. Lesage, had he remained in power, would have done by necessity.

In the social field, two important indications of the new government's probable orientation have been given during the summer. Soon after taking office, Mr. Johnson was faced with grave strikes of hospital workers and of construction workers at a key plant of Hydro-Quebec. Each of those two strikes implied severe threats to the public welfare. For three weeks all important hospitals were more or less closed and the strike at Hydro threatened a severe shortage of electrical power by 1968. Notwithstanding these great dangers, Mr. Johnson behaved with remarkable calm. Not once did he utter any anti-labor statement. Not once did he seriously indicate that he intended to abolish or curtail the right to strike in the vital areas affected by the work stoppages. The two strikes were finally settled on terms which brought great satisfaction to the workers. Was Mr. Johnson acting out of a genuine concern for the promotion of the working class? Was he trying

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to remove the old anti-labor stigma which had attached to the declining years of the Duplessis rule and which still hung over him and his party? Was he just trying to buy time in order to increase his strength for an eventual showdown with the labor movement? Only Mr. Johnson could answer these questions. One must record, for the time being, that he came out of these first trials with remarkable skill and self-control.

The other test now confronting the new administration revolves around the health-insurance program put forward by the federal government. Health care is primarily a responsibility of the provinces under the Canadian Constitution. But Ottawa has long been active in this field because of the federal government's concern for the promotion of equal standards for all Canadians in such fields as education, social security and health. The federal project—based on the recommendations of a Royal Commission which surveyed the problem for five years—would provide financial assistance to the provinces on the explicit condition that the latter initiate comprehensive, universal and government-controlled programs of health care. In other words, Ottawa is deeply committed to the principle of public medicare.

Mr. Lesage had already accepted the principal conditions set by Ottawa and had stated his intention to inaugurate a health-insurance program in Quebec by July 1967. Mr. Johnson has often said that he wants to make sure before accepting public medicare that Quebec can afford it. He has never hidden his personal preference for a program which would be confined to assisting needy people, leaving the rest to private initiative. The problem is now further complicated by Ottawa's apparent determination to proceed with its own project regardless of the objections of at least half of the provinces. Mr. Johnson may be tempted to exploit the tactical mistake of the federal government to his own political advantage. From a constitutional point of view his position would be unassailable in Quebec, but by the same token he would then appear to favor the social philosophy of the Chambers of Commerce over the views of the labor movement and the farmers' organization.

The health-insurance case will provide a clear illustration of how far Quebec can be expected to move in the welfare field under Mr. Johnson. Present indications suggest that rather limited measures will be adopted for the moment and that Mr. Johnson will leave the door open for an eventual enlargement

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of the original program, thus pulling the rug from under the feet of those who would attack him on grounds of principle.

In the field of education, the National Union government has immensely difficult choices to make in the near future. After years of controversy the question of religion in the schools must be settled. Increased enrollment in the secondary schools has created an urgent need for multiplied, diversified services at the post-secondary level. The relationship between local schoolboards and the Department of Education must be stabilized. The role of private institutions in education must be clarified and some of the tensions which built up during the ministry of Mr. Gérin-Lajoie must be lessened. All these problems were left in abeyance by the outgoing Liberals, not because they had carelessly let them pile up but rather because their rapid accumulation was hardly preventable. Any positive, forward-looking solution will require increased spending, and the corresponding courage to tax the people still more than the Liberals did. Nobody in the National Union would have dared face this grim prospect only a few weeks ago. Mr. Johnson was elected on the promise that he would get better results for the same money. It would be surprising if he had the same feeling after spending two months studying the files of the Department of Education.

In one field prospects seem definitely better with the advent of the National Union. The Justice portfolio was formerly held by a man whose methods and public utterances smacked of authoritarianism and showed a dangerous lack of moderation. The new incumbent, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, is a reasonable, well-balanced and extremely fair-minded man. If he keeps the portfolio of Justice, he may be the man to carry out most of the interesting reforms promised in his party's platform. The National Union pledged to provide better safeguards for the individual citizen in his dealings with courts and law officers, to eliminate partisan considerations from judicial appointments and to improve the competence of justice officials in Quebec. This part of the National Union platform reflects the keen sense of justice and respect for individual liberties which is characteristic of both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Bertrand. Justice is the one area where real hopes of improvement have been shining in recent weeks.

Mr. Johnson, when he was in opposition, referred repeatedly to the excessive importance which Lesage and his colleagues accorded to brain-trusters of the Civil Service. He had even prom-

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ised to get rid of some of these top civil servants once he took office. Two months have now elapsed and all the experts appointed by Lesage are still there. From what one hears, the new ministers have been extremely courteous to them and they in turn have shown charitable appreciation for the willingness of the new men to learn about the problems of their respective departments. But one has the impression that the present truce is an uneasy peace which has yet to meet its real test.

Will the new ministers be strong enough eventually to impose —by the process of dialogue—their own conception of things upon their professional assistants? If they are not really able to master the problems, will they be willing merely to echo in parliament and in other public places the views of their professional assistants? To one who knows most of the men now forming the cabinet, it seems unlikely that they will ever prevail intellectually over the bright experts who joined the Civil Service under Mr. Lesage. Yet it will be very important that the ministers demonstrate their capacity to stand on their own feet intellectually. Much forbearance and understanding will be required on both sides if the new relationship which Mr. Lesage introduced between science and the art of government is to survive and prosper.

Instinctively, Mr. Johnson and most of his colleagues would probably like to return to the days when the government of men was mostly a matter of judgment and common sense. But they have, one can believe, sincerely espoused the fundamental objectives of Quebec's "quiet revolution." And they are genuinely looking for new ways of pushing the revolution forward without losing contact with the people. The question that remains unanswered is what precise role they can define for themselves in this new era when government is no longer a matter of good will but of hard competence. Looking at Mr. Johnson's cabinet, one cannot escape a feeling of uneasiness. Only a fresh injection of vigorous blood from outside the ranks of the party could help Mr. Johnson's team become a real match for the new type of men that Lesage brought forward not only in his own party but also in the upper echelons of the Civil Service. Men like Johnson and Bertrand are genuine friends of liberty and democracy; few men in Quebec are less authoritarian than these two leaders. They have yet to demonstrate, however, that they possess the qualities required to keep a modern government moving.

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THE CONSCIENCE OF THE RICH NATIONS: THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE AND THE COMMON AID EFFORT. By Seymour J. Rubin. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 164 p. $3.95 (Paper, $2.45).

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DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS. By Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966, 538 p. $8.50.

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THE PATTERN OF HUMAN CONCERNS. By Hadley Cantril. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1966, 427 p. $10.00.

In this ambitious work, Professor Cantril "attempts to provide a systematic psychological study" of what the various nations and peoples are feeling, seeking and hoping for at this point in history. Case studies are drawn from a number of highly dissimilar countries.

THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION. By David E. Apter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, 481 p. $7.50.

A somewhat theoretically oriented study of the problem of modernization, the methods for mobilizing a society, and the adequacy of traditional democratic practices in achieving the needed results.

WORLD POLITICS AND TENSION AREAS. By Feliks Gross. New York: New York University Press, 1966, 377 p. $10.00.

A work dealing with and classifying antagonisms arising between ethnic groups and those between ideological groups. It consists largely of a wide range of case studies from the tribal to the international.

PSYCHIATRY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966, 465 p. $8.95.

This substantial volume of reports and symposia, prepared under the auspices of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, covers such fields in the area of public affairs as desegregation, international relations, forceful indoctrination and nuclear war. A mixed serving but with some stimulating contributions.

U THANT: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. By June Bingham. New York: Knopf, 1966, 300 p. $5.95.

An interim biography of the Secretary-General of the U.N. by the wife of a former U.S. Ambassador to the organization.

CULTURAL FRONTIERS OF THE PEACE CORPS. Edited by Robert B. Textor. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966, 363 p. $6.95.

A book by a number of authors dealing with the overseas activities and problems of the Peace Corps with particular attention to the qualities and characteristics of 13 selected host countries.

POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. Edited by Robert A. Dahl. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, 458 p. $10.00.

An extensive collection of essays dealing with the apparently self-evident but frequently denied or circumscribed right of oppositions to appeal for votes against the party in power. Treatment is chiefly by country.

THE DEFENSES OF FREEDOM. By Arthur J. Goldberg. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 342 p. $6.95.

A collection of the public papers of the former Supreme Court Justice, now U.S. Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

ARMS AND INFLUENCE. By Thomas C. Schelling. New Haven: Yale University Press (for the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University), 1966, 293 p. $7.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A leading student of strategic theory here studies the principles that underlie the "diplomacy of violence"—"the bargaining power that comes from the physical harm a nation can do to another nation."

NATO IN QUEST OF COHESION. Edited by Karl H. Cerny and Henry W. Briefs. New York: Praeger (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1965, 476 p. $8.00.

The record of a conference on many aspects of NATO's future, comprising excerpts from actual discussions and specially prepared papers on various topics by 23 qualified authors.

THE LIDDELL HART MEMOIRS. VOLUME II: THE LATER YEARS. New York: Putnam, 1966, 334 p. $7.50.

This second volume (Vol. I noted here July 1966) of the noted military strategist's absorbing memoirs opens with the spring of 1937 and goes to the collapse of France in 1940: "For me, in that spring of 1940, there was a tragic irony in having to watch, as a mere onlooker, my ideas being applied to pierce the defence of France."

DECISIVE BATTLES OF WORLD WAR II: THE GERMAN VIEW. Edited by H. A. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer. New York: Putnam, 1965, 509 p. $10.00.

A revised English edition of an earlier German symposium on the leading battles in Europe from Dunkirk to the Battle of the Bulge, written by leading German experts. A valuable contribution to World War II literature.

DER DEUTSCH-FRANZÖSISCHE WAFFENSTILLSTAND IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. ERSTER TEIL: ENTSTEHUNG UND GRUNDLAGEN DES WAFFENSTILLSTANDES VON 1940. By Hermann Böhme. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (for the Institut für Zeitgeschichte), 1966, 464 p. DM. 43.

A fascinating and detailed account of the Franco-German armistice negotiations of June 1940 and of the immediate post-armistice period, with particular emphasis on the impact of the English attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940. By a former German officer, a participant of these negotiations, who has carefully studied non-German sources as well.

MIDWAY: TURNING POINT OF THE PACIFIC. By Vice Admiral William Ward Smith. New York: Crowell, 1966, 174 p. $4.95.

The story of the battle of Midway in June 1942, by one of the four Flag Officers participating.

FROM THE DREADNOUGHT TO SCAPA FLOW: THE ROYAL NAVY IN THE FISHER ERA, 1904–1919. VOLUME III: JUTLAND AND AFTER (MAY 1916–DECEMBER 1916). By Arthur J. Marder. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, 306 p. $11.20.

This third volume in Professor Marder's massive history centers on the endlessly debated Battle of Jutland and its immediate aftermath. In the author's judgment, from the strategical point of view the British fleet was undoubtedly the winner.

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN. VOLUME IV. THE RECONQUEST OF BURMA. By Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby and Others. London: H.M.S.O., 1965, 586 p. (New York: British Information Service, $17.00).

This penultimate volume in the history of the war against Japan in the official British History of the Second World War covers operations in Southeast Asia and the Pacific from August 1944 to May 1945, but deals centrally with the achievements of General Slim's 14th Army.

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DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION. By M. M. Postan and Others. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1964, 579 p. (New York: British Information Service, $12.60).

This volume in the U.K. History of the Second World War, Civil Series, consists of separate essays on the various branches of design and development: aircraft, army weapons, radar and basic research.

General: Economic and Social

DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE POLICY ISSUES, 1945–1965. By Gardner Patterson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 414 p. $10.00.

What governments have sought to accomplish by trade discrimination and, so far as one can tell, what the effects have been are the points of enquiry of this major book. Writing with access to GATT documents and a fine sense of balance, Professor Patterson has produced what will surely be the definitive work for a long time to come on a central problem of postwar international trade.

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: THE ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC POLICY. By W. Arthur Lewis. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 278 p. $4.95.

Half the book is a remarkable *tour de force* explaining in simple language and with great clarity the steps in making a national economic plan—and what needs to go into it. The other half will have a much wider interest since it provides a comprehensive and well-written statement of the up-to-date views of one of the leading experts in the economics of development.

THE WORLD MONEY MAZE: NATIONAL CURRENCIES IN INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS. By Robert Triffin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, 585 p. $12.50.

Professor Triffin has long lived a double life as academic analyst and as close adviser to men who were putting ideas to work. A prolific and often witty writer in both capacities, he has here arranged a large number of valuable and often controversial papers, some not published before, so that they illuminate a number of themes.

L'ÉCONOMIE INTERNATIONALE DEPUIS 1950: DU PLAN MARSHALL AUX GRANDES NÉGOCIATIONS COMMERCIALES ENTRE PAYS INÉGALEMENT DÉVELOPPÉS. By Jean Weiller. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1965, 250 p. Fr. 18.

An established French scholar covers a broad subject with a wealth of references to the conflicting views that he and other economists have held over the years.

LE LANCINANT PROBLÈME DES BALANCES DE PAIEMENTS. By Jacques Rueff. Paris: Payot, 1965, 233 p. Fr. 14.

A number of papers, some prewar, are put together as an exposition of the author's theory of how monetary factors determine the balance of payments.

THE CHALLENGE OF HUNGER: A PROGRAM FOR MORE EFFECTIVE FOREIGN AID. By I. W. Moomaw. New York: Praeger, 1966, 222 p. $5.95.

Like many people with a long experience of privately-run aid programs, Dr. Moomaw, an agricultural specialist, believes that the way out of our foreign aid troubles is to separate military from economic aid, stick to the original principles of Point IV, emphasize direct contact with people, and give well-selected men in the field greater freedom from Washington's dictates.

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POLICIES AND METHODS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. By Murray D. Bryce. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, 309 p. $7.50.

An experienced Canadian writes a very practical book on how to discover the best possibilities for industrial development and what to do about them.

DEVELOPMENTAL PLANNING. By Richard L. Meier. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, 420 p. $10.00.

Education, administration and social factors rather than economics are at the center of this analysis.

PROBLEMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD BY THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION. Edited by E. A. G. Robinson. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965, 625 p. $14.00.

A most impressive array of economists from all over the world contribute papers on many major issues of economic development, as well as on some very special subjects.

PLANNING AND GROWTH IN RICH AND POOR COUNTRIES. Edited by W. Birmingham and A. G. Ford. New York: Praeger, 1966, 267 p. $7.50.

Studies of Britain, India, Ghana, Sierra Leone and New Zealand lead to the conclusion that "economic growth is far too important . . . to be left to" decentralized decisions and markets. It requires positive state action.

THE UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: AN APPRAISAL OF U. S. ECONOMIC STRATEGY. Edited by N. R. Danielian. Washington: International Economic Policy Association, 1966, 200 p. $10.00.

Convinced, as most business groups are, that restraints on private investment and capital movements generally should be dropped (except on long-term bank lending for foreign industrial development), the authors recommend tackling the balance-of-payments problem by reducing military expenditures abroad, tying aid more effectively than before, abandoning most-favored-nation treatment and making balance-of-payments considerations the main guide of trade policy. A good deal of material is very well presented.

MODERN SMALL INDUSTRY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Eugene Staley and Richard Morse. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, 435 p. $9.00.

A great deal of experience in India and some other countries has gone into this very thorough and hard-headed book about the kinds of small industries suitable for different conditions, what they can and cannot do, and how governments and people can get the most out of their possibilities.

TWENTY-SIX CENTURIES OF AGRARIAN REFORM. By Elias H. Tuma. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, 309 p. $6.95.

A study of land-reform movements from the Greeks to the present. At the end the author suggests some elements for a general theory of agrarian reform. On the whole he is not very sanguine about the efficacy of reform attempts.

WHITE-COLLAR TRADE UNIONS. Edited by Adolf Sturmthal. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966, 412 p. $7.95.

A collection of essays covering such advanced industrial societies as Australia, Austria, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden and the United States. The editor concludes with an essay in comparison.

FAMILY PLANNING AND POPULATION PROGRAMS: A REVIEW OF WORLD DEVELOPMENTS. Edited by Bernard Berelson and Others. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, 848 p. $12.50.

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A massive survey dealing in turn with the achievements and problems of various national programs, their organization and administration, the implications of different contraceptive methods and, finally, the problems of research in this sensitive but vital topic.

The United States

LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND THE WORLD. By Philip Geyelin. New York: Praeger, 1966, 309 p. $5.95.

The diplomatic correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal* undertakes an appraisal of President Johnson's handling of foreign affairs. The picture is depressing, with Viet Nam continuing its ulcerous role. The author is very doubtful of the wisdom of relying upon "consensus" to set the course of policy.

THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY. By Cabell Phillips. New York: Macmillan, 1966, 463 p. $7.95.

A well-told narrative of Harry Truman's remarkable and hardly-to-be-expected success in the Presidency, in sharp contrast to the disasters that befell two other immediate postwar presidents, Andrew Johnson and Warren Harding.

THE NEGLECTED ASPECT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. By Charles Frankel. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1966, 156 p. $5.00.

Professor Frankel, a philosopher and at present Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, argues that our educational and cultural policy abroad has been badly neglected or poorly defined. He concludes with some recommended principles and practices.

POWER AND IMPOTENCE: THE FAILURE OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY. By Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff. New York: Random House, 1966, 244 p. $4.95.

As the title suggests, this is a wholesale onslaught on U. S. foreign policy, its premises, stemming back to the Wilsonian tradition, its picture of the world, and its practices. The chief, and a major, shortcoming of the book is precisely its undifferentiating condemnation. This is not helpful for policy-making.

PROFILES IN POWER: A WASHINGTON INSIGHT. By Joseph Kraft. New York: New American Library, 1966, 192 p. $4.95.

A series of perceptive and often sprightly essays in an effort to "trace a brief passage in the Washington maze." Includes discussions of the Presidency, the "outside insiders" and the vast bureaucratic apparatus.

NO TIME FOR REST. By Robert Cutler. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1966, 421 p. $7.50.

The political memoirs of a Bostonian become national public servant, who served with Stimson, Marshall, Forrestal and ultimately as Special Assistant to President Eisenhower.

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY UNIFICATION: A STUDY OF CONFLICT AND THE POLICY PROCESS. By Demetrios Caraley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 345 p. $8.95.

A close study of the intense struggle that took place in the U. S. between 1943 and 1947 over the issue of the unification of the military services.

AIR TRANSPORT POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY. By Frederick C. Thayer, Jr. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965, 352 p. $8.00.

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A discussion of the multiple relationships between military airlift policy and commercial air transport policy. The author inclines to be quite critical of past U. S. policies in these matters.

THE RAND CORPORATION. By Bruce L. R. Smith. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, 332 p. $7.95.

An illuminating case study of an important postwar phenomenon: the emergence of the nonprofit research or advisory corporation, chiefly in conjunction with military and strategic affairs.

THE AMERICAN DISSENT: A DECADE OF MODERN CONSERVATISM. By Jeffrey Hart. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966, 262 p. $4.95.

A sympathetic discussion of recent American conservative and right-wing thought, with particular attention to the writers and writings appearing in the *National Review*.

THE CITY MAN'S GUIDE TO THE FARM PROBLEM. By Willard W. Cochrane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965, 242 p. $4.95.

The city man "has the political power and the budget incentive to resolve the farm problem" but he does not know much about it. Professor Cochrane does a first-rate job of enlightenment with some striking statistics, clear explanations of technology as well as economics, and a thoughtful if not altogether convincing exposition of some of the possible directions of change in national policy.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1965. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 430 p. $6.95.

Widening conflict in Viet Nam and military intervention in the Dominican Republic provide the highlights in this most recent volume of a long-established series. The India-Pakistan fighting, Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence, Gaullist attacks on the institutions of the Western community and the struggle to curb the U. S. balance-of-payments deficit are among other major subjects handled with authority and skill.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1965. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins with Elaine P. Adam. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 528 p. $9.50.

The latest volume in this valuable series provides a comprehensive selection of the outstanding documentary materials relating to American foreign policy in the year of the Vietnamese escalation and the Dominican intervention. A cumulative index for 1961–1965 enhances the usefulness of the volume and the series.

The Western Hemisphere

A SAMARITAN STATE? EXTERNAL AID IN CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY. By Keith Spicer. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966, 272 p. $7.50.

A review and appraisal of Canada's performance in providing foreign aid over the last 15 years. The author finds the record relatively good and improving—from makeshift to mediocre to a steady competence.

INTERNAL SECURITY AND MILITARY POWER: COUNTERINSURGENCY AND CIVIC ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA. By Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966, 338 p. $6.50.

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In this interesting study of United States policies toward Latin America, the authors examine the contradiction resulting from economic programs designed to promote social reform and military assistance deemed necessary for internal security. The authors see the solution to the misuse of military power in the education of the military tc their social responsibilities.

INTEGRATION IN LATEINAMERIKA. By Felipe Herrera and Others. Zurich: Orell Füssli, 1965, 193 p. Swiss Fr. 24.50.

Essays examining the state of Latin America's common markets by Felipe Herrera, Mateo Magariños de Mello, Abrahán Bennatón and Christoph Eckenstein, along with supplementary documents concerning the organizations of the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market.

HOW LATIN AMERICA VIEWS THE U.S. INVESTOR. Edited by Raymond Vernon. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration), 1966, 117 p. $10.00.

Four papers drawn from the 1965 Leatherbee Lectures at Harvard University examine the impact of foreign investment upon Latin America; the stress is upon the investor's obligations rather than his rights.

POPULATION DILEMMA IN LATIN AMERICA. Washington: Potomac Books, 1966, 249 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $3.95).

Presented at the Pan American Assembly on Population held in Cali, Colombia, during the summer of 1965 and sponsored by the American Assembly of Columbia University, this collection of papers examines varied aspects of the demographic crisis in Latin America.

THE RED, WHITE, AND BLACK CONTINENT: LATIN AMERICA—LAND OF REFORMERS AND REBELS. By Herbert Wendt. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966, 526 p. $6.95.

Translated from the German "Der Schwarz-Weiss-Rote Kontinent" (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1964), this is a sensitive and perceptive journalistic study of Latin America today. The book provides an excellent introduction to hemispheric problems, and captures the flavor and spirit of the region.

TRANSPORT AND THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF SOUTH AMERICA. By Robert T. Brown. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1966, 288 p. $6.00.

In this examination of the relationship between various modes of transportation and Latin America's economic integration, the author notes that the failure to eliminate artificial political and economic barriers between countries has contributed largely to the inefficient use of existing transport facilities.

THE IMPACT OF HIGHWAY INVESTMENT ON DEVELOPMENT. By George W. Wilson and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1966, 226 p. $6.00.

Focused largely on Bolivia, Guatemala and El Salvador, these thoughtful—and sobering—case studies examine the role which highway systems have played in the economy of an underdeveloped country.

MEXICAN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT. By Dwight S. Brothers and Leopoldo Solís M. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1966, 236 p. $7.50.

A detailed, rather wordy study of Mexico's financial system, chiefly in the years since 1940, in which the authors conclude that "the problem of financial efficiency will become increasingly central to the activities of monetary and fiscal authorities during the stage of Mexican financial development just beginning."

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DIVIDING THE WATERS: A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO. By Norris Hundley, Jr. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966, 266 p. $6.95.

A thoughtful and detailed study of water, its scarcity and the controversies which it has caused between the United States and Mexico. Focusing on the Colorado, Rio Grande and Tijuana Rivers, the book is supported by illustrations, extensive references and bibliography.

THE X IN MEXICO: GROWTH WITHIN TRADITION. By Irene Nicholson. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966, 295 p. $4.95.

A captivating potpourri of Mexico, past and present, written by an understanding and long-time resident. In Mexico's retaining the assertive letter X in its spelling, rather than the modern Spanish J, the author sees those unique Indian roots that have deeply influenced the land and its people.

TRUJILLO: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF A CARIBBEAN DICTATOR. By Robert D. Crasswellер. New York: Macmillan, 1966, 468 p. $8.95.

A vividly written, terse account of the Trujillo era, one which in its study of the man and his abuse of power adumbrates the resulting moral degradation of a nation and its people. The author, while noting certain positive governmental actions, observes that "against these must be balanced the gravest of crimes and abuses, which outweigh the achievements."

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF CHILE. By Federico G. Gil. Boston: Houghton, 1966, 323 p. $4.95 (Paper, $2.95).

A comprehensive survey and well-stated description of the social, economic and historical influences shaping the contemporary political system in Chile.

Western Europe

EUROPE'S FUTURE: THE GRAND ALTERNATIVES. By David P. Calleo. New York: Horizon Press, 1965, 192 p. $4.95.

A fresh look at the options before Europe, by an intrepid young American scholar.

PERSONALITIES AND POLICIES. By D. C. Watt. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965, 275 p. $6.00.

A series of perceptive essays on various aspects of British foreign policy. Important for the light they shed on particular problems—such as the influence of the Commonwealth on Munich—and highly suggestive for the student of foreign policy of any period. The author, an English historian-political scientist, is the editor of the "Survey of International Affairs."

TRADE POLICIES FOR BRITAIN: A STUDY IN ALTERNATIVES. By Sidney Wells. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1966, 137 p. $2.00 (Paper).

A close study of the implications for the British economy of the alternatives of joining the Common Market, an Atlantic free trade area or a free trade grouping that omitted the Common Market, or of continuing multilateral tariff reductions in GATT. The conclusions underline the importance of Europe to Britain. Originally prepared as a contribution to the trade project of the Council on Foreign Relations' Atlantic Policy Studies.

HALIFAX: THE LIFE OF LORD HALIFAX. By the Earl of Birkenhead. Boston: Houghton, 1966, 626 p. $8.50.

A rather full and friendly biography of this cautious and religious man who "had

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held three of the highest offices of the State"—leaving a major mark on none. Written in the grand manner and based on some new and hitherto unpublished material.

PATHWAYS TO PARLIAMENT. By Austin Ranney. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965, 298 p. $6.50.

On the basis of recent elections, an American political scientist analyzes how English parties select their candidates and whom they select.

IRELAND SINCE THE RISING. By Timothy Patrick Coogan. New York: Praeger, 1966, 355 p. $6.95.

A serious, searching, cheerful account of Ireland in the half-century since the Rising. The author, a leading Irish journalist, believes "her long hard climb to economic prosperity is nearing success" and with it, modernizing social change.

SCANDINAVIA. By John H. Wuorinen. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965, 146 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A comprehensive introduction, by a well-known scholar in the field.

FRANCE. By John C. Cairns. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966, 180 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A brief but sensitive introduction to contemporary France.

MARXISM IN MODERN FRANCE. By George Lichtheim. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 212 p. $6.75.

A critical analysis of the adaptations of Marxist theory to French conditions and of the resulting changes in both. By a well-known writer on Marxism and other contemporary issues.

LA RÉPUBLIQUE DES ILLUSIONS, 1945–1951, OU LA VIE SECRÈTE DE LA IVe RÉPUBLIQUE. By Georgette Elgey. Paris: Fayard, 1965, 555 p. Fr. 25.

The first volume of a political history of the ill-fated Republic, covering the period from de Gaulle's ambiguous withdrawal in 1946 to the elections of 1951. Written with verve, by a knowledgeable journalist, it includes many authentic conversations and reflects countless interviews.

LE RÉFÉRENDUM D'OCTOBRE ET LES ÉLECTIONS DE NOVEMBRE 1962. Under the Direction of François Goguel. Paris: Colin, 1965, 437 p. Fr. 29.

A team of political scientists presents impressive studies of various aspects of the referendum confirming de Gaulle's wish for the direct election of the President and of the subsequent parliamentary election which brought defeat to the "old parties."

AN EXPLANATION OF DE GAULLE. By Robert Aron. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 210 p. $4.95.

A rather slight essay on de Gaulle, based partly on four interviews with this great "unknown," as the author calls him—and leaves him. (The French original, "Charles de Gaulle," appeared in Paris in 1964, published by Perrin.)

LOST SOLDIERS: THE FRENCH ARMY AND EMPIRE IN CRISIS, 1947–1962. By George Armstrong Kelly. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965, 404 p. $10.00.

A thoughtful, informative and well-written study of the travail of the French Army from the war in Indochina to the Algerian conflict. The author, a young American scholar, puts this anguished story against a wider background of French politics and military history.

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ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY IN FRANCE UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. By Lawrence Scheinman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 259 p. $6.50.

The origins of French atomic policy depicted against the background of domestic politics, by a political scientist.

GERMANY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: THE INTERACTION OF STRATEGY AND POLITICS. By James L. Richardson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University), 1966, 403 p. $8.95.

A scholarly study of the interrelationships of "the orientation of Germany and the political and strategic implications of nuclear weapons." A book of intelligence and great timeliness, by a member of the British Foreign Office.

DIE RICHTLINIENKOMPETENZ DES BUNDESKANZLERS. By Ernst Ulrich Junker. Tübingen: Mohr, 1965, 140 p. DM. 15.

A solid study of the historical development and the constitutional position of the office of Chancellor within German parliamentary democracy.

ARMY, INDUSTRY AND LABOR IN GERMANY, 1914–1918. By Gerald D. Feldman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 572 p. $12.50.

A pioneering study of the struggles and changing fortunes of major interest groups and their impact on wartime and revolutionary Germany, by a young American historian. New material and sound judgment mark this valuable work.

GERMANY: YESTERDAY AND TOMORROW. By Peter H. Merkl. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 366 p. $7.50.

An uneven, rather personal, essay on postwar Germany, by a native German who has lived and taught in this country for the last eight years.

ALCIDE DE GASPERI: THE LONG APPRENTICESHIP. By Elisa A. Carrillo. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965, 185 p. $5.50.

A narrow, but well-documented study of De Gasperi's political career, from his membership in the Austrian Reichsrat to his selection as Italian Premier in 1945.

THE INTERNATIONAL BRIGADES: SPAIN 1936–1939. By Vincent Brome. New York: Morrow, 1966, 317 p. $6.00.

The first comprehensive account, containing some valuable and moving passages, but a bit facile and disappointing.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

COMINTERN AND PEASANT IN EAST EUROPE, 1919–1930. By George D. Jackson, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 339 p. $8.50.

A scholarly account of the efforts of the Comintern and of the various peasant parties to master or gain the support of the important peasant movement in Eastern Europe in the first decade after World War I.

ROSA LUXEMBURG. By J. P. Nettl. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, 2 v. $20.20.

While much has already been written about Rosa Luxemburg, one of the most remarkable and intelligent figures in the Marxist movement, Mr. Nettl, author of a study of eastern Germany, presents a good case for having undertaken this ambitious biography and interpretation of her life and political views. A valuable contribution.

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A HISTORY OF POSTWAR RUSSIA. By R. W. Pethybridge. New York: New American Library, 1966, 263 p. $5.95.

A brief survey by a young British political scientist of developments in Russia between 1945 and the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961.

KHRUSHCHEV: A CAREER. By Edward Crankshaw. New York: Viking, 1966, 311 p. $7.50.

A correspondent of the London *Observer* and frequent writer on Russian themes turns here to the career of Nikita Khrushchev. A substantial study, though controversial in places, and by necessity not the definitive biography. The final chapter intimates the reason for Khrushchev's ultimate defeat: "A Visionary Imprisoned by His Past."

THE NEW CLASS DIVIDED: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY VERSUS COMMUNISM. By Albert Parry. New York: Macmillan, 1966, 364 p. $8.95.

The author's theme is stated at the outset: "My purpose is to investigate the possibility that the [Soviet] scientific-technical personnel is essentially a group distinct, or potentially distinct, from the Party zealots." He foresees an increasingly important and oppositional role for this key group.

THE CASE OF RICHARD SORGE. By F. W. Deakin and G. R. Storry. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 373 p. $6.00.

An able and scholarly account of Richard Sorge's extraordinary espionage activities in the Far East on behalf of the Soviet Union. As with most spy stories, however, one is left with the question of how the intelligence was used.

WOMEN IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY. By Norton T. Dodge. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, 331 p. $10.00.

A substantial inquiry, rich in statistical information, into the role of Soviet women in the various areas of economic, professional and scientific activity.

DAS SELBSTBESTIMMUNGSRECHT IM SOWJETISCHEN VÖLKERRECHTSDENKEN. By Marianne Wannow. Göttingen: Institut für Völkerrecht der Universität, 1965, 287 p. DM. 34.50.

A monograph on Soviet theories of self-determination, both within and outside the Soviet Union.

SUOMEN KOMMUNISTINEN PUOLUE JA SEN VAIKUTUS POLIITTISEEN JA AMMATILLISEEN TYÖVÄENLIIKKEESEEN 1918–1928. By Ilkka Hakalehto. Helsinki: Söderström, 1966, 319 p. Fmk. 16.

A doctoral dissertation, based largely on police records, tracing the underground activities of the Finnish Communist Party 1918–1928.

AMERICAN-BALTIC RELATIONS 1918–1922: THE STRUGGLE OVER RECOGNITION. By Albert N. Tarulis. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1965, 386 p. $8.95.

A well-documented account of the attitude of the Wilson and Harding administrations toward the Baltic States, and a detailed description of the efforts of various Baltic organizations and diplomats to obtain from Washington *de jure* recognition of the new republics.

LA TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE. By Viktor Knapp and Zdeněk Mlynář. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1965, 262 p. Fr. 31.30.

Two Czech scholars, at the Charles University in Prague, write on the theory and practice of Czech government and administration. Vol. XI in the series "Comment Ils Sont Gouvernés."

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THE ROAD TO SARAJEVO. By Vladimir Dedijer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966, 550 p. $11.95.

Although the literature on the immediate origins of the First World War is mountainous, this work, by the author of a biography of Tito and a member of the wartime partisan movement, is of special interest both because of the particular background and vantage point from which Mr. Dedijer writes and because of the book's intensive inquiry into the mood and mentality of the Bosnian revolutionary youths responsible for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. It is based on wide research in various national archives.

THE GREEK CIVIL WAR 1944–1949. By Edgar O'Ballance. New York: Praeger, 1966, 237 p. $7.50.

The author of studies of the Soviet and Chinese armies here recounts the story of the Greek Civil War that erupted intermittently between 1944 and 1949. Not based, apparently, on Greek-language sources, but contains some interesting if debatable military analysis of guerrilla warfare.

GREEK POLITICAL REACTION TO AMERICAN AND NATO INFLUENCES. By Theodore A. Couloumbis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, 250 p. $7.50.

A study emphasizing the reactions of Greek politicians and the press to Greece's postwar foreign policies.

MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE EXPERIENCE OF GREECE, 1950–1963. By Xenophon Zolotas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 223 p. $6.00.

An economist who is also Governor of the Bank of Greece combines a study of his country's postwar experience with a contribution to the more general problem of the interplay of stable money and economic growth.

The Middle East

MIDDLE EAST RECORD. VOLUME TWO, 1961. Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations (for Tel Aviv University, Reuven Shiloah Research Center), 1966, 799 p. (New York: Daniel Davey and Co., $20.00).

This valuable new reference series presents information on current Middle Eastern politics. Far more comprehensive than any similar publication, it promises —if the editors' present care and objectivity continue—to become indispensable to everyone seriously concerned with the area.

PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER OIL RESOURCES: A STUDY OF MIDDLE EAST OIL CONCESSIONS AND LEGAL CHANGE. By Muhamad A. Mughraby. Beirut: Middle East Research and Publishing Center, 1966, 233 p. L.L. 22.

The changing principles of ownership and sovereignty over natural resources, the development of joint-venture agreements in the oil industry, and the evolution and promise of collective bargaining techniques are usefully examined by a Lebanese legal scholar.

POLITICS IN LEBANON. Edited by Leonard Binder. New York: Wiley, 1966, 345 p. $8.50.

This well-edited volume presents a comprehensive exploration and analysis of the politics of present-day Lebanese democracy by 17 authorities in essays of uncommon merit.

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ISRAEL: HIGH-PRESSURE PLANNING. By Benjamin Akzin and Yehezkel Dror. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966, 90 p. $2.95 (Paper).

Two political scientists review the development of economic planning in Israel.

ISRAEL ZWISCHEN DEN FRONTEN: UTOPIE UND WIRKLICHKEIT. By Bruno Frei. Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1965, 200 p.

Reflections of a senior Austrian foreign correspondent, editor, author and publisher, 1959–65, of *Tagebuch* on some of the problems besetting modern Israel.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE CASE OF IRAN. By Jahangir Amuzegar. New York: Praeger, 1966, 275 p. $15.00.

Point IV in Iran: An Iranian Ambassador-at-Large and Chief of the Iranian Economic Mission in Washington explores and documents the uses and limitations of foreign technical assistance from the point of view of a developing country.

SOWJETRUSSISCHER KOLONIALISMUS UND IMPERIALISMUS IN TURKESTAN. By Baymirza Hayit. Oosterhout (Netherlands): Anthropological Publications, 1965, 117 p. Gldrs. 12.

Dr. Hayit, a Turkestani Muslim trained in Germany and author of several books and monographs on the history of Turkestan, enlarges on the theme that the U.S.S.R., anti-imperialist in Asia and Africa, none the less practices a rigorous imperialism of its own in Turkestan.

South and Southeast Asia

ASIA: A HANDBOOK. Edited by Guy Wint. New York: Praeger, 1966, 856 p. $25.00.

Under the editorship of the Senior Fellow of St. Antony's College at Oxford, more than 60 outstanding experts collaborate to provide statistical data on the individual countries of Asia, analyses of their economic, political and industrial development and other basic information. Selected treaties are appended, copious maps are interspersed and there is a comprehensive index. A valuable reference work.

RE-ORIENTATIONS: ESSAYS ON ASIA IN TRANSITION. By Hugh Tinker. New York: Praeger, 1965, 175 p. $5.50.

Transformation of Asian government and society and interaction between community and authority in times of internal and international tensions, are subjects here treated by an Asian specialist at London University's School of Oriental and African Studies.

STRUGGLE FOR THE HIMALAYAS: A STUDY IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS. By Shanti Prasad Varma. Jullundur: University Publishers, 1965, 342 p. Rs. 25.

An historian and political scientist studies India's international relations and foreign policies, especially as affected by the 1962 Chinese invasion and the reactions of military combat and foreign policy changes on the domestic political institutions and processes.

THE PROCESS OF PLANNING: A STUDY OF INDIA'S FIVE-YEAR PLANS, 1950–1964. By A. H. Hanson. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1966, 560 p. $16.80.

Professor Hanson, of the University of Leeds, first details the making and implementing of India's three Five-Year Plans and then scrutinizes them from the point of view of the student of politics and public administration.

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THREE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN GUJARAT: DEVELOPMENT OF A DECADE, 1952–1962. By Devavrat N. Pathak, M. G. Parekh and Kirtidev D. Desai. Ahmedabad: Gujarat University, 1966. 267 p. Rs. 10.

Three political scientists study election results in various Gujarat districts to seek evolving patterns not only of growth potentialities for rightist, centrist and leftist parties and their support but also of the socio-economic structure of the state.

PARTITION OF THE PUNJAB. By Satya M. Rai. New York: Asia Publishing House (for the Indian School of International Studies), 1965, 304 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $10.75).

A political scientist at Hindu College in Delhi covers the 1947–1956 period in her scholarly study of the problems arising from the Punjab's becoming overnight a border state. Emphasis is on the effects of the influx of refugees.

SOVIET STRATEGIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN EXPLORATION OF EASTERN POLICY UNDER LENIN AND STALIN. By Charles B. McLane. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 563 p. $12.50.

A Dartmouth College professor, whose sources include unpublished documents and interviews, identifies and interprets the origins of Russia's shift in attention to the emerging nations of the East. Short biographies of important personalities and chronologies are appended.

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN BURMA. By Donald Eugene Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 350 p. $7.50.

An Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania describes the interaction of Buddhism and politics from antiquity onward, with emphasis on post-independence; he shows "Burmese attempts to relate Buddhism to the ideologies of nationalism, democracy, and socialism."

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S SECOND FRONT. By Arnold C. Brackman. New York: Praeger, 1966, 341 p. $6.95.

Predicting that the Malay Archipelago will succeed Viet Nam as a battleground, Mr. Brackman, who has lived and traveled extensively in Southeast Asia, recently interviewed leaders of the Malay world to identify the political and strategic problems Moscow, Peking and the West will have to cope with.

A SHORT HISTORY OF MALAYSIA. By Harry Miller. New York: Praeger, 1966, 274 p. $6.00.

This work, by a journalist who lived in Singapore and Malaya from 1933 to 1959, is actually a history of the Federation of Malaya, including the events that led to the creation of Malaysia. Emphasis is on the period 1940–1965.

THAILAND: THE MODERNIZATION OF A BUREAUCRATIC POLITY. By Fred W. Riggs. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966, 470 p. $10.00.

This work surveys the processes of change in politics and administration from the mid-nineteenth century on in Thailand, a country free from foreign domination and thus able to develop its own form of bureaucracy.

VIETNAM: YESTERDAY AND TODAY. By Ellen Hammer. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966, 282 p. $3.95.

An admirable basic work analyzing the complex background of recent developments in Viet Nam, its political, economic and social institutions, and its place in the modern world.

VIET-NAM WITNESS: 1953–66. By Bernard B. Fall. New York: Praeger, 1966, 363 p. $6.95.

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A leading specialist selects from his earlier writings to validate his convictions that the present war was not unavoidable and that Paris, Saigon and Washington have repeatedly and mistakenly chosen the easiest ways out in making their policy decisions.

WAR WITHOUT GUNS: AMERICAN CIVILIANS IN RURAL VIETNAM. By George K. Tanham and Others. New York: Praeger, 1966, 141 p. $4.95.

Mr. Tanham was formerly Director of Provincial Operations for A.I.D.; his co-authors were American Provincial Representatives. The book tells of their experiences while involved in helping improve social, economic and governmental conditions throughout Viet Nam's 43 provinces.

FIVE JOURNEYS FROM JAKARTA: INSIDE SUKARNO'S INDONESIA. By Maslyn Williams. New York: Morrow, 1966, 383 p. $6.00.

An Australian journalist's account of observations made during trips in 1964 from Jakarta to Sulawesi (formerly Celebes), Bali, Sumatra and the hinterlands of Indonesia.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

A CONCISE HISTORY OF EAST ASIA. By C. P. FitzGerald. New York: Praeger, 1966, 306 p. $7.00 (Paper, $2.50).

A remarkably succinct survey of 4,000 years of the culture and politics of China, Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia by a leading Asian specialist, now at the Australian National University.

EAST ASIA: THE MODERN TRANSFORMATION. By John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig. Boston: Houghton, 1965, 955 p. $14.75.

An historical interpretation of East Asian civilization as it developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, written mostly by Professor Fairbank, with Professor Craig collaborating, following Dr. Reischauer's appointment in 1961 as Ambassador to Japan. Like its predecessor, "East Asia: The Modern Tradition," this volume evolved from lecture courses at Harvard dating back to 1937.

AMERICA AND CHINA: A NEW APPROACH TO ASIA. By Chang Hsin-hai. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966, 288 p. $5.95.

Dr. Chang, once a high-ranking Nationalist China diplomat and now an expatriate teaching in the United States, calls on the U.S. to surrender Formosa to Peking, speed Communist China's admission to the U.N., give up the Viet Nam struggle, and abandon Japan.

IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA. By Franz Schurmann. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966, 540 p. $12.50.

A professor of history and sociology and Chairman of the Center for Chinese Studies at Berkeley first discusses ideology and how and why the Chinese Communist organization functions so successfully, and then examines in detail the organization of the party and the government, industry, cities and villages. An important work, using Chinese and Japanese-language sources.

BEHIND THE GREAT WALL: AN APPRAISAL OF MAO'S CHINA. By Lorenz Stucki. New York: Praeger, 1965, 154 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A Swiss journalist's account of a two months' visit to Red China in 1964 as correspondent for the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. He notes progress in some respects, regression in others, and predicts that when and if China's war potential is strong it, like

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the Soviet Union, will have to establish a "peaceful coexistence" with the other great powers.

THE POLITICS OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY: A TRANSLATION OF THE BULLETIN OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY. Edited by J. Chester Cheng and Others. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966, 776 p. $35.00.

The *Kung-tso T'ung-hsün,* of which this work is a translation, were the secret military journals for the November 1960–August 1961 period, issued to expedite party instructions to high-ranking cadres in the field. They give candid accounts of conditions in the military rank-and-file as well as political, ideological, social and economic problems on Mainland China. A most important primary source.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, 1840–1937. By Chi-ming Hou. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 306 p. $8.95.

Professor Hou critically analyzes and challenges the commonly held theory that foreign economic intrusion impeded China's economy and oppressed Chinese-owned enterprises.

CHINA'S WARTIME FINANCE AND INFLATION, 1937–1945. By Arthur N. Young. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 421 p. $10.00.

Mr. Young, financial adviser to China from 1929 to 1947, relies mainly on contemporary materials he collected at his post, many of which were destroyed during the war. He also uses the Morgenthau diaries and unpublished State Department records to describe, analyze and appraise the main fiscal and monetary developments during China's wartime years.

CHINESE INTELLECTUALS AND THE WEST, 1872–1949. By Y. C. Wang. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966, 557 p. $10.00.

A Peking-born historian details the beginning and development of the Chinese movement to study abroad, what the students accomplished upon their return home and the impact they later made on Chinese society and government. Roughly 100,000 students were involved during this period.

HIROHITO: EMPEROR OF JAPAN. By Leonard Mosley. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966, 371 p. $7.95.

A British journalist and columnist for the London *Daily Express* talked with close associates of the Imperial Family and others and delved into documents and manuscripts held by the U.S. National Archives to produce this highly readable biography of the man whose story necessarily reveals much about the history of the Japanese people over a period of 60 years.

PROTEST IN TOKYO: THE SECURITY TREATY CRISIS OF 1960. By George R. Packard III. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 423 p. $9.00.

A former Special Assistant to Ambassador Reischauer examines with painstaking detail the massive Tokyo riots of May and June 1960, held in protest against the revised Security Treaty with the U.S. Although Communist activity was involved, he finds no single, simple explanation of the disturbances.

ECONOMIC ENQUIRY IN AUSTRALIA. By Craufurd D. W. Goodwin. Durham: Duke University Press (for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1966, 659 p. $12.50.

A history of the importation and adaptation of economic theories and analytical techniques by Australia from the early settlement days to the 1929 Depression.

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AMERICA'S PARADISE LOST. By Willard Price. New York: Day, 1966, 240 p. $5.95.

A first-hand report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands which, the author contends, has been shamefully neglected these last 30 years through low U.S. appropriations and inadequate, though devoted, staff.

Africa

COMMUNISM IN AFRICA. By Fritz Schatten. New York: Praeger, 1966, 352 p. $7.95.

An interesting account of the various dimensions of Communist foreign policy in Africa. The author, a West German journalist, traces the historical and theoretical background of Sino-Soviet policy differences and stresses the obstacles facing Communist activity inherent in the nature of African nationalism.

NATIONAL UNITY AND REGIONALISM IN EIGHT AFRICAN STATES. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966, 565 p. $10.00.

Using a common topical outline, the contributors to this volume provide a broad survey of the historical, economic and political forces underlying the tension between national unity and regionalism in Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, Ethiopia, Congo (Brazzaville), Chad, Gabon and the Central African Republic.

BRITAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA. By Dennis Austin. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1966, 191 p. $5.60.

A British political scientist evaluates proposed alternatives for British policy toward South Africa on the basis of a dispassionate and highly competent appraisal of the precise nature of Britain's economic, political and strategic interests in southern Africa.

AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS. By Ioan Davies. Baltimore: Penguin, 1966, 255 p. $1.25 (Paper).

A useful, comprehensive survey providing a scholarly examination of the economic and social forces influencing the trade-union movement, the impact of different colonial policies, the political role of trade unions both before and after independence and the politics of international trade unionism in Africa.

STATE AND SOCIETY IN INDEPENDENT NORTH AFRICA. Edited by Leon Carl Brown. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1966, 332 p. $7.50.

Fourteen essays, some of them brilliant, growing out of a Middle East Institute Conference.

FALSE START IN AFRICA. By René Dumont. New York: Praeger, 1966, 320 p. $7.00.

Examining the dilemmas of economic and social development in French-speaking Africa, Professor Dumont combines the expertise of a professional agronomist with a penetrating and critical grasp of the dynamics of social and political change. The cogency of his analysis has been underscored by developments since the work was originally published in French four years ago.

FOUNDATIONS OF AN AFRICAN ECONOMY: A STUDY OF INVESTMENT AND GROWTH IN NIGERIA. By Ojetunji Aboyade. New York: Praeger, 1966, 366 p. $15.00.

In this highly informed study of the development of the Nigerian economy since

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World War I, the Senior Lecturer in Economics of the University of Ibadan discusses major theoretical and methodological problems involved in the measurement of development. His critical appraisal concludes with several proposals for a reorientation of economic planning in Nigeria.

DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE UAR (EGYPT). By Bent Hansen and Girgis A. Marzouk. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1965, 333 p. (New York: Humanities Press, 1966, $11.00).

A major study of economic development and economic policies in Egypt since 1945 including an analysis of the present mixed government-private system and an appraisal of the first five-year plan, written by and for economists.

AHMED BEN BELLA. By Robert Merle. Paris: Gallimard, 1965, 184 p. Fr. 9.

A first-person appreciation of the Algerian leader based on interviews, two years in Algeria, and *parti pris*.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN LIBERIA. By Russell U. McLaughlin. New York: Praeger, 1966, 217 p. $15.00.

In this informative study of the structure of the Liberian economy, the author explores the relationship between foreign public and private investment and domestic economic growth.

J'ACCUSE LA CHINE. By Fulbert Youlou. Paris: Éditions de la Table Ronde, 1966, 253 p. Fr. 14.

The former president of Congo (Brazzaville) "exposes" the grand conspiracy launched by the Chinese Communists and their African accomplices throughout the continent, and above all in his own country.

TANZANIA: YOUNG NATION IN A HURRY. By Alexander MacDonald. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1966, 253 p. $5.95.

A sympathetic journalist presents a well-informed and highly readable survey of the major features of contemporary politics and society in Tanzania.

LES ANGOLAIS. By Robert Davezies. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1965, 259 p. Fr. 15.40.

Abbé Robert Davezies, a partisan of the anti-colonialist struggle in Angola, seeks to present the people of Angola by means of personal portraits of individual peasants, students, teachers and political leaders.

FEDERATION IN EAST AFRICA: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS. Edited by Colin Leys and Peter Robson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, 244 p. $3.95 (Paper).

A collection of papers originally prepared for a conference on public policy in East Africa at the University College, Nairobi, in 1963.

A HISTORY OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA. By L. H. Gann. London: Chatto and Windus, 1965, 354 p. (New York: Humanities Press, $10.00).

Complementing the author's "History of Northern Rhodesia," published in 1964, this important and well-documented volume traces "the history of Southern Rhodesia from prehistoric times to 1934 when Dr. Godfrey Huggins (now Lord Malvern) became Prime Minister."

THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1888–1965. By Claire Palley. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, 872 p. $23.55.

A thorough-going scholarly analysis of the constitutional and legal development

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of Southern Rhodesia in which the author seeks to illuminate the legal techniques of British imperial control and demonstrate the actual extent of internal self-government enjoyed by Southern Rhodesia for over 40 years.

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN TRANSITION. Edited by John A. Davis and James K. Baker. New York: Praeger (for the American Society of African Culture), 1966, 427 p. $8.50 (Paper, $2.95).

A collection of edited papers, first presented in 1963 at the Fourth International Conference of the American Society of African Culture. Topics include: the nature of nationalist movements, violent and non-violent tactics, the role of expatriate economic interests, the significance of Pan-Africanism, U.S. policy toward southern Africa, and the problems of racial adjustment after independence.

THE ZANDE SCHEME: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL CASE STUDY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA. By Conrad C. Reining. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, 255 p. $7.50.

An anthropologist provides a first-hand account of the dilemmas of economic and social change encountered by the Zande Scheme in southern Sudan, a development program initiated in 1945 and designed to promote greater self-sufficiency in manufactured products among remote rural populations.

SELECTIONS FROM THE SMUTS PAPERS. Edited by W. K. Hancock and Jean Van der Poel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966, 4 v. $47.50.

Covering the same period as the first volume of Sir Keith Hancock's authoritative biography, "Smuts—The Sanguine Years, 1870–1919," these four volumes of selected papers and letters, provided with useful index, annotations and biographical notes, are divided as follows: June 1886–May 1902 (Volume I), June 1902–May 1910 (Volume II), June 1910–November 1918 (Volume III) and November 1918–August 1919 (Volume IV).

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By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York, 10022. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York, 10027. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington, D.C. 20036. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 89th Congress, 2nd Sess. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

African agricultural development; reflections on the major lines of advance and the barriers to progress. N.Y., 1966. 243 p. (66.II.K.6.) $3.50.

Industrial estates in Africa. N.Y., 1965. 52 p. (66.II.B.2.) 75¢.

Ghana: projected level of demand, supply and imports of agricultural products in 1965, 1970 and 1975. Washington, Dept. of Agriculture, 1964. 120 p.

The Economic development of Morocco; report of a mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of Morocco. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press (for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 1966. 356 p. $8.50.

Tansania: Der 5-Jahresplan für Tanganjika, ed. by Markus Timmler. Köln, Bundesstelle für Aussenhandelsinformation, 1965. 40 p. (Wirtschaftlicher Aufbau in Afrika.)

Atlantic Community

The Atlantic Alliance. Hearings, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, Apr. 27–Je. 21, 1966. Washington, 1966. 6 pts.

Atlantic union resolutions. Hearings, International Organization Affairs Subcommittee, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. Con. Res. 64 and S. Res. 128, Mar. 23–24, 1966. Washington, 1966. 210 p.

The Crisis in NATO. Hearings, Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Mar. 17–Je. 13, 1966. Washington, 1966. 366 p.

U.S. views and statements on NATO. Ottawa, U.S. Information Service, 1966. 58 p.

Atomic Power

Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Hearings, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, on S. Res. 179, Feb. 23, Mar. 1–7, 1966. Washington, 1966. 178 p.

——. Report, Apr. 28, 1966. Washington, 1966. 3 p. (S. Rept. 1141.)

Authorizing appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission for fiscal year 1967. Report, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to accompany H.R. 14732, May 3, 1966. Washington, 1966. 50 p. (H. Rept. 1471.)

——. Report, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to accompany S. 3293, May 3, 1966. Washington, 1966. 50 p. (S. Rept. 1142.)

Commercial Policy and Trade

Asian Development Bank and trade liberalization. N.Y., 1965. 137 p. (Regional Economic Co-operation Series, 2;65.II.F.15.) $2.00.

Inventaire des impots perçus dans les états membres de la Communauté Economique Européenne au profit de l'Etat et des collectivités locales . . . avec tableaux des recettes pour les années 1961 et 1962. Brussels, Communauté Economique Européenne, 1965. v. p. $1.70.

The Economic relationships between grains and rice. Rome, FAO, 1965. 125 p. (Commodity Bulletin Series, 39.) $3.00.

Trading with the enemy act. Report, Subcommittee to Examine and Review the Administration of the Trading with the Enemy Act and the War Claims Act of 1948, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 51, Mar. 4, 1966. Washington, 1966. 5 p. (S. Rept. 1051.)

Interim trade agreement between the United States and Canada. Message, President of the United States, Mar. 15, 1966. Washington, 1966. 32 p. (H. Doc. 411.)

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Eastern Europe

The Warsaw Pact; its role in Soviet bloc affairs. Study, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 181, May 11, 1966. Washington, 1966. 49 p. (Com. Print.)

Economic integration and industrial specialization among the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. N.Y., 1966. 34 p. (66.II.B.4.) 50¢.

Dokumente zur Aussenpolitik der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1965.

Bd. 11. Vom 1. Januar bis zum 31. Dezember 1963. 709 p.

Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. Tom odinnadtsatyi: 1 ianvaria-31 dekabria 1928 g. Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury (for the Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR), 1966. 798 p. Rubles 1.50.

Instructor training centres: Yugoslavia. [Report prepared for the Government of Yugoslavia by the International Labour Organisation acting . . . for the United Nations Special Fund]. Geneva, U.N. Special Fund; International Labour Organisation, 1965. 82 p.

Far East and Asia

United States policy toward Asia. Hearings, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Feb. 15–Mar. 10, 1966. Washington, 1966. Pt. II.

——. Report, pursuant to H. Res. 84, May 19, 1966. Washington, 1966. 12 p. (Subcom. Print.)

The Role and application of electric power in the industrialization of Asia and the Far East. N.Y., 1965. 98 p. (66.II.F.4.) $1.50.

Industrial development in Asia and the Far East. N.Y., 1965. 97 p. (Industrial Development News, 1;65.II.F.16.) $1.50.

U.S. Policy with respect to mainland China. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Mar. 8–30, 1966. Washington, 1966. 657 p.

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